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This thesis situates the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) and the attempts to 
provide him with a third term in the republican political culture of Reconstruction. Exploring 
the period through the lens of the press, pamphlets, and archival material, it shows how 
republican ideas – especially hostility to partisan politics and fear of concentrated power – in 
the era had the capacity to both augment and detract from the president’s ability to secure the 
post-war settlement. Early interpretations of Grant’s presidency, written by scholars often 
hostile to Reconstruction, accused him of overzealous support for African-American civil 
rights. In contrast, revisionists blamed Reconstruction’s failure in part on Grant’s weak 
administration. However, when viewed through the prism of the republican political culture 
of the era, it is possible to see how Grant’s presidency could be simultaneously strong and 
weak. Republicanism enabled the portrayal of Grant as both a model republican and a tyrant-
in-waiting. This thesis argues that the very qualities which made him a strong president – his 
antipartisanship, self-sacrifice, and honour – gave Grant the independence and support which 
many feared would be the undoing of the republic. 
Republicanism had the power to define the parameters of the possible during Reconstruction. 
With the federal government in tumult and the boundaries of presidential power undefined, 
Americans’ fears over the safety of their liberties helped shape what could be achieved during 
Reconstruction. When Grant and his backers were able to portray the General as a model 
republican they helped to increase his political capital. But by painting Grant as a tyrant, 
political figures – beginning with his opponents and ending with his supporters – undermined 
his political capital to protect the fragile gains of Reconstruction. This thesis, by exploring 
several moments before, during, and after Grant’s presidency in which the question of 
presidential power came to the fore argues that a political culture shaped by republicanism 
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When Andrew L. Slap published his book, The Doom of Reconstruction, many a sceptical 
eye was cast over his claim that the political beliefs – rather than the racial prejudices – of the 
Liberal Republicans doomed Reconstruction.
1
 But Slap had a valid point. The dominant 
republican political culture of the nineteenth century, though beginning to splinter into what 
scholars have called pluralist liberalism, defined the parameters of the possible during 
Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency of 1869 to 1877.
2
 Republican ideas, such as hostility to 
partisan politics and fears over the centralisation of power, could both augment and detract 
from the President’s political capital and thus his ability to enforce the gains of 
Reconstruction. The portrayal of Grant as a model republican – the antipartisan, self-
sacrificing, and duty-bound civil officer – helped provide the President with enough political 
capital to enforce radical and unprecedented policies to support universal male suffrage. 
However, when his detractors succeeded in portraying both his character and these actions as 
those of an unrestrained, dishonourable, unrelenting tyrant, they had the ability to undermine 
the reach of federal power into state politics. Grant’s willingness to put the Reconstruction 
settlement above his own political ends – to value antipartisanship, self-sacrifice, and honour 
above personal considerations – conversely gave rise to both his depiction as a model 
republican and tyrant-in-waiting. Given longstanding fears of centralised power, corruption, 
and the demise of the republic – no mere theoretical position considering the recent Civil War 
– his portrayal as the latter had the power to undermine efforts to entrench the Reconstruction 
settlement for future generations. 
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Over the last decade historians have increasingly noted that fears of centralised power, 
corruption, and the stability of the republic, seemed to dominate the Reconstruction era.
3
 The 
Civil War, in particular, invoked old fears of the possible demise of the republic, and 
furnished republicans with substantial evidence that corruption had pulled their country apart, 
which led to – admittedly partisan – calls for the infusion of purer principles in politics.
4
 But 
despite the revival of antipartisanship in Civil War politics, which sought to unite the country 
behind a single purpose (or rather, a single indivisible common good), anxieties over the 
safety of their republican experiment remained ever present during the war.
5
 Though 
historians have been reluctant to extend these anxieties into the Reconstruction era, especially 
beyond the turbulent administration of Andrew Johnson, they have begun to acknowledge 
that many Americans still feared that the end of the republic was nigh.
6
 This fear of 
centralised power, rooted in republican antecedents, would undermine the federal 
government’s ability to protect African-American suffrage. The following chapters argue that 
both the ideas of antipartisanship and a single public good, and the fears of centralised power 
and corruption, collected under the umbrella term of republicanism, would work to create 
uncertainty around the intentions of President Ulysses S. Grant and undermine his ability to 
protect the gains of Reconstruction. 
Fears of centralised power had been around since the beginning of the republic, and indeed 
were a motivating factor in the American Revolution, yet their role in Reconstruction has 
been underexplored. Educated citizens were well versed in the examples of the Greek and 
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Roman republics, which, they believed, fell due to a lack of vigilance in guarding their 
liberties.
7
 As a result many Americans held onto their revolutionary republican ideology even 
as their country underwent dramatic changes.
8
 This ideology conditioned Americans to be 
suspicious of self-seeking politicians and to be ever-vigilant of challenges to their liberties 
which could endanger the republic. It emphasised the existence of a single public good, and 
the necessity of self-sacrifice in politics in order to privilege the nation above personal 
concerns. Plenty of Americans, of course, recognised – as James Madison had noted in the 
Federalist papers – that self-interest would shape politics, but even after the establishment of 
mass based party politics in the 1830s, parties continued to rally followers around the pursuit 
of a single common good.
9
 Republicanism encouraged Americans to ‘see politics as a 




Yet historians have been slow to appreciate how in the nineteenth-century corruption had 
multiple meanings – among them an anxiety over centralised power – and had a more 
encompassing definition than in later centuries.
11
 Harry L. Watson has explained how it 
included ‘social, economic, and moral changes that could undermine the basis of republican 
society.’
12
 In many respects, Americans’ interpretation of corruption was a warning against 
the rise of a modern society, which many believed would transform their country into a ‘state 
of decay’.
13
 In this sense Reconstruction, with its extension of the federal government, the 
retention of a standing army, the enlargement of the federal debt, the intrusion of the federal 
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military into state affairs, and the extension of the suffrage could be, and by many Americans 
was, deemed corruption.
14
 These fears of centralised power, the demise of the republic, and 
corruption were part of the republican heritage of the United States which still played a 
pivotal role in United States politics, and, I will argue, helped to undermine Reconstruction. 
Republicanism’s roots stretched back to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical 
and oppositional thought and migrated to American shores in the colonial era.
15
 The 
discourse, which the colonials were well-versed in, evolved into a Revolutionary creed which 
transfused into practical politics.
16
 American republicanism transformed from ideas cultivated 
in Renaissance Europe and from the English Commonwealthmen into a much more diverse 
ideology which promised, as a kind of guide to political behaviour, to safeguard the republic 
against unrepublican impulses.
17
  Republicanism, as a fluid ideology, continued to inform 
politics as the dominant political culture at least until the 1830s when previously most 
historians would argue that the rise of the Second Party System resulted in the demise of the 
idea of a common good, self-sacrifice, and antipartisanship in politics, which were all crucial 
components of the concept.
18
 However, historians have increasingly acknowledged that the 
United States ‘retained its republican conscience – long after it had become, at least in the 
North, the most liberal, individualistic, and capitalistic society in the world.’
19
 Furthermore, 
both the Democratic and Whig parties claimed the republican heritage of the nation for 
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themselves and attested that their party mandates represented a singular public good.
20
 
However, it was the Whig Party with its reluctance to engage in party politics and demand 
loyalty from its voters which has been identified more closely with this heritage.
21
 Though 
many historians argue that the importance of republicanism diminished in the 1830s, it is 
evident that in many ways, it continued to exert influence on the worldviews of many 
Americans. 
The most significant example of this was the way in which Americans interpreted the basis 
upon which their republic operated. Crucially, when the republic was created it was not 
motivated by egalitarian principles, in the modern sense, but by notions of representation and 
the universal (and singular) interest of the whole nation.
22
 This led to the creation of a 
republic – a government ruled by laws subject to some democratic and institutional checks – 
but it did not create a democracy, which was seen as unrestrained majority rule.
23
 The latter, 
of which, many Americans still struggled to accept as late as 1873, as Chapter Three 
illustrates in its analysis of the Caesarism scare: a brief episode which played to fears that 
electoral popularity could lead to tyranny. Anxieties over the likes of presidential third terms 
highlighted that many citizens, even after the Civil War, privileged the republic over 
democracy; though compatible, the two concepts are not one and the same. Though the idea 
of democracy was commonplace by the 1840s, it did not supersede the idea of the republic 
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until the twentieth century.
24
 Republicanism was for many Americans in the nineteenth 
century what democracy became in the twentieth century. 
Republicanism was an ideology which provided ideas for how to organise a people-led 
government but also infused itself into culture thus providing widely held beliefs, values, and 
norms which shaped the nature of governance. By privileging the ideals of representation, 
federalism, and a singular public good, Americans created a government which protected 
liberties, guarded against tyranny, opposed corruption, but was not necessarily democratic. 
This allowed, initially at least, for suffrage to be limited to propertied classes but even after 
its broader expansion in the 1820s and the 1830s to nearly all white men, instances still 
occurred where democratic governance was restricted in order to govern in the interest of the 
public good.
25
 One of the most salient examples of this practise occurred in San Francisco 
where Vigilance Committees were assembled twice in the 1850s to rule in place of the city’s 
elected government. This belief, however questionable, in an indivisible public good could 
result in the pursuit of undemocratic actions while many Americans simultaneously believed 
republican government was being adhered to. 
However, the outbreak of the Civil War saw a significant change in this ideology; while 
many Americans continued to privilege republican government above democratic 
government – evident in the continuing power of republican ideas such as fears of centralised 
power – the emancipation of the slaves and the rise of African-American civil rights led to a 
splintering in the republican ideology as many Americans increasingly saw themselves as 
interest groups with valid demands.
26
 Yet the most significant thing about this change was 
that, as republicanism was still the dominant ideology, these interest groups had to posit their 
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interests within a discourse of republicanism in order to challenge it.
27
 This meant that even 
as Americans began to accept that multiple public goods existed, there was still an overriding 
claim to the moral high ground of a universal public good, which these groups had to interact 
with to promote their interests. 
This meant that republican fears were still widespread during the Reconstruction era as 
Americans continued to see politics in terms of a battle between the good of the nation and 
the destruction of the republic. In turn, this interpretation of power meant that the intrusion of 
federal power in state affairs – including the apparent centralisation of power in an individual 
– continued to determine how many Americans viewed Grant’s efforts to entrench the gains 
of Reconstruction for future generations of African Americans. This thesis explores how 
republicanism shaped the reach of executive power during the Grant presidency of 1869-
1877, and influenced attempts to give him a third term in 1880. Through the use of 
newspaper articles, campaign literature, and personal papers I aim to illustrate that 
republicanism was not simply a language of legitimacy which provided a cover for the day to 
day transaction of interest group politics. Rather it was an ideology which transfused into 
political culture a set of widely shared beliefs, values, and norms which governed the nature 
of governance in this era.  
Fears of centralised power, a strong independent executive, a large national debt, a standing 
federal army authorised to intervene in state institutions all worked to arouse the suspicions 
of many ever-vigilant Americans over the intentions of Grant in power. These fears inhibited 
his ability to work towards the equality of all men in the late nineteenth century. Increasingly 
Americans began to fear that Grant’s actions were endangering the very nature of the republic 
through the President’s willingness to take unprecedented actions to protect the 
Reconstruction settlement. I argue that the very qualities which made him a model republican 
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– his belief in antipartisanship, the public good, and self-sacrifice in politics – and led him to 
protect Reconstruction at great political cost to himself and the Republican Party also gave 
rise to an image of Grant as a tyrant who unnecessarily interfered in local politics and 
destabilised the republic.  
Republicanism as Political Culture 
This thesis revolves around the contention that republicanism, as an ideology, not only 
influenced the type of government created in the United States but also infused political 
culture with certain values, beliefs and norms through which Americans interpreted and 
understood the actions of their governing officials. Pivotal to a study of this kind is therefore 
an exploration of the relationship between ideology and political culture, which has been 
explored by many scholars. One of the most influential scholars to address this issue is 
Clifford Geertz, whose essay ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’ influenced a generation of 
historians and led to renewed interest in the ability of political culture to throw new insights 
on the nature of politics in the United States and elsewhere.
28
 
Geertz helped historians solve the problems facing them when examining ideology and 
culture. He successfully ‘fused ideas, interests, and behavior by treating ideology as a socially 
constructed ‘cultural system.’’
29
 Essentially, his thesis revolved around the theory that 
‘ideology itself is a part of reality’; in this sense ideology became ‘a layer of culture that 
fuses sentiments into significant belief systems.’
30
 By doing so, Geertz helped illuminate how 
‘[i]deology ... affected how people perceived and acted on their material interests ... and 
shaped political ideas with unspoken assumptions that guided behavior.'
31
 He showed that 
‘ideology was the overall context of ‘events, behaviors, institutions, or processes,’ rather than 
                                                 
28
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the cause ... or the effect ... of social phenomena—including politics.’
32
 Geertz claimed that 
‘[t]he link between the causes of ideology and its efforts seems adventitious because the 
connecting element—the autonomous process of symbolic formation—is passed over in 
virtual silence.’
33
 As Gendzel sufficiently summarised, ‘[t]he cultural context of politics 
encompassed perception of interest, intention for behavior, and assumption behind idea. It 




By focusing on cultural semiotics, which Geertz defined as ‘the interworked systems of 
construable signs’, and the physical practise of politics, historians were able to bring a new 
level of analysis to political history by focusing on political culture.
35
 His statement that 
‘[c]ulture is public because meaning is’ helped bring creditability to numerous untapped 
sources, such as newspapers, campaign literature, and campaign memorabilia.
36
 Geertz 
highlighted that language – even something as hackneyed as partisan language – had meaning 
as it indicated the rules by which politicians had to play, and therefore what was meaningful 
to the society’s citizens, regardless of whether the politician used it with sincerity.
37
 As Ward 
Goodenough has stated, ‘society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or 
believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members.’
38
 Political rhetoric took on 
new significance with Geertz’s interpretation as it became a lens which historians could use 
to understand how politicians and citizens conceived and interacted with politics. Political 
language and symbols now shed new light on the meaning of government. 
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Historians embraced Geertz’s interpretation of culture enthusiastically as they sought to bring 
new insights to previously dismissed areas of politics, such as partisan language. They 
defined political culture as ‘the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values 
which defines the situation in which political action takes place’ which includes ‘the life 
histories of the individuals who make up the system ... [and] the public events and private 
experiences that become ‘the collective expression of a political system.’’
39
 This approach 
utilised ‘patterns of language, behavior, and thought drawn from large bodies of evidence’ in 
order to gain awareness of how citizens understood and interacted with the process of 
politics.
40
 As many historians of the United States have illustrated, a study of political culture 
provides the opportunity to understand how Americans in general viewed their government in 
any one period. Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, in particular, used Geertz’s 
approach to show how Republicans in the Civil War era interpreted and interacted with 
politics thus shedding new light on the coming of the Civil War.
41
 Even though Geertz’s 
theory is a half century old, it continues to inform historians’ methods for interpreting 
politics. As the historian Lynn Hunt had attested ‘governing cannot take place without the 
stories, signs, and symbols that convey and reaffirm the legitimacy of governing in thousands 
of unspoken ways.’
42
 These emblems of political culture helped Americans to interact with 
and understand their politics. By exploring political culture – analysing language, symbols, 
and stories – American History scholars detected the continuation of the ideals of 
republicanism long after the Revolution, thus helping historians to see eras, such as the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, as disputes which went deeper than simply a power struggle, but 
rather a struggle for the continuation of the existence of the republic. 
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The Rise of Republicanism in Historiography 
The historiographical battle to establish republicanism as a vital component of American 
political culture in the nineteenth century has been hard fought. Originally developed by early 
American historians researching Colonial and Revolutionary America, it gained prominence 
through works by Bernard Bailyn, J. G. A. Pocock, Caroline Robbins, and H. Trevor 
Colbourn.
43
 Bailyn, the most influential scholar, explored republicanism’s development from 
English reformist thought to American republicanism succinctly documenting its roots and 
evolution within American society into a Revolutionary creed.
44
 Moreover, he analysed the 
transfusion of the theory of republicanism into practical politics.
45
 Bailyn recognised that the 
fears that Englishmen has expressed in Britain were given greater gravity in America.
46
 These 
fears informed their interpretation of British actions and ideas about government which were 
eventually transferred into practice.
47
 However, republicanism did not only affect the form of 
government established but ideas about power and the role of the electorate in guarding it.
48
 
Republicanism became infused into all levels of government and politics.
49
 
However, it was Gordon S. Wood who ultimately identified and illustrated the importance of 
the concept for understanding the birth of the young republic. Wood contended that ‘the 
historiographical problems involved in interpreting the Revolution and the formation of the 
                                                 
43
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Constitution stemmed from a failure to appreciate the distinctiveness of the political culture 
in which the Revolutionary generation operated.’
50
 Republicanism here was both an idiom of 
politics and a way of seeing the world, rather than simply a form of government, as earlier 
scholars had conventionally cast it.
51
  
Increasingly historians of the Early Republic begun to understand republicanism as 
encompassing a diverse range of connected ideas. For Wood ‘[t]he sacrifice of individual 
interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism’.
52
 It 
demanded politicians with sufficient reserves of civic virtue to legislate for the good of the 
republic. Good republican citizens valued selfless duty, personal honour, and hostility to 
faction and party. By privileging self-sacrifice, republicanism ran counter to America’s 
supposed ‘liberal tradition’ of individualism, which helps explain its appeal to a generation of 
New Left historians searching for alternatives to unbridled capitalist competition.
53
 But 
republicanism was above all about power. In the republican mentality, liberty needed careful 
guardianship lest corrupt men transformed the nation into despotism. It epitomised the ideal 
that unless republican citizens fiercely guarded their liberties they would lose them: a fate 
that had befallen history’s previous republics. 
It was this ideology of republicanism which not only provided theories for the structure of 
government in the United States but also ways for Americans to interact with the process of 
governance. In this way, republicanism became a cultural system which dominated both the 
system of government and the culture of governance. It imbued Americans with ideas about 
how to safeguard their new republic. Republicanism asked citizens to watch vigilantly for 
threats to their liberty; to be wary of attempts to centralise power; to protest against the 
                                                 
50
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creation of a standing army and a large national debt; to fear factions and parties; to sacrifice 
their personal interests to the public good of the whole nation; and honourable conduct and 
selfless duty in power to sustain the republic. These values and beliefs infused the new 
political culture of the country in order to protect the nascent republic. Republicanism 
became the dominant political culture of the nineteenth century.
54
 
However, though republicanism provided a fixed set of values that Americans followed to 
protect the republic, this does not mean that all Americans interpreted these values in the 
same way. Although Americans believed in the existence of a single public good for the 
nation, like any country, they did not all agree what form this public good should take. This 
was most saliently illustrated by the vehement nature of American elections in the nineteenth 
century which saw each party argue that their opponent’s vision would foreclose the death of 
the republic.
55
 Republicanism did not preclude competing visions of the public good, but 
rather the idea that only one could exist and be implemented. 
Wood’s work, Robert E. Shalhope argued, helped historians acknowledge the gravity which 
language possessed in forming the political thoughts of early Americans and he suggested 
looking beyond the eighteenth century to trace the genealogy of republican thought.
56
 
Shalhope would not be disappointed: over the following years, historians found 
republicanism all over the first half of the nineteenth century, tracing its influence on 
journeymen resisting industrialisation, yeoman farmers fighting market encroachment, 
slaveholders battling abolitionists, and even abolitionists fighting slaveholder tyranny.
57
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Watson’s study of republicanism in the Age of Jackson and Smith’s study of corruption and 
political culture in the Civil War indicate how far the concept has travelled.
58
 
But the alacrity with which historians answered Shalhope’s call to extend the study of 
republicanism beyond the Revolutionary era has often been met with scepticism. In 1985 the 
American Quarterly hosted a roundtable discussion on the concept in which many historians 
expressed doubts over the extent of republicanism’s importance in nineteenth-century 
political culture. Jean H. Baker argued that by the 1830s, with the rise of mass political 
parties, republicanism had ceded in importance as external threats diminished.
59
 She claimed 
individualism, majoritarian government and the liberty to pursue ‘personal interests’ – often 
through party organisation – had made the concept anachronistic.
60
 Her claims were 
supported by Joyce Appleby who had argued in a long-running debate with J. G. A. Pocock 
that republicanism was incompatible with capitalism.
61
 Individualism and republicanism 
could not co-exist, she argued, as private and public interests could not coincide.
62
 Appleby 
contended that if the United States had made the transition to capitalism by 1800, the country 
could not have been republican as well.
63
 A few years later, Daniel T. Rodgers tried to lay the 
republican ‘paradigm’ to rest by arguing that its popularity owed as much to the professional 
dynamics of academic history as it did to the historical record.
64
 But despite his assertion that 
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historians had stretched the concept too far and applied it to areas where it seemed to have 
little relevance – critiques which many scholars took onboard  – it has experienced a 
resurgence in the last decade. 
Republicanism’s Endurance into the 1850s 
While many historians agreed with Rodgers that republicanism had been overused, they also 
argued that its use in political culture had great merit. In particular, Philip J. Ethington has 
shown with precision the ways in which republicanism integrated itself into both an ideology 
and a culture which intersected politics through beliefs in a singular public good and the 
necessity of antipartisanship in politics. Despite the rise of interest groups, and the increasing 
popularity of the notion of pluralist liberalism or rather multiple public goods, republicanism 
persisted as a guide to political action, which can be seen in many anti-democratic actions 
which posited themselves as the pursuit of a united public good.  
The demise of the Second Party System into multiple political groups during the 1850s gave 
credence to arguments that partisan interests overtook the republican outlook, but these 
groups often used both the language and the ideology of republicanism to pursue their 
political aims. The sincerity of their stances matters less than the necessity of using 
republicanism to gain political ground in this era as it highlights that the republican political 
culture was still dominant in this period. In particular, the notion of limiting suffrage to 
implement a united public good showed that many Americans valued their republican system 
of government, which urged vigilance in protecting liberty, over democratic government or 
rather the unrestrained will of the majority. The ability of Americans to suggest that a 
restrictive suffrage was compatible with republicanism originated in the property 
qualifications for suffrage at the republic’s creation.
65
 The emphasis, when it came to 
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As a result, the government employed numerous means to restrict the influence of the 
common masses on the governing process, but perhaps the most outright embodiment of this 
notion was how state legislative caucuses chose the presidential electors who decided which 
candidate would be awarded each state’s Electoral College votes, as well as the state’s 
senators.
67
 This situation existed in a majority of the states in 1800; only two left the choice 
to the popular vote.
68
 However, by 1824 all but six referred to the popular vote, and by 1836 
only South Carolina still lagged behind.
69
 Universal white male suffrage had been established 
in all but three states by 1824.
70
 The procedure for nominating presidential candidates also 
became more democratic after the 1824 election.
71
 Although the caucus for presidential 
electors was gradually superseded by popular elections in the 1820s and 1830s, United 
States’ senators continued to be chosen by the state legislature until the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.
72
 A change to this rule was first proposed in 1826 but 
significant opposition meant support was not forthcoming until problems with this procedure 
were encountered in the 1890s.
73
 The longevity of this limitation suggests that concerns 
remained over the ability of all men to choose their representatives wisely. While the suffrage 
was increasingly expanded, safeguards on the electoral process remained. For the established 
elite, a virtuous citizenry was the cornerstone of the republic, not democracy. 
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The sanctity of republicanism – and the public good – over democracy can be seen in 
numerous incidents, but two of the most significant were the rise of the anti-immigrant 
Know-Nothing Party and the Vigilance Committees of San Francisco. Formed in 1849, the 
Know-Nothing Party flourished in the early to mid-1850s through ‘hostility to the old parties’ 
and ‘Catholic immigration’, especially Irish, both of which they saw as denigrating the purity 
of American politics.
74
 Anxieties over the partisanship, and selfishness, of parties combined 
with the supposed ignorance of immigrants and their ‘idolatrous allegiance to a ‘foreign 
potentate’ cast grave doubts on [their] patriotism’.
75
 The party believed both the Germans and 
Irish Catholics ‘voted [for] the welfare of their group, often at the direction of machine 
politicians and priests.’
76
 They also contended they were ‘deficient in self-restraint’ which 
had led to a rise in both crime and intoxication in the areas they populated.
77
 As such Catholic 
immigrants became the embodiment of naturalised Americans’ fears over the direction of 
politics in the 1850s. These fears and insecurities over the future of the republic – 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the controversies caused by slavery – allowed the Know-
Nothings to make substantial electoral gains in the mid-1850s.
78
 Though the party ceased to 
exist after its poor showing in the 1856 presidential election, its popularity illustrated the 
ability of political movements which organised around republican themes – in this stance 
antipartisanship and the common good – to do very well locally despite their anti-democratic 
sentiments.
79
 The party’s popularity suggests that many citizens had serious doubts over the 
republican qualifications of some Americans to vote.  
Similarly, the Vigilance Committees of San Francisco highlighted these fears of unrepublican 
values compromising the national good of the republic. These political committees, arising in 
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both 1851 and 1856, sought to resolve the moral degeneracy of politics which many felt had 
been corrupted by an unrepublican city government. Though short-lived – both lasted around 
three months – they shared common origins and both intended to correct a lack of republican 
virtue in politics. Its members saw themselves as ‘republican statesman faced with an ancient 
challenge to liberty’ which must be corrected lest the republic dissolved under the sway of 
corruption.
80
 The Committees illustrated the persistence of republican solutions to 
governmental problems as republicanism dictated that the lapse of republican virtue, justice, 
and honour in politics necessitated the overthrow of the existing government until civic virtue 
could be restored to the elected members.
81
 These solutions were only possible because as 
Ethington has stated in relation to San Francisco, ‘[t]he republican ideological construction of 
the political community was not ... democratic.’
82
 
Though the Second Committee only lasted ninety-nine days, its effects penetrated far deeper 
into San Franciscan politics. The Vigilantes founded the People’s Party which gained 
‘comfortable majorities or pluralities’ at every election for ten years thus providing it with an 
unprecedented level of power.
83
 An achievement they gained by combining aspects of 
republicanism ‘that legitimated the rule of a self-avowed apolitical party run by a secretive 
executive committee on business principles.’
84
 Its definition of the public good included 
typical republican values such as ‘low municipal expenditures, low taxation, and the 
prevention of professional politicians’ from elevation in their ranks.
85
 While they 
acknowledged the existence of interest groups, they insisted ‘they were not legitimate actors 
in the formation of public policy.’
86
 These groups included Irish Catholics and low-blue 
collar workers whose needs were ignored in the Vigilantes definition of the public good; an 
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action which would eventually led to the splintering of the dominant belief in a single public 
good in society.
87
 Yet the Vigilantes long reign in power showed the potency of espousing 
republican values. 
Republicanism in the Civil War and Reconstruction Era 
The true power of espousing these republican values would be most saliently shown during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction era where great strides were made for African-American 
civil rights in the name of national unity. As Ethington has illustrated, republicanism 
stretched into the Civil War era as the People’s Party controlled San Francisco’s city 
government into the mid-1860s.
88
 It was a situation replicated throughout the country as the 
parties that claimed the republican mantle rose to power. To this end, the national Republican 
Party re-styled itself as the Union Party and sought to use republican values to gain political 
power. Many historians have argued, in opposition to Ethington, that republicanism saw a 
revival during the Civil War as many Americans began to fear the possible demise of their 
republic. By doing so, they illustrate how important republicanism was for many Americans 
at this time of national uncertainty. This thesis argues, in line with Ethington, that 
republicanism continued as the dominant political culture during this era. But it also began to 
splinter as legislation for African-Americans provided legitimacy for interest group politics, 
or rather the existence of multiple public goods. However, even as pluralist liberalism gained 
supporters in the political arena, republicanism still dominated and thus defined the terms of 
politics in this era. 
Among those who argue for republicanism’s revival during the Civil War is Baker who has 
argued that Democratic actions during the war were motivated by a republican political 
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culture revived by the war.
89
 This republicanism led many Democrats (known as Peace 
Democrats, or to use their derogatory title, Copperheads) to oppose the war. They believed 
the conflict jeopardised their liberty, as it brought into being a large army and substantial 
debt, both of which had led to policies in England which made the monarchy’s rule 
intolerable.
90
 Democrats too felt the war would degrade their liberties and lead to 
despotism.
91
 Even those who did support the war (the War Democrats) wanted to retain the 
Constitution as it was believing that only ‘a thesaurus of maintenance’ of ‘preserving, 
restoring, upholding, and keeping’ would save their virtuous republic from a dangerous slide 
into ruin caused by war.
92
 Viewed in the republican political culture, the Democrats’ actions 
can be seen as being informed by their fears of the destructive power of war for republics 
rather than support for the Confederacy, or slavery.
93
 Debates over power in the Civil War 
era were often refracted through a republican lens. 
The Civil War also saw the revival of another distinctly republican trait: antipartisanship. 
Though often used by third parties, including the Know-Nothing Party, to amass support by 
positing themselves in opposition to the partisan – and by extension, selfish – tactics of the 
main parties, it was rekindled during the Civil War to gain support for the Union war effort.
94
 
Adam I. P. Smith has explored how the Republican Party used antipartisanship to 
‘delegitimiz[e] organized opposition’ for electoral gain by stressing the need for ‘national 
unity’ to save the republic; the most popular refrain being ‘No Party Now but all for the 
Union’.
95
 The plight of the nation during the Civil War, Smith argues, led to a resurgence of 
antipartisanship in order to support the Union war effort. He illustrates how the Republican 
Party used this revival to their advantage to win elections, a strategy known as ‘partisan 
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 The strategy ‘combined a disdain for partisan practices with the claim that 
the only issue of consequence was the survival of the republic.’
97
 By claiming to represent the 
public good, the Republicans effectively denied their own partisanship by forcing their 
opponents into an ‘endorsement of the war policy of the administration’, or risk charges of 
treachery.
98
 Antipartisanship, Smith argues, reaped electoral success whilst ‘partisanship 
reaped electoral defeat.’
99
 The party which embraced national unity, abandoned partisanship 
and showed the partisanship of their opponents won elections.
100
 Partisanship quickly became 
the equivalent of disloyalty which allowed politicians to strengthen the system of party 
politics whilst promoting antiparty sentiments.
101
 It was a tactic which allowed the 
Republicans to implement partisan policies in the name of saving the republic; one which 
they would repeatedly invoke – through the waving of the ‘bloody shirt’ – during 




In the fraught climate of the Civil War another aspect of republican politics came to the fore: 
fears and conspiracies circled and infected the political arena.
103
 In particular, Michael T. 
Smith has demonstrated in his study of corruption that many Northerners believed corruption 
posed a greater threat to the republic than the Confederate States of America, which 
illustrates how deeply entrenched the fear of unrepublican behaviour had become.
104
 The 
growth of the national government during the Civil War – in particular Lincoln’s expansion 
of the executive office – even proved a more immediate concern to some Americans than the 
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potential victory of the Confederates.
105
 These fears highlight the tendency inherent in 
American politics to identify internal threats to liberty, even during periods of real danger 
from external forces, which illustrates that domestic worries about the state of the republic 
preoccupied many citizens. 
Due to its quasi-military nature, Reconstruction proved a fertile ground for these republican 
fears over the dissolution of the republic to take root once more. The enhanced powers of the 
presidency and the lack of precedence for reconstructing the nation cultivated misplaced 
anxieties, especially during Andrew Johnson’s presidency which Mark W. Summers has 
explored in A Dangerous Stir.
106
 The extension of presidential power – especially the war 
powers wielded by Lincoln – and the uncertain future of the former Confederacy led to 
heightened fears over Johnson’s actions in directing Reconstruction policy, and lay behind 
Republican congressmen’s desire to impeach the President. However, Summers argues that 
Johnson’s near conviction by the Senate led to the dissipation of paranoid politics before 
Grant ascended to the presidency. Yet Andrew Heath and Gregory P. Downs have argued that 
the uncertain nature of politics in the period continued to spark concerns about national 
demise, which manifested themselves in prophecies of monarchical government and 
‘mexicanization’: the descent into recurring civil wars.
107
 Both Heath and Downs have shown 
that republicanism and its corollary of paranoid politics remained vital aspects of American 
political culture during Grant’s and Hayes’ presidencies. 
Indeed, Downs, in his latest book, After Appomattox, argues for the prominence of issues of 
historic republican anxiety – without linking them to republicanism – in enabling the failure 
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 He highlights how concerns over a large standing army and the size of 
the national debt led both the Republicans and Democrats to reduce expenditure, through the 
demobilisation of the army, as soon as feasibly possible, especially after the little known 
financial crisis of 1865.
109
 However, in doing so, both parties jeopardised the ability of the 
federal government to protect African-American civil rights.
110
 While the issue, politically at 
least, benefitted the Democrats, it bore no fruit for the Republicans who supported it 
including ardent abolitionists such as Senator Charles Sumner.
111
 By acting on deep seated 
republican fears surrounding both large federal debts and a large standing army, the 




Similarly, Andrew Slap has argued for the potency of republicanism during the 
Reconstruction era by highlighting how many former Radical Republicans – men who 
supported the abolition of slavery and worked diligently to clothe African-Americans in civil 
rights – pursued policies that seemed the antithesis of these endeavours, yet were consistent 
with the republican ideology of limited government.
113
 These men argued against the 
involvement of the federal government in the states, and for the reduction of the size of the 
army and the federal debt – issues ingrained in Americans from the colonial era as dangerous 
to republican government, as they believed these issues constituted a serious and ongoing 
threat to republican government.
114
 Slap’s work illustrates that even those committed to an 
egalitarian vision of government could not overlook republican ideas on good governance for 
democratic government. Republican government would not be sacrificed on the altar on equal 
rights. 
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The Liberal Republican Party itself was the embodiment of a republicanism that often led to 
the creation of third parties which posited themselves in opposition to the main parties and 
promised to uphold values in opposition to partisanship.
115
 These included the ‘promise to 
transcend mere partisanship and return vaulted ‘morals,’ ‘principles,’ and ‘brotherhood’ to 
the center of American public life’ which Voss-Hubbard has shown appealed not only to 
antebellum citizens, most conspicuously illustrated by the Know-Nothing Party, but even to 
late nineteenth-century Americans.
116
 He argues that the language and methods used by third 
parties as diverse as the Prohibition Party (founded in 1869), the Grangers and 
Antimonopolists (founded 1874), and the Farmers’ Alliances and the Populist party (active 
during the 1880s and 1890s), were rooted in republican suspicion of self-interested 
partisans.
117
 Thus the antiparty tradition persisted well into the Civil War era and beyond 
illustrating the dominance of a republican political culture even as interest group politics 
became increasingly prevalent in the late nineteenth century. 
These historians have worked diligently to show that republicanism continued to inform 
opinions over the boundaries of federal power and the distinctions between the public and 
private spheres where civil rights were concerned. Republicanism remained an important 
political language which influenced conceptions of public service and political parties. It also 
shaped opinions on the role and behaviour of the president. Even republicanism’s detractors 
have shown how the concept continued to influence the nation. Baker, who argues both for 
republicanism’s irrelevance in the 1830s and its revival in the 1860s, highlighted this in the 
1985 roundtable discussion in the American Quarterly, where she showed that children’s 
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education in republicanism continued beyond the 1830s.
118
 In particular, the self-sacrifice of 
military figures was a crucial element in this republican pedagogy, for ‘[s]oldiers, more than 
anyone, surrendered their private concerns to attend the greater good.’
119
 Historians such as 
Slap, Baker, and Ethington have shown that while the ideology of liberalism – the idea that 
individuals pursued selfish interests – increasingly permeated nineteenth-century American 
political culture, it remained compatible with an evolved republicanism.
120
 This is a point 
Wood himself acknowledged some years ago. ‘America’, he asserted, ‘retained its republican 
conscience – long after it had become, at least in the North, the most liberal, individualistic, 
and capitalistic society in the world.’
121
  
The rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century, therefore, could not curtail the strength of the 
Revolutionary political rhetoric as many Americans continued to view politics in terms of the 
public good, civic virtue, corruption and tyranny. The fear of republican decay, however, 
heightened anxiety about plots to undermine liberty, and placed a great onus on citizens to 
defend their fragile polity. Richard Hofstadter’s 1964 book The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics began to explore this phenomenon by looking at moments as diverse as the Salem 
Witch Trials and McCarthyism.
122
 Hofstadter wrote that some Americans feared the existence 
of ‘a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of influence set in 
motion to undermine and destroy a way of life’.
123
 Hofstadter did not have the conceptual 
language to link the idea to republicanism. Yet many historians have built on his thesis and 
connected the paranoia Hofstadter highlighted in politics to the vigilance necessary to protect 
the republic from disintegration. In particular, Wood has written on how the fear of tyranny, 
which drove the colonialists to overthrow the British ruling elite in America, transcended the 
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Revolution and embedded itself in American politics and culture.
124
 This fear of oppression 
did not dissipate with the creation of the American republic; instead the fears of tyranny were 
transposed onto American institutions like the White House, a point James Madison 




Even as interest groups became credible, the resilience – and continuing dominance – of 
republicanism, which was a consequence of the instability wrought by both the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, led many interest groups to situate themselves in an antipartisan culture of 
civic virtue, self-sacrifice, and honour in politics or face defeat.
126
 Even those who openly 
rejected the ideology of a single public good found that to gain political traction they needed 
to engage with republicanism in order to circumvent it. Ferdinand Wood, mayor of New York 
in the 1850s and 1860s, encountered this particular problem when he attempted to espouse 
interest group politics.
127
 Though Wood felt ‘that notions of the common good were 
antiquated’ and the city simply needed ‘strong, pragmatic, and experienced politicians who 
would preserve order’, he also realised that this idea needed to be posited in the republican 
political culture of ‘civic leadership devoted to the public good rather than private interest’ to 
gain widespread support.
128
 The strength of republicanism meant that opposing republicanism 
also meant working within its framework.
129
 Parties and politicians needed to posit their 
policies in republican values to augment power and to detract capital from their opponents. In 
this respect republicanism, even as it began to wane, still held great potency for policy ends 
in the late nineteenth century. Democracy remained on the back foot until the turn of the 
century. 
                                                 
124
 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, pp. 409-467. 
125
 Ibid., pp. 410, 419-424. 
126
 Smith, No Party Now, pp. 3-24. 
127
 Connolly, An Elusive Unity, pp. 12-13. 
128
 Ibid., p. 13. 
129
 Ibid., pp. 12-20. 
35 
 
Ulysses S. Grant and the Historians 
Ulysses S. Grant was born in the mid-west of America at Point Pleasant, Ohio in April 1822. 
The oldest son of a tanner, Grant’s experiences in this small town shaped the rest of his life 
serving as an education in an antiparty republicanism which moulded his conception of 
politics and politicians.
130
 Following his father’s wishes, the reluctant Grant matriculated at 
the military academy of West Point in 1839 and, despite applying little effort to his studies 
and hoping Congress would shut down the Academy, graduated in 1843 twenty-first out of 
the thirty-nine cadets remaining from the original cohort of 109.
131
 Denied a position as a 
mathematics professor, Grant joined the fourth infantry at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri.
132
 
Shortly after, the company was ordered to Louisiana as part of ongoing attempts to acquire 
Texas, and in the ensuing Mexican War Grant distinguished himself despite his personal 
objections to the partisan conflict.
133
 Grant received a permanent promotion to first lieutenant 
and a temporary promotion to Captain, progressing in 1853 to the permanent rank of Captain 
in the regular army.
134
 However, his subsequent post guarding the Californian border proved 
a dreary task and in his misery Grant resigned from the army in 1854.
135
  
It was during his seven years as a civilian in Missouri and Illinois that Grant’s antipartisan 
political viewpoints came to the fore. Though never an active participant in politics, he held 
strong opinions on issues as diverse as slavery and the spoils system. Despite his marriage 
into a slaveholding family, Grant objected to the institution, going as far as to build his own 
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house, his neighbours claimed, to escape arguments on the subject with his father-in-law.
136
 
He even once stated, within hearing range of his father-in-law’s slaves, that ‘he wanted to 
give his wife’s slaves their freedom as soon as possible’ and in March 1859 he took a slave 
acquired from his brother-in-law to the local court and freed him.
137
 Politically, though never 
officially linked with them, he followed many practises associated with the Whig Party. 
While his father identified with the Whigs, there is no indication that Grant did so, however, 
he was guided by republican political notions that aligned with Whig principles, such as 
antipartisanship, the sacrifice of personal interests, and duty to the public good in politics.
138
 
He also supported the ideal of the statesman and federally funded improvements.
139
 His 
objections to the spoils system came to light with his inability to gain a patronage position 
due to lack of identification with the controlling party on a commission.
140
 This failure led 
him to enunciate, to his father, his dislike of party politics and his favouring of a meritocratic 
system rather than one which relied upon party loyalty.
141
 Though Grant would come to 
accept, somewhat, the necessity of rewarding party loyalty to pass his favoured legislation as 
president, he still retained his republican, and Whiggish, viewpoints which would influence, 
both negatively and positively, the direction of Reconstruction under his presidency. 
When Civil War broke out in 1861 Grant felt compelled to offer his services to the United 
States. He almost failed to get a position after he rejected help from an old army friend as, he 
wrote, ‘he was perfectly sickened at the political wire pulling for all these commissions and 
would not engage in it.’
142
 After unsuccessfully petitioning the Adjutant-General of the 
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Army, Colonel Thomas, and failing to acquire an interview with Major-General McClellan at 
his headquarters in Cincinnati, Grant unexpectedly received a helping hand from his 
Congressman Elihu B. Washburne with whom he had just become acquainted.
143
 The reason 
Washburne offered his services is unknown as Grant had not appealed to his congressman, 
but possibly his former rank led Washburne to recommend him to the Governor of Illinois for 
service.
144
 As a result, the position he eventually received was lower than his abilities 
merited. His distaste for party politics, this thesis argues, would continue to be his compass 
throughout the rest of his life, and would prove both advantageous and detrimental to his 
presidential career. 
However, the abilities which had distinguished him in Mexico, and saw him rise from his 
original class ranking of twenty-first on graduation to ninth, came to the fore despite his 
refusal to engage in party politics.
145
 Grant rose from an assistant in the state adjutant 
general’s office to the highest position in the army.
146
 His intellect and his determination, 
derived from his hardships, helped establish him as the United States’ most successful 
General.
147
 Congress revived the rank of Lieutenant General for Grant and looked to him for 
guidance in the post-war years.  
As Commanding General of the United States Army, Grant was stationed in Washington 
D.C. after the Civil War ended, and it was here that his own republican outlook became most 
apparent. His refusal to express his opinions on political issues and indeed any issues not 
directly related to his duties contrasted starkly with the partisan fighting occurring over 
Reconstruction between the President and Congress. A more astute political thinker than has 
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often been recognised, Grant acknowledged the desire of politicians to use his prestige for 
their partisan endeavours, and remained steadfastly neutral.
148
 President Johnson, in 
particular, tried assiduously but unsuccessfully to use Grant’s reputation for his own re-
election on his ‘Swing around the Circle’. This led many Republicans to believe Grant held 
conservative opinions on Reconstruction, a belief reinforced by Grant’s acceptance of the ad 
interim Secretary of War’s office after Johnson removed the incumbent Edwin Stanton. But 
this political tightrope walking and Grant’s stoically nonpartisan stance meant senior 
Republicans saw him as a plausible presidential candidate who would be acceptable to the 
whole country after the Radicals were blamed for electoral reverses in 1867. Grant’s 
popularity led him to unanimously win the 1868 Republican presidential nomination.  
In a highly partisan battle over the future of Reconstruction which was nevertheless fought in 
an often antipartisan republican language, Grant won the election and ascended to the 
presidency in March 1869. He then governed in a way at odds with the political spoils 
ideology established by President Andrew Jackson in 1828. Taking his guidance from his 
hero, the Mexican War commander President Zachary Taylor, Grant ruled in a nonpartisan 
fashion which astounded and appalled Republican congressmen who desired administration 
positions.
149
 Most historians refer to Grant’s military background to explain his actions, yet 
there exists considerable evidence that Grant believed appointments should not be rewards 
for party loyalty, but given to those with the requisite abilities to fulfil the duties of an 
office.
150
 However, it is evident he did not appreciate the necessity of coalition building 
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within his party to pass favoured presidential measures which could be attributed to his 
military education but also his political education, Johnson, after all, was hardly an ideal 
mentor. 
This lack of knowledge, combined with the President’s desire to stay independent of 
Congress, and of his party, was a major contributing factor to the split in his party prior to the 
1872 presidential election, which led to an unlikely alliance between the breakaway Liberal 
Republicans and Democrats. Though he quickly learnt of the need to use patronage as a tool 
to achieve partisan ends – his toppling of Senator Charles Sumner from the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee is a particularly salient example of this – he did not reconcile with these 
men. His second term, though, was rarely in doubt. Grant’s overseeing of the ratification of 
the Fifteenth Amendment, which secured African-American men suffrage across the nation; 
his successful resolution of the dispute with Britain over the Alabama Claims; and his 
prosecution of the Ku Klux Klan saw him once again win the Republican nomination 
unanimously.  
Re-elected in a landslide victory, Grant proceeded to cement the gains of the Civil War. His 
evolving understanding of the practical implementation of republicanism led him to give 
more gravitas to party loyalty to achieve these ends, which saw him, in the face of election 
fraud, consistently side with his own party. In this regard, he continued to prosecute the Klan 
and enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. However, the financial crisis of 1873, the 
uncovering of corruption and concerns over the extension of presidential power greatly 
reduced Grant’s ability to protect the gains of Reconstruction. When Grant approved the use 
of the military to combat voter intimidation and fraud in the Deep South, many Republicans 
joined the Democrats in decrying the threat posed to republican government by a strong 
executive. This backlash – especially from Northern Republicans – decreased Grant’s 
political capital to implement Reconstruction and hastened its downfall. Each of these events, 
40 
 
I argue over the following chapters, were debated at the time in republican political language 
and often shaped by republican ideological assumptions. 
Prospects of a third (and for Grant unwanted) term disappeared amid these concerns over the 
strength of the presidential office. Despite the disputed election of 1876 leaving the federal 
government in limbo until March 1877, Grant successfully (and peacefully) transferred the 
presidential office to his successor: the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. He then embarked 
on a world tour for two years which raised his stature both at home and abroad. The inclusion 
of a New York Herald journalist on the tour and the frank conversations on his presidency 
which – although initially reluctant – Grant allowed John Russell Young to publish, turned a 
man scarred by partisan political fighting into a statesman.
151
 Upon his return, domestic 
problems and growing admiration for his use of federal power during Reconstruction led 
some Republicans to renew calls for a third term. However, Grant could not muster enough 
votes to win the 1880 Republican nomination which he lost to House member James 
Garfield, who won the election.
152
 Grant retired to New York where he remained a private 
citizen – rarely engaging in public events – until a poor business investment and poor health 
thrust him back into the public arena.
153
 In a bid to provide for his family after contracting 
terminal throat cancer, Grant initially wrote a few articles for Century magazine for which he 
received little compensation.
154
 Their popularity led to a suggestion that he write his memoirs 
which began a race against time as Grant sought to complete the task before his passing.
155
 
The resulting product, which covers his career up to Appomattox, is considered an American 
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 The absence of any reflection on his presidency in the memoir is telling, for 
upon his death in July 1885, he was remembered as a general rather than a chief executive. 
The emphasis on the military man who fought for national unity rather than the incumbent of 
the White House who battled for equal rights signalled the shift in mood towards 
‘reconciliationist’ memories of the Civil War era.
157
 
Initial histories of Grant’s life reflected the image presented of him to the nation in death.
158
 
Whilst his Civil War career was celebrated, his attempts to enforce African-American civil 
rights were denounced as overzealous and mistaken, anticipating the position that would 
crystallise in the Dunning School historiography of the first half of the twentieth century.
159
 
This image of Grant prevailed until the 1920s, when, in the aftermath of the attrition of World 
War One, scholars re-evaluated Grant’s military reputation. Historians begun to denigrate 
Grant’s military abilities by claiming his victories owed simply to superior numbers and 
resources; they denounced him as a ‘drunken butcher’ who did not care about his troops.
160
 
Not until the 1950s when popular historians re-evaluated Grant’s military reputation did this 
view of Grant change. The appearance of numerous popular histories which reclaimed 
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Grant’s ‘military genius’ along with academic scholarship helped to re-establish Grant’s 
battlefield reputation to the standing it had enjoyed at the time of his death.
161
  
However, Grant’s presidential standing still languished. While scholarship on Reconstruction 
– especially the presidency of Abraham Lincoln – underwent favourable revision during the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Grant’s presidency received a harsher 
critique in this era than in initial evaluations. With the exception of John A. Carpenter’s 
Ulysses S. Grant, published in 1970, which is a rare example of a favourable study of Grant’s 
presidency. Carpenter highlighted Grant’s nonpartisan style of governing which saw him 
attempt to reform the federal government.
162
 Picking up on his republican beliefs, without 
naming them as such, Carpenter showed how Grant’s sense of duty drove his journey to the 
White House and how he was more committed to dutiful governance than any specific 
policies.
163
 In particular he illustrated that Grant pursued reform of the civil service, seen 
partly through his cabinet appointments, in good faith though he was ultimately unsuccessful 
in achieving permanent reform.
164
 Though critical of Grant’s Southern policies, Carpenter 
offered a more balanced assessment of Grant’s conduct than other works.
165
 He illustrated 
Grant’s attempts to ensure the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment but also strongly 
critiqued his lack of intervention in Southern states.
166
 In this sense, Carpenter presented a 
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more nuanced examination of Grant than other historians at this time and provided a more 
balanced, though often extremely critical, account of Grant’s presidency. 
Revisionist historians, along with Carpenter, criticised Grant for failing to protect and enforce 
African-American civil rights. Denouncing Grant’s lack of political prowess, they alleged his 
loyalty to his friends led him to appoint corrupt men to power who mired his administration 
in scandal.
167
 Preoccupied with dealing with this corruption, the administration’s attention 
was distracted from Reconstruction which allowed white conservatives to disenfranchise 
African Americans in the South.
168
 Grant, they charged, wasted the opportunity provided by 
Lincoln and the Republican Congress to firmly establish equal rights for the former slaves.
169
 
One historian went further. William Gillette alleged that Grant’s Southern policy was non-




The evaluation of the inept president culminated with William S. McFeely’s biography of 
Grant which not only accused Grant of incompetence but also denied him the military 
greatness accorded by earlier scholars.
171
 McFeely’s assessment echoed the post-World War 
One scholarship on his Civil War career and post-World War Two evaluations of his 
presidency. Not only did the picture presented include the worst elements of previous works 
but McFeely attributed a brutality to Grant which other scholars had not, especially in his 
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seemingly brilliant Civil War career. Seeing arrogance where others saw modesty; 
inhumanity where others saw compassion; and incompetence where others saw brilliance; 
McFeely presented the most negative portrayal of Grant to date in 1981, plunging Grant’s 
reputation lower than even the orthodox historians of the early twentieth century had placed 
it.  
Although the book was praised by many of McFeely’s contemporaries, its portrait of Grant 
did not chime with many historians.
172
 Reviews criticised McFeely for his insubstantial 
research and his lack of understanding of Civil War military history.
173
 As a result, 
McFeely’s biography inspired a wave of post-revisionist works which sought to amend 
Grant’s reputation. The first salvo came from Brooks D. Simpson who challenged McFeely’s 
implication that Grant was simply a ‘butcher’ and a ‘racist’.
174
 McFeely did not explicitly 
accuse Grant of these things, as Simpson acknowledged, rather he suggested Grant had ‘an 
indifference to human suffering.’
175
 Grant, in McFeely’s view, cared neither for his soldiers 
as a General, nor the African-Americans whose rights he should have protected as 
President.
176
 However, Simpson charges McFeely with using his sources selectively and 
ignoring a large body of evidence which showed that Grant cared deeply about both his 
soldiers and the former slaves.
177
 Simpson, along with a number of other historians, such as 
John Y. Simon, John A. Carpenter, and lawyer Frank J. Scaturro, has worked to amend this 
viewpoint, and restore Grant’s humanity. 
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Simpson’s article did much to challenge McFeely’s assessment of Grant’s insensitivity and 
inhumanity by showing how deeply Grant felt the carnage of war and the suffering caused by 
battles. Simpson showed both Grant’s efforts to avoid unnecessary suffering, highlighting 
that Grant’s battles from 1861-1863 ‘achieved significant results at a surprisingly low cost in 
casualties’ but also his regrets, even years later, at the loss of life which occurred at Cold 
Harbor – a battle which he lost – and his inability ‘to remove the Union wounded for several 
days after the battle.’
178
 A colleague of Grant’s, Colonel Horace Porter, wrote how Grant 
‘was visibly affected by his proximity to the wounded, and especially by the sight of 
blood.’
179
 To Porter, it was evident that Grant ‘felt most keenly the painful spectacle 
presented by the field of battle.’
180
 Grant even went as far as risking his death to ‘halt an 
offensive that had become needless slaughter’ after he realised ‘the attempt to pierce the 
Confederate lines through the use of a mine was doomed’.
181
 Simpson painted a man with 
great humanity and compassion for others; one whom it was evident, by Simpson’s account, 
had depths which remained unplumbed by McFeely.  
This assessment of Grant’s conduct in war was reinforced by his care and concern for 
African-Americans. McFeely charged Grant with a lack of concern for them citing, in 
particular, his wife’s ownership of several slaves.
182
 According to Simpson, Grant 
‘enthusiastically supported’ the enlistment of African-Americans in the army and pushed his 
officers to prevent ‘prejudice against them’; an indication of his potential policies as 
president.
183
 He had great belief in their abilities and felt that strategically they were ‘a 
powerful ally.’
184
 He also showed his support for ‘black equality’ by ‘promising retaliation if 
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Confederate commanders either executed or reenslaved them.’
185
 In support of his assessment 
of Grant’s freedom from racial prejudice, Simpson cited the opinions of several prominent 
African-Americans after the war, as well as the opinions of both free blacks and slaves that 
worked with him in Missouri in the 1850s.
186
 Not only did Grant pay more than other 
employers of free blacks, which both his neighbours and other whites complained about, he 
also refused to whip them or force them to work.
187
 Simpson recalled General Order No.3, 
issued 12 January 1866, which nullified the Black Codes that had restricted the free 
movement of the former slaves in the South; and Grant’s request for ‘statistics on interracial 
crime’ from his colleagues in the field.
188
 By highlighting these little known incidents, 
Simpson illustrated that Grant was more committed to black equality and in tune with the 
suffering of others than McFeely claimed. In doing so, Simpson showed the need for a deeper 
analysis of Grant’s policy decisions as president. 
Yet Simpson went further in trying to revise Grant’s reputation. In addition to writing a 
biography on his life up to the end of the Civil War, Simpson wrote a book on the period 
1861 to 1868 and another on the Reconstruction presidents which briefly explored Grant’s 
presidency. Both efforts went a long way to revising the existing picture of Grant as a 
president not committed to maintaining black civil rights. His first effort, Let Us Have Peace, 
presented a far more succinct and nuanced examination of Grant’s political abilities 
illustrating that Grant was far from the novice that many historians have portrayed. He cited 
instances as diverse as Appomattox, where his ‘terms embodied Lincoln’s spirit of 
magnanimity, achieving what the president wanted’, to Johnson’s Reconstruction where, 
amongst other actions, he urged Congress to pass legislation which would shield ‘district 
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commanders from removal by the president’ to protect the gains already made.
189
 Grant 
repeatedly tried to circumvent Johnson’s attempts to undermine Reconstruction; from 
attempts to convince Congress to pass legislation and stay in session, to pleading with the 
president, and accepting the ad interim Secretary of War position to make sure that orders 
contrary to Congress’ wishes were not issued.
190
 It was evident from these actions that Grant 
was more politically savvy than many historians (and contemporaries) had given him credit.  
Yet his work also showed a side of Grant which has been little explored: that of the dutiful, 
antipartisan man who assiduously tried to walk a patriotic line in politics; a line he would 
again attempt to follow as president. Though Simpson acknowledges Grant’s Whig roots, 
especially in his belief in following Congress’ will, he did not equate his sense of 
antipartisanship, his sense of duty, and his honourable stances with republicanism.
191
 Despite 
this he showed, in both Let Us Have Peace and The Reconstruction Presidents, a man who 
‘played politics skilfully’, who cared deeply about the public good, and who fought for black 
civil rights against the odds.
192
 He searched for means to clothe the former slaves in their 
rights from advocating the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, asking Congress for 
legislation to enforce its provisions, and pursuing the annexation of Santo Domingo so white 
Southerners would learn to appreciate their worth.
193
 Simpson showed that Grant strove for 
African-American civil rights more diligently than many have realised. 
Simpson’s picture of a more principled, committed, and compassionate man than many 
historians, especially McFeely, had painted was propelled forward by other scholars too, such 
as John Y. Simon, who also endeavoured to elevate Grant’s stature by giving him a more 
balanced assessment. Simon worked laboriously to amass Grant’s personal papers and 
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publish them in print form thus making widely available a large body of evidence to enable 
fresh research into the man.
194
 In his many published articles, Simon highlighted the care 
which Grant showed for his troops recalling how he wrote ‘to an anxious mother of two 
privates’ at one point stating he would find her sons when possible and ‘do all in my power to 
cheer them up.’
195
 He recalled Frederick Douglass’ statement on Grant’s ‘superiority to 
popular prejudice’ and depicted the patriotism which motivated Grant’s decision to accept the 
presidency despite his distaste for politics.
196
 If Grant had only served one term, Simon 
suggests he would be viewed far more favourably, for despite his teething problems, he 
achieved many significant successes in his first term.
197
 Simon, like Simpson, showed a more 
complex and politically astute man with far more compassion than had previously been 
recognised and in doing so, helped to enhance his reputation. 
Though few works on Grant look specifically at his presidency, one recent study which has 
sought to re-evaluate Grant’s presidency is Frank J. Scaturro’s aptly titled President Grant 
Reconsidered.
198
 In analysing Grant’s presidency, and the type of president he was, Scaturro 
suggested that part of the reason for Grant’s mediocre reputation was the literary reputations 
of his adversaries; left out of power, these men had ample time to pen their criticisms of the 
President.
199
 Scaturro, like Simpson and Simon, claimed Grant was a far more competent 
politician than has been generally acknowledged, but more than this, he claimed Grant, as a 
president, was a reformer, which can be seen in his attempt to rally against the spoils system 
at the beginning of his administration with his cabinet choices.
200
 He also highlighted how 
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Grant’s critics, for political reasons, had exaggerated the extent of corruption discovered.
201
 
In one instance another reformer, George William Curtis, in trying to show how easily the 
spoils system could be abused, used financial figures from Johnson’s administration on the 
New York Customhouse, which elicited accusations from Grant’s critics that he had lost 
nearly $100 million when corruption had actually been reduced under Grant’s governance.
202
 
Scaturro also goes some way to show the superficial nature of investigations into corruption 
and how less corruption occurred than under other presidents with better reputations such as 
Harry Truman.
203
 Scaturro has attested that Grant has been judged harshly, both by his 
contemporary critics and scholars, creating an image which is out of sync with much of his 
presidency. 
Yet despite these re-evaluations, the overall historical opinion on Grant’s presidency still 
languishes somewhat under the misapprehension that Grant was politically naive and unable 
to distinguish between honest and corrupt men. But although this evaluation still persists in 
Grant’s historiography, there has also been a steady stream of new studies published in the 
last decade which have continued to present a more nuanced assessment of Grant’s 
presidency.
204
 One of the most recent academic monographs, Joan Waugh’s U.S. Grant: 
American Hero, American Myth, was published in 2009 and focused mainly on Grant’s 
passing and the process of building his tomb in New York City.
205
 However, her book also 
contained a short biography which – though heavily reliant on existing historiography of 
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Grant’s military and political careers – offered new insights into Grant’s early life.
206
 As a 
result, her work indicated how far re-assessments of Grant’s life had come.  
Yet many of the recent published works on Grant are still popular biographies of his life 
which often describe his military career in great detail and cover his presidential career more 
briefly.
207
 Their assessments of Grant’s presidency offer scant revision of his abilities or 
policies as president. The latest, by academic H. W. Brands, bucks this trend by allotting a 
significant portion of his biography to Grant’s presidency.
208
 Though Brands presents the 
most favourable assessment of the Grant administration to date he is more interested in policy 
than ideology and political culture, and consequently leaves unexamined the republican 
milieu which both shaped Grant’s own understanding of the presidency and delimited the 
powers of his office. An understandable emphasis on what Grant did rather than what he 
could do is common in numerous biographies and academic works, which often begin with 
the qualifier that their subject is an enigma – a paradox – who eludes understanding.
209
 By 
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not identifying the ideas which motivated Grant – and the constraints of the political culture 
in which he operated – these historians and biographers cannot sufficiently understand and 
explain his actions. Many of the works which have most successfully re-evaluated Grant have 
therefore examined his actions within the wider context of the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
By contextualising Grant and narrowing their focus, historians such as Eric T. L. Love, 
Nicholas Guyatt, Jonathan D. Sarna and Patrick J. Kelly have furthered our understanding of 
Grant the man – and the type of president he was – and in doing so have provided a more 
nuanced account of his own understandings of politics and the limits of what he was able to 
achieve.
210
   
But despite the efforts of Brands and others, Grant’s role in Reconstruction still awaits a 
fuller revision, as historians continue to claim that Grant lacked a proper Southern policy and 
that scandals and corruption need to be placed along the blind spots of free labour ideology 
and persistent racism for the Grant administration’s inability to firmly establish equal rights 
during Reconstruction.
211
 While in recent years many aspects of Reconstruction have been 
reassessed, Grant’s role in many events continues to take a backseat to local figures and 
social history.
212
 Moreover, Grant’s presidency has not been subjected to the same studies of 
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political culture that other aspects of Reconstruction have undergone. For example, Slap’s 
The Doom of Reconstruction, contains a chapter and numerous references to Grant, but 
presents an unrevised portrayal of the President and does not consult Grant’s published 
personal papers.
213
 Despite this tendency many works are forthcoming on the role of Grant’s 




Political Scientists’ Assessment of Grant’s Presidency 
Many works on the Reconstruction presidency by political scientists have tended to assess the 
White House in this period badly in the wider history of the office. Presidential studies tend 
to deem Lincoln’s presidency the highpoint of executive power in the nineteenth century: a 
peak not scaled again until Theodore Roosevelt in the twentieth century. This, in part, derives 
from Congressional Reconstruction which incapacitated President Andrew Johnson. Grant’s 
presidency here appears as a prelude to the diminished office of the Gilded Age. These 
studies rarely recognise the distinctiveness of Grant’s presidency, though, and by reproducing 
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charges that he was incompetent, naive and a mere puppet of Congress, they reinforce the 
perception of a weak executive.
215
 Michael J. Korzi in his book A Seat of Popular Leadership 
offers an explanation for this situation: he claims that political scientists are too focused on 
‘presidential leadership of the Progressive stripe’ which leads to many seeing little point in 
studying other styles of leadership.
216
 Only leaders, such as Lincoln, who epitomise this 
leadership style gain attention.
217
 Elaborating on this theme Korzi explains how other 
presidents ‘are often dealt with in a cursory fashion and less on their own terms than in the 
ways they failed to be strong modern leaders.’
218
 The result of this has been a ‘superficial 
picture of nineteenth-century presidents and presidential leadership.’
219
 Though he claims this 
situation is being challenged, he also asserts that many political scientists continue to ‘do a 




One indication of this change can be found in political scientist Max Skidmore’s recent study 
on the nineteenth-century presidency entitled The Maligned Presidents. Though, as the title 
suggests, Grant still does not fare well in existing literature on his administration. 
Nevertheless Skidmore has attempted to reconsider many elements of Grant’s presidency, 
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including his role in Reconstruction.
221
 By highlighting aspects of Grant’s administration 
where Grant showed the strength of the executive office such as his enthusiasm for enforcing 
civil rights and strenuous involvement in implementing Reconstruction, Skidmore presents a 
more favourable image of Grant’s presidency than many historians. Of particular significance 
is Skidmore’s analysis of Grant’s appointments to the circuit courts where he shows that 
Grant took an active role in judicial appointments to safeguard the implementation of the 
Reconstruction settlement.
222
 In doing so, Skidmore illustrates that Grant was a perceptive 
political strategist. However, in his analysis of Grant, he undertook no primary research and 
instead relied primarily upon secondary literature which somewhat detracts from his 
otherwise insightful analysis.
223
 In common with many studies by political scientists, he also 
does not situate his study within the republican political culture which informed many of 
Grant’s decisions in power focusing instead on Grant’s achievements rather than the 
constraints on his power. Though Skidmore highlights that historians have not given Grant’s 
presidency proper consideration in their efforts to understand him, his own study misses an 
opportunity to redeem Grant through its own lack of in-depth research which would have 
substantiated his creditable study. 
Building on Korzi’s insight, this thesis aims to explore the political culture in which Grant 
operated, and thus address misconceptions over his use of executive power.
224
 By situating 
the Grant presidency in both its historical and political context, specifically a political culture 
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shaped by republicanism, the chapters that follow aim to provide a more historicised account 
of Grant’s presidency than much of the existing work on the subject.
225
 Removing presidents 
from the political cultures, and thus the constraints, in which they operated can present a 
lopsided view of administrations. It is therefore difficult to understand the accusations of 
tyranny that Grant so often faced if we do not consider the political context his administration 
occupied. Republicanism, as the dominant ideology of the era, was an everyday part of 
nineteenth-century political culture, and understanding it can help explain the enigmas of the 
Grant White House.  
Sources and Plan of Thesis 
My thesis explores the Grant presidency in the context of a political culture shaped by 
republicanism. Looking at the President himself, his friends, and his critics, I will show how 
republican ideology could simultaneously augment and detract from Grant’s power. The 
relationship between executive power and republicanism defined Grant’s ability and inability 
to reshape the nation in an egalitarian vision enshrined in law but lacking in reality. I argue 
that Grant tried to remake the presidency along antiparty lines, but his success in doing so, 
paradoxically, made him vulnerable to charges of despotism which hindered his attempts to 
govern as a strong independent executive. Although some historians have recognised aspects 
of Grant’s republicanism, especially his antipartisanship, none have closely analysed Grant’s 
dedication to his understanding of republicanism and the impact this had upon his conception 
of politics and its influence on his policy decisions.
226
 Republicanism, I argue, shaped 
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Reconstruction much like other, better-explored ideologies of the era like white supremacy 
and free labour. 
By exploring the political culture of the era, my research mainly rests upon public 
perceptions of Grant and his presidency which has resulted in the use of sources from many 
different areas of print culture. Primarily the thesis draws upon newspapers and journals 
which carried news of political developments to even the most remote areas of America in 
the nineteenth century. In 1860 there were 4,051 newspapers in the United States, of which 
3,242 were partisan in nature.
227
 It has been suggested that this meant almost every town of 
1,500 people had two political newspapers circulating, which highlights the importance of 
print culture to the republic.
228
 To stay afloat in this harsh environment, these newspapers had 
to reflect their constituents’ views, and while they do not present the unmediated perspectives 
of their readers, they do offer insights into the language and ideas that resonated in a 
competitive political marketplace.
229
 Mark E. Neely Jr., one of the leading historians of Civil 
War-era political culture, noted a few years ago that he was ‘continually surprised by the 
insight on American society that can be derived by diligent reading of nineteenth-century 
newspapers.’
230
 It is a comment supported by Ethington who has stated that ‘[i]t is impossible 
to overestimate the importance of the press as the central institution of the public sphere.’
231
 
In exploring newspapers I have catalogued the differing types and practices of newspaper 
editors across the United States. There are several methods that can be used to taxonomize 
newspapers but I have split them into five main categories. The most notable genre was the 
big city national newspapers, such as the New York dailies, the Chicago Tribune, and the 
Atlanta Constitution, whose influence was signified by their national reach. Smaller 
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newspapers would have subscriptions for them and often reprinted their articles, both with 
and without acknowledgement. Next in significance were the independent journals such as 
Harper’s Weekly, the Nation, and Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, which also had 
national reputations, but were printed on a weekly basis. Also of great importance, and 
treated in a similar manner to the big city papers, were the big party newspapers, which also 
had national readerships, such as the semi-official government paper the National 
Republican, the Republican Hartford Daily Courant, the Liberal Republican Springfield 
Republican, and the Democratic New York World. After this were the smaller city 
newspapers whose reach extended to the surrounding states, but which would also have 
extracts printed in the bigger newspapers when they desired to show a cross-section of 
national opinion. These included both party and independents, such as the Milwaukee 
Sentinel, the Sacramento Daily Union, and the Philadelphia Public Ledger. Lastly, and 
perhaps the most important, were the small, and usually more rural, newspapers, of both party 
and independent stripes, which had small circulations and remained mostly confined to their 
locales, such as Juniata Sentinel (Mifflintown, Pennsylvania), the Jeffersonian (Stroudsburg, 
Pennsylvania), and the Bolivar Bulletin (Bolivar, Hardeman County, Tennessee).  
Newspapers, which provided the medium for citizens to connect with the wider world of 
politics, are vital to my study of public perceptions of Grant’s presidency. The United States 
was a literary nation with enviably high literacy rates by the 1850s.
232
 Like the Revolution, 
which Ethington claims ‘was literary as much as it was oral’, much of the nineteenth-century 
discussions of politics took place in the literary sphere.
233
 Therefore it is crucial to examine 
newspapers from every category to analyse the relationship between the well-capitalised 
larger papers and their smaller counterparts. Together they helped to constitute a republican 
national political culture, albeit one that was often shaped by partisan and local 







preoccupations. In this respect Chronicling America has been an essential resource for 
unearthing small town newspapers, whilst for-profit newspaper databases have made many 
city newspapers accessible. I have also supplemented this with the perusal of key 
newspapers, for my research, from library archives in the UK and US especially where they 
are unavailable digitally. 
Print culture, though, encompasses many varied forms, and I have also consulted numerous 
pamphlets, books and official government records, all of which have provided valuable 
insights into the concerns of nineteenth-century Americans. Two in particular are of especial 
importance. Campaign biographies, a feature of nineteenth-century electioneering, have been 
used to explore the presidential races of 1868 and 1872.
234
 Pamphlets, meanwhile, have often 
proved crucial in the dissemination of ideas, especially where these are records of important 
speeches printed cheaply to reach a wider audience. These forms of political discussion 
helped to shape opinion and thus give insight into the kind of values and rhetoric which 
skilful political operators understood nineteenth-century Americans esteemed. Print culture, 
therefore, was essential to informing and shaping the political opinions of nineteenth-century 
Americans.  
However, in order to test whether public pronouncements of republicanism were just 
rhetorical devices for the mobilisation of the electorate, I have consulted the personal papers 
of many important public figures to my thesis, including editors and publishers themselves, 
and also important political figures such as Senators Carl Schurz, Lyman Trumbull and 
Charles Sumner. Here I have found significant correlation between their private concerns and 
public rhetoric, and though at times this might be explained by their assumption that anything 
they wrote may eventually enter the public domain, it does suggest that their understanding of 
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executive power was more than mere propaganda. For those such as Grant, who was famous 
for his reluctance as a public speaker, they have been essential to understanding the motives 
behind their actions. Personal papers have illustrated that the language of republicanism in 





The thesis is divided into five substantial chapters, each exploring episodes during Grant’s 
political career in which his understanding and use of executive power came into question. 
Chapter One provides a brief introduction to the presidency on the eve of the 1868 election 
before focusing on the election itself. The boundaries of executive power had been in flux 
since the beginning of the Civil War when Lincoln expanded the war powers of the executive 
office. Johnson furthered the uncertainty through his refusal to compromise with Congress on 
Reconstruction policy which resulted in a congressional takeover of Reconstruction after the 
1866 midterms. In contrast to both Lincoln and Johnson, though, Grant had his own vision of 
the presidency, which harked back to George Washington and Zachary Taylor, but the 
uncertainties over power during Reconstruction meant that his attempts to change the nature 
of the office would often be misconstrued. Although Grant did not campaign in 1868, his 
acceptance letter illustrated his conception of the presidency – the idea of a strong 
antipartisan republican President. To reinforce this, his supporters built upon the themes in 
his letter in order to present his republicanism to the nation; a convenient campaign strategy 
in a tumultuous era. The 1868 Republican campaign was built around Grant’s republican 
simplicity, but his silence, hostility to partisan politics as usual, and military background led 
Democratic critics to accuse him of coveting an imperial crown. The election that year set the 
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basis upon which Grant would both be supported and opposed: the republican themes that 
defined his presidency are first showcased during this election.  
Chapter Two explores the consequences of Grant’s attempt to define the presidency in his 
own republican vision. It highlights the many faces of corruption and how congressmen 
attempted to deal with deviations from the accepted status quo. Grant’s independence and 
antipartisanship – especially in his cabinet choices and patronage appointments – were 
interpreted as an attempt to build a power base for his dictatorship rather than an attempt to 
make the presidency a bastion of the people’s will. As a result, influential members of the 
party sought to undermine the President’s appointment power partly through their actions but 
more powerfully through print culture. Senator Charles Sumner coined the term ‘Caesarism’ 
– by which he referred to ‘militarism’ or ‘military rings’ – to explain Grant’s preference for 
army appointments in civilian affairs.
236
 Prominent figures believed these men would support 
Grant in all his endeavours: even a perpetual presidency.
237
 Grant’s independence – and the 
strong executive position he had established through his antipartisan leadership – led them to 
fear for the safety of the republic.
238
 His opponents within the Republican Party attempted to 
curtail executive appointment powers through what became known as ‘the one term 
principle’, which was one of the reasons behind the party’s split into two rival factions prior 
to the 1872 election. Although seemingly championing civil service reform, Grant’s 
opponents’ reform aimed to curtail executive power especially, effectively strengthening the 
hand of Congress in its ongoing battle with the White House. The breakaway Liberal 
Republicans aimed to weaken the independence and antipartisanship of the President to 
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lessen the dangers of a republican slide into tyranny. But in doing so they began a process of 
weakening the presidency which would in turn undermine Reconstruction. 
Chapter Three explores how fears of centralised power remained a powerful weapon with 
which opponents of Reconstruction could curtail the President’s power. Though Grant had 
won re-election by a landslide majority in 1872, anxieties over the reach of executive power 
had not diminished. By exploring the impact of a series of editorials entitled ‘Caesarism’ by a 
New York Herald journalist, this chapter seeks to show how Grant’s ability to enforce the 
Reconstruction amendments remained precarious due to the repeated incursions of federal 
power into state matters. The articles exacerbated these fears by suggesting that the office had 
grown so large, had so few restrictions on power, and such a popular man in the office that an 
unprecedented (though not unconstitutional) third term could be sought and won. Although 
seen as a hoax by the only historian to explore the subject, it is my contention that the author 
voiced real anxieties about federal power engendered by the nature of Reconstruction.
239
 
Concerned that Grant’s landslide victory in 1872 had given him the popular support for a 
coup, and drawing on ideas put forward by Democrats in 1868 and Liberal Republicans four 
years later, many newspapers and public figures warned that the presidency (and sometimes 
Grant in particular) was a menace to the republic. These fears worked to undermine Grant’s 
military powers at a moment when they were most needed as southern white conservatives 
once more turned to violence. 
Chapter Four, while continuing to examine republican anxieties about executive usurpation, 
challenges the notion presented by some historians that Grant was controlled by the 
Republican Party. It looks specifically at Grant’s veto of the inflation bill of 1874, a measure 
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which sought to increase the number of greenbacks in circulation without increasing the 
amount of gold held by the United States treasury. The President’s independence from party 
– many Republicans strongly supported the bill – allowed supporters to portray him as a 
model antiparty man, but opponents suggested his unconventional use of the veto represented 
more aggrandisement on the part of the White House. It suggested that fears over the 
expanded powers of the executive office extended well beyond the familiar issues of 
Reconstruction. The veto, I argue, challenges the dominant view of Grant as a weak 
executive controlled by the Republican Party. It also suggests how thoroughly republican 
ideas about party, independence, and honour permeated Reconstruction-era political culture. 
Chapter Five explores attempts to nominate Grant for an unprecedented third term. Concerns 
about a third term had abounded since 1873, but the idea seemed a more realistic possibility 
as Grant’s second term neared its termination. This chapter challenges the conception that 
Grant’s ability to implement Reconstruction was solely undermined by alleged scandals and 
corruption by illustrating that concerns over executive power, especially his military powers, 
continued to play a powerful role in politics. Grant’s firm use of his military powers to 
enforce Reconstruction even instigated investigations into the conduct of his administrations 
in an attempt to undermine the power of his office. Grant’s use of the military to preserve the 
democratic process in Louisiana in 1875 led to renewed concerns about centralised power 
which diminished Grant’s political capital even before a series of corruption scandals left him 
a lame duck. I suggest that we need to look too at republican fears of executive 
aggrandizement to understand why prospects of a third term were foreclosed in 1876. 
However, after Grant left office and embarked on his successful world tour, he enjoyed a 
political rehabilitation. The rise of Democratic power in Congress over the following years 
and the party’s underhand methods to coerce President Hayes to undermine Reconstruction 
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outraged Republicans who threw their support behind the ‘strong man’ of politics: Grant.
240
 
These Republicans now argued that Grant’s use of federal military powers to enforce black 
civil rights made him the model republican. During Reconstruction they had interpreted his 
use of executive power – from his cabinet to his veto to his use of military power in the South 
– as dangerous political developments, but the actions of unscrupulous Democrats awakened 
them to the dangers for the legacy of the Civil War and the future stability of the country. 
These Republicans supported a third term for Grant in 1880 but could not override the fears 
of other Republicans over breaking George Washington’s two term precedent. Ultimately, the 
republican mantra that liberty required close vigilance and self-restraint proved too strong to 
risk giving Grant another four years. 
* 
My thesis seeks to illustrate the continuing dominance of the different facets of the republican 
ideology in the Reconstruction era. It highlights the endurance of republicanism in American 
political culture in the nineteenth century and its ability to shape the political agenda. Both 
supporters and opponents of Grant defined their positions using this malleable republican 
language, employing the idiom to both empower the President and hinder him. Principled 
republican opposition to Grant early in his presidency gnawed away at the foundations of his 
administration and enabled the outrage that strong executive action later engendered. When 
Grant intervened in Louisiana in 1875, Republican opposition to his actions revolved around 
ingrained republican fears over centralised power, not just disregard for African-American 
civil rights. Prominent public figures and newspapers – many of them ostensibly committed 
to defending biracial democracy – feared for the safety of the republic when troops entered 
the Louisiana legislature and forcibly removed men from the chamber. Whilst racism and 
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economics certainly contributed to the downfall of Reconstruction, the dominance of the 
republican political culture of the nineteenth century continued to shape the parameters of 
executive power and defined how far the President could go in protecting the gains of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction. To understand the downfall of Reconstruction, this thesis 
























The 1868 Presidential Election: The Republican Paradox of the Silent Man 
 
Ulysses S. Grant was surely unusual among recipients of presidential nominations when he 
wrote to a friend in May 1868 stating that he could not visit on account of meeting with ‘a 
Committee from that awful Chicago Convention’.
1
 His private statement reflected his public 
sentiments: he was called to office reluctantly. Grant’s acceptance letter of the Republican 
presidential nomination epitomised his understanding of the presidency as a republican duty. 
His letter referred not only to the Republican Party, but the whole country in accepting the 
nomination. ‘I endorse the resolutions’, the General declared, ‘[i]f elected it will be my 
endeavour to administer all the laws in good faith, with economy, and with the view of giving 
peace, quiet and protection everywhere.’
2
 Acknowledging the turbulent nature of politics in 
the late 1860s, Grant stated how at ‘present it is impossible, or at least eminently improper to 
lay down a policy to be adhered to, right or wrong, through an administration of four years.’
3
 
Further emphasising his antipartisanship and adherence to the public good, Grant explained 
how ‘[n]ew political issues, not foreseen, are constantly arising; the views of the public on 
old ones are constantly changing, and a purely Administrative officer should always be left 
free to execute the will of the people. I always have respected that will, and always shall.’
4
 
The independent nominee of a political party ended his letter with a plea rather than a 
promise: appealing to the nation, he claimed only ‘[p]eace and universal prosperity—its 
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sequence,—with economy of administration, will lighten the burden of taxation, while it 
constantly reduces the national debt. Let us have peace.’
5
 
The acceptance letter of the Republican presidential nominee stood in stark contrast to many 
examples of the genre in the Civil War era. Though, in accordance with others from 1848-
1892 (they only became commonplace in 1852), it professed sympathy with the party 
platform, Grant’s letter did so diplomatically, referring to the people and the nation as a 
whole rather than simply the Republican Party.
6
 In commending the Republican convention’s 
‘wisdom, moderation, and patriotism’, the writer echoed his hero Zachary Taylor’s brief 
acceptance letter in 1848, which applauded the ‘spirit of moderation in [the convention’s] 
political opinions’, though unlike Grant, Taylor did not refer to the entire country but his 
party alone.
7
 But most letters went further, detailing the nominee’s commitment to certain 
policies and, sometimes, giving their opinions on party platforms.
8
 Grant’s letter thus 
expressed far less affinity with the party than the first victorious Republican in 1860, 
Abraham Lincoln, and more accord with the people’s will.
9
 Grant promised to look instead to 
the country for guidance in policy, and not to party or providence as others had done before 
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 Where other candidates were keen to appear as party men, Grant’s letter showed a 
desire to remain starkly antipartisan.
11
 
Grant’s acceptance letter seems incongruous given how the 1868 presidential election has 
typically been portrayed in histories of Reconstruction. The election is usually shown as a 
referendum on Reconstruction due to the strikingly partisan election platforms of both 
parties.
12
 The Democratic platform promised to repeal all the Reconstruction Acts with the 
exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery.
13
 Reconciliation among 
whites, and not Reconstruction, was their watchword as they sought the immediate removal 
of political disabilities for all Confederates. The Republicans, however, desired the 
continuation of Reconstruction.
14
 This entailed enforcing the former slaves’ new citizenship 
rights derived from the Fourteenth Amendment and pursuing the future possibility of colour-
blind suffrage nationwide, though that precise aim was absent from the platform. Republicans 
also restated their policy for the re-admittance of the former Confederate states which rested 
upon the incorporation of the new Amendments into their State Constitutions. Voters, then, 
had a clear choice: to turn the clock back to 1865 or continue the changes unleashed by 
Reconstruction. Yet despite these highly partisan platforms, both parties had desired Grant as 
their candidate, not only due to his popularity but also on account of his reluctance to express 
his own views on these contentious issues.
15
 Grant’s refusal to engage in partisan politics 
made him an ideal candidate as it allowed the Republicans to campaign on the basis of 
Grant’s character and nationalism; it was that character, meanwhile that Democrats set out to 
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 It was ironic that in an election where so much was at stake, a significant amount of 
the campaigning in the North revolved around whether one man was a good republican or a 
threat to the nation. This chapter explores those debates by looking at republicanism and the 
presidency in the 1868 election. 
The election needs to be read in light of the constitutional as well as the social turbulence of 
the previous three years. The assassination of President Lincoln a few days after the defeat of 
the Confederacy saw former Democrat and Union Party Vice-President Andrew Johnson 
ascend to the presidency. Johnson proceeded to govern the country in a way at odds with 
Republicans in Congress, which led to many political tussles and resulted in his impeachment 
by the House of Representatives, though he would be narrowly acquitted by the Senate.
17
 The 
political turmoil of these years and the promotion – and defeat – of black suffrage in a 
handful of Northern states in the 1867 elections led the Republicans to seek a popular 
antipartisan candidate.
18
 Though the losses were not great, they reduced the strength of party 
and provided a clear rebuke on the extension of the suffrage; the partisan platform, 
reluctantly adopted by the party due to the Radicals’ strength, had proved unpopular with the 
Northern electorate.
19
 The electoral reverse in the same year that the party had extended the 
vote to African-American men in the South (as a military Reconstruction measure) meant that 
many leaders’ preferred choice of a more Radical Republican no longer seemed plausible.
20
 
Seeking a candidate who would ensure success in 1868, and aware of the popularity of the 
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Commanding General of the United States Army, the conservatives and moderates had 
desired Grant’s nomination prior to the election but had faced opposition from the influential 
Radicals.
21
 Now facing a reverse in fortunes, the more Radical Republicans, out of necessity, 
accepted the antipartisan General.
22
 A decision made more appealing after Grant’s open-
conflict with Johnson in early 1868 marked him, by default, as a Republican supporter.
23
 
Republicans believed the frenzied state of American politics required moderation, and the 
popular, independent Grant represented an ideal candidate in 1868.
24
 
However, the focus on Grant’s character in the election also reflected Grant’s own attempts 
to define the presidency as an office. Grant’s acceptance letter illustrated a different 
conception of presidential power to many of his predecessors. It illustrated an attempt not 
only at ‘carving out a position of independence for the executive, free from the influence of 
party’ but a redefining of the presidency in republican terms as standing for the public ahead 
of party.
25
 Grant’s antipartisan republican vision of politics, this chapter argues, had roots in 
his youth. Educated at the United States’ military academy of West Point between 1839 and 
1843 and given a commission on graduation, Grant for most of his adult life had served the 
nation.
26
 His early schooling and military education instilled in him a conception of politics 
which revolved around republicanism and the pursuit of the public good. As an army officer 
he had remained strictly antipartisan, refusing to become implicated in political matters for 
fear it would compromise his duty to the nation. As a candidate Grant provided an 
opportunity for the Republican Party to eschew divisive political issues and instead 
concentrate on his character and nationalism. Personal honour mattered more than policy. 
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The result was an election which, to a more significant extent than has sometimes been 
realised, revolved in parts of the United States around Grant’s republicanism. Supporters and 
opponents used republicanism in different ways to measure Grant’s fitness or otherwise for 
high office. The Democrats depicted Grant as a military blunderer, drunkard, and tyrant: a 
man so lacking in self-restraint that under his rule the nation would lose its last remaining 
liberties. Republicans sought to counter such a portrait with examples of Grant as the model 
republican.
27
 The stories Democrats and Republicans told about Grant in 1868 would serve as 
foundations for coming political conflicts during and after his two terms in office. Supporters 
and opponents would draw, modify, and subvert ideas about the General in attempting to 
either expand or restrain the powers of the presidency. The use of republican tropes – both in 
1868 and after – indicated the powerful hold which republicanism retained on the nation and 
the desire for republican politics despite the significant issues at stake. The election was not 
simply a referendum on Reconstruction, but a referendum on Grant’s republicanism, too.  
Defining the Presidency 
The presidency which Grant sought to redefine had undergone tremendous change during the 
previous seven years. The Civil War, which resulted from the secession of eleven 
slaveholding states, led the newly inaugurated President Lincoln to greatly expand his 
presidential powers through a broad interpretation of his oath to protect the nation and the 
‘Commander in Chief’ clause of the Constitution.
28
 Acting while Congress was out-of-
session Lincoln claimed powers most assumed to be vested in Congress such as the right to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and pursued actions of questionable constitutional basis 
                                                 
27
 Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle, pp. 268-277. 
28
 Ibid., p. 58. Marcus Cunliffe, American Presidents and the Presidency (London, 1969), p. 84. See also Mark 
E. Neely Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford and New York, 1991), pp. 4-14 
on Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. Edward S. Corwin has also explored the laws under which Lincoln 
exercised these powers and argued that Lincoln partially drew his authority to execute these actions through ‘the 
presidential oath.’ (p. 77). And Edward S. Corwin, The President Office and Powers 1878-1948: History and 
Analysis of Practice and Opinion (Washington Square and New York, 1948), p. 77. 
71 
 
like employing more troops than sanctioned by the Constitution.
29
 Though Lincoln argued he 
was acting in an emergency with Washington in recess, even after Congress assembled, he 
continued with his programme of executive aggrandisement. The President closed 
newspapers; limited freedom of speech by forbidding the use of the Post Office ‘for 
‘treasonable’ correspondence’; emancipated slaves in areas beyond Union lines; and solely 
directed wartime Reconstruction.
30
 Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William H. Seward, astutely 
summarised the situation to an English minister when he said ‘I can touch a bell on my right 
hand and order the imprisonment of a citizen of Ohio; I can touch a bell again and order the 
imprisonment of a citizen of New York; and no power on earth, except that of the President, 
can release them. Can the Queen of England do so much?’
31
 Lincoln understood that the 
Constitution was endowed with a certain flexibility and vagueness in order to allow for action 
by the executive in emergencies.
32
  
However, while the powers he used to direct the war were borne out of necessity, Lincoln, in 
attempting to direct the post-war settlement single-handedly, was setting a dangerous 
precedent for the executive office.
33
 Lincoln set the stage for future confrontations with 
Congress over Reconstruction when he begun issuing directives for reconstructing the 
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defeated and occupied Confederate states before the Civil War had ceased.
34
 Radical 
Republicans fumed about Lincoln’s tyranny but – with the exception of the Wade-Davis bill, 
which Lincoln vetoed – did not openly challenge him.
35
 They were particularly outraged by 
his attempts to influence their legislative role during the passage of a confiscation bill. One 
senator announced ‘I will not surrender the independence of the Senate and the Constitution 
of the United States at the dictation of any President’, while another cried ‘it will not do, 
through a Senator upon this floor, to suggest that a bill must be modified. It is monstrous to 
commence a practice that would require the two Houses to ascertain and the shape their 
action by the will of the Executive.’
36
 The founders had not provided for reconstructing the 
nation, having failed to foresee the possibility of such a crisis when drafting the 
Constitution.
37
  As a result, Lincoln’s claim of the prerogative to direct Reconstruction was 
pure conjecture, and led the Senate to vigorously debate the issue.
38
 Lincoln’s defence rested 
upon his belief that ‘the Executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation 
of actual war.’
39
 Yet the end of the war did not herald the end of hostilities in the South, and 
Lincoln’s war powers passed to a man whose conception of the Constitution was greatly 
removed from his own. 
Taking his lead from Lincoln, the new President – Andrew Johnson – sought to reconstruct 
the Confederate states by himself.
40
 Just as Lincoln did not assemble Congress when the war 
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commenced, Johnson did not summon Congress in the aftermath of Lincoln’s assassination. 
Instead, just as Lincoln sought to establish the direction of the Civil War, Johnson sought to 
establish the direction of Reconstruction without congressional interference.
41
 The difference 
between the two men was their interpretation of the Constitution. Lincoln believed the 
emergency powers and his oath to protect the country gave him – and by extension the 
federal government – the ability to direct Reconstruction.
42
 However, Johnson – as a strict 
constructionist – did not believe that either the executive or the legislature had the right to 
reconstruct the former Confederacy.
43
 He believed that authority rested with the states: the 
president could suggest legislation but could not enact it.
44
 Johnson also did not believe he 
could force African-American suffrage on the states, or repeal state legislation, no matter 
whether he found it to his taste or not.
45
 Ironically, in order to implement his interpretation of 
the Constitution, he had to use the presidential powers Lincoln had claimed to restore the 
states to their antebellum stature.
46
 
Formally neither the President nor Congress had the right to reconstruct the nation and the 
quasi-war status of the country meant that the president’s powers were further blurred. 
However, whereas Congress had acquiesced somewhat to Lincoln, as a sufficient number of 
Republicans believed his actions were governed by good intentions, the same courtesy was 
not extended to Johnson due to his antagonistic personality and his new-found sympathy for 
the former slaveholding planter elite.
47
 Johnson, in his Annual Message of December 1865, 
seemed to accept that Congress had a role within Reconstruction, yet his actions as President 
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 When Congress attempted to provide a modicum of protection to 
former slaves by extending the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau, he issued a veto with the 
statement that the bill was unconstitutional as ‘it had been passed when none of the eleven 
ex-Rebel states was represented in Congress.’
49
 This position meant – as Senator William P. 
Fessenden observed – that it would be impossible for Congress to pass any legislation on 
Reconstruction without facing a presidential veto.
50
 This gave the President the sole power to 
direct Reconstruction (which he delegated to the states), unless Congress achieved a two-
thirds majority to overturn the President’s vetoes, which Republicans were soon able to do.
51
 
Johnson’s unwillingness to compromise with Congress eventually resulted in his 
impeachment and near-conviction in May 1868.
52
  
By the time of Grant’s nomination in late May 1868 – which came a day after Johnson’s 
acquittal – the strength of the presidential office had greatly decreased from its high point of 
1865. Johnson was an embittered and marginal figure, while control of Reconstruction stood 
firmly in legislative hands. Yet Reconstruction as a military occupation was still ongoing, 
which meant the future president could still use the expanded powers of the presidency with a 
supportive Congress. Who would be in command, though, was still subject to question. It was 
not clear whether the taming of Johnson had permanently diminished the presidency or 
whether under a more adept chief executive, the White House might come to dominate the 
federal government once more. Thus the boundaries of presidential power, and which branch 
of government had greater authority to direct Reconstruction, remained undefined. It is in the 
context of these doubts over presidential power, then, that the 1868 election must be 
understood. Americans were voting for an officer but were unclear what the office meant. 
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And though Congress had managed to restrict presidential power under Johnson, the quasi-
military nature of Reconstruction, and the recent memory of Lincoln’s wartime measures, 
meant the potential for power to flow back to a strong commander-in-chief remained a very 
real prospect. Grant – with an army behind him – could appear in this context as not just a 
true patriot, but also a dictator waiting for his chance to strike.  
The General’s introduction to partisanship 
Johnson’s battles with Congress had a tremendous influence on Grant, who due to his 
popularity as Commanding General of the United States Army, became embroiled in many of 
Johnson’s conflicts despite the General’s insistence on the non-political status of the army.
53
 
Grant believed the presidency, as a vehicle, should be used to implement the public good as 
opposed to party programmes; a view which was only reinforced by Johnson’s manoeuvring 
for his own political advantage. During Johnson’s years as President, Grant had privately 
indicated his disagreement with Johnson’s interpretation of the rights of the office, and his 
sympathy with Lincoln’s perception of executive power. Grant believed that the sacrifice of 
those who fought in the Civil War was being trifled with by politicians.
54
 The power battles 
between the President and Congress, he feared, revolved around self-serving partisanship 
rather than the interests of the nation.
55
 Johnson was not a Republican – the Tennessee 
Democrat had received the 1864 vice-presidential nomination partly to show national unity 
during the Civil War – and as President he had begun to align himself with the Democratic 
Party and shun Republican policies.
56
 Dismayed by the penetration of party politics into the 
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 Republicans had faced accusations by Democrats that antipartisanship during the Civil War was merely a 
guise to deny them power. The concession of Johnson to the 1864 Union ticket was an attempt to show 
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presidency at a time of crisis for the country, General Grant accepted the Republican 
nomination, despite his distaste for politics.
57
  
Grant’s acceptance letter echoed the views of many white voters throughout the country who 
– desirous of peace and a settlement of Reconstruction questions – seemed to reject party 
politics in the elections of the previous two years. In the 1866 and 1867 elections, the party 
which eschewed antipartisanship to campaign upon radical party positions tended to lose, 
indicating a desire for the antipartyism promoted during the Civil War.
58
 Faced with the 
patriotic antipartisan Republican platform in the 1866 elections, the Democrats sustained 
significant losses.
59
 In contrast, during the canvass for the 1867 elections, the Republicans’ 
championing of black suffrage in the North met much hostility and led to a decrease in voter 
support.
60
 Meanwhile Johnson’s ‘reprehensible’ attempt to develop an electoral base in his 
‘swing around the circle’ and his fights with Congress alienated even Democratic 
supporters.
61
 His abuse of patronage powers – in an attempt to build a loyal body of 
supporters – further illustrated that Johnson had no interest in ensuring peace.
62
 His actions 
proved politics had taken a decidedly partisan turn, which, by unbalancing the equilibrium of 
power and encouraging white Southern intransigence towards the freedmen, threatened 
further turmoil.
63
 It became evident to many Republicans after the 1867 elections that 
antipartisan platforms constructed around the promise of peace and unity remained popular 
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despite the end of the war.
64
 White voters in the North seemed willing to accept party 
measures like African-American suffrage in the South if it meant Union, indeed, but proved 
less supportive when they were pursued as policy ends in their own right. This led more 
politically astute Republicans (and Democrats) to realise that a moderate antipartisan 
candidate was necessary to win votes in 1868, and despite the reluctance of many Radical 
Republicans to choose an outsider not openly committed to black suffrage, they eventually 
joined with the moderates and conservatives at the Republican convention to choose a 
candidate who could appeal to all white voters.
65
 The convention unanimously selected Grant 
as their candidate amidst much fanfare.
66
 
Over the preceding years it had been Grant’s status as the unifier of the nation that led both 
Congress and the President to seek his support for their own cause in their battles. However, 
as a general who believed in the strict separation of civil and military life, Grant claimed 
neutrality. Both branches – and both parties – nevertheless claimed his support.
67
 And 
Grant’s apolitical stance did have a politics of its own. As Commanding General of the 
United States Army Grant had been consulted on the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, 
which placed most of the ex-Confederacy under temporary army control and gave suffrage to 
African Americans in the South. A few Republican congressmen claimed Grant’s 
participation here as proof of his support for the Republican Party, but as the man himself 
refused to openly declare his support, many Radicals remained sceptical of his real 
allegiance; others, such as President pro tempore of the Senate Benjamin Wade, deliberately 
deceived many Republicans on Grant’s political position in order to deny him the presidential 
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 Many of the Radicals were understandably sceptical of Grant’s solidarity with 
their cause, especially as Johnson and his Democratic supporters had repeatedly tried to win 
the General over to their side.
69
 Others, such as General Benjamin F. Butler, had a personal 
dislike of Grant due to his actions during the Civil War: Butler had been removed from his 
command by Grant in January 1865, and had never forgiven him.
70
 Grant did have some 
supporters in the Radical camp, such as Senator Henry Wilson, but on the whole only 
moderate and conservative Republicans preferred his nomination prior to the losses of the 
1867 elections.
71
 In general, the Radical Republicans supported the candidacies of either 
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase or Wade.
72
 However, the electoral reverse in 1867 illustrated 
the lack of white support for black suffrage when the latter was presented as part of a party 
programmes rather than as a necessity for national unity. The Radicals, who had championed 
this policy, including Chase and Wade, were clearly going to struggle to win electoral 
support.
73
 Grant’s popularity gave him the nomination, although some Radicals, such as 
Charles Sumner and Wendell Phillips, continued to dissent against his nomination.
74
 Grant’s 
supporters, however, were not worried; the Radicals, especially Phillips, had objected to 
Lincoln in 1864, too.
75
  
While refusing to take sides overtly in the battles going on in Washington between 1866 and 
1868, Grant came to see Johnson as a threat to the republic, and particularly resented the 
President’s attempts to manipulate him.
76
 Forced to accompany Johnson on his ‘swing around 
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the circle’ campaign in 1866, in Cincinnati Grant had implored the organiser of a soldiers’ 
demonstration outside his theatre to disperse the crowd explaining that he ‘consider[ed] this 
merely a political demonstration for a selfish and political object, and all such I disapprove 
of.’
77
 He believed such an action was intended ‘to offend the President’ and ‘embarrass the 
relations existing between them.’
78
 In Pittsburgh, he fumed to a correspondent that ‘he had 
abstained from declaring his own political sentiments, or authorizing anybody else to do so’ 
and that ‘he was annoyed at the successive attempts which [had] been made by Seward and 
others, to announce to the people along the road that his political views were in harmony with 
those of Mr. Johnson’; such actions, he declared, were ‘unwarranted and impertinent.’
79
 The 
President then drew the General directly into the political fray when, in defiance of the 
Tenure of Office Act, he dismissed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and appointed Grant as 
his successor.
80
 Despite the Senate’s reinstatement of Stanton, Johnson still sought to involve 
Grant in unconstitutional actions by trying to persuade him to remain in the position.
81
 In a 
further attempt to persuade the General to act illegally, Johnson told Grant to ignore the 
reinstated Secretary of War’s orders, but refused to put the statement into writing or issue a 
formal order to Grant.
82
 To circumvent Stanton, Johnson contrived to force Grant to break the 
law without implicating himself.
83
 Johnson, however, underestimated Grant’s constitutional 
scruples. 
Unable to control his General, Johnson proceeded to leak private conversations to a 
newspaper in an attempt to slander Grant’s name by suggesting he had disobeyed orders.
84
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This culminated in Grant’s damning letter to Johnson – given to Congress by Stanton – 
outlining the President’s scheme.
85
 Grant summarised Johnson’s actions in his closing 
remarks, stating: 
And now, Mr President, when my honor as a soldier and as a man have been so 
violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can regard this whole matter, from 
beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for 
which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my 
character before the country.
86
  
Though Grant focused on obedience to the law and defence of his character here, it is evident 
from the letter that he feared Johnson was trying to politicise the army, which, he claimed, 
Johnson’s ‘communication[s] plainly indicate was sought.’
87
 It was on this basis that he 
accepted Stanton’s position; Grant explained ‘my greatest objection, to [Stanton’s] removal 
or suspension, was the fear that some one would be appointed in his stead who would, by 
opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the Southern States to their proper 
relations to the Government, embarrass the Army in the performance of duties.’ 
88
 Grant’s 
point was clear: partisan politics had no place in the army.  
Johnson’s actions had opened Grant’s eyes to the reality of politics, and he appears to have 
been genuinely disgusted that the cause for which he and thousands others had fought was 
being jeopardised by politicians jockeying for base and selfish advantages in the political 
arena.
89
 Grant expressed his outrage to his friend and subordinate General William T. 
Sherman in a letter of 18 September 1867, soon after he had assumed the office of Secretary 
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of War, but still five months before his public falling-out with President Johnson.
90
 ‘I 
received your very kind letter written from Omaha which gave assurances of your sympathy 
for me at the very unpleasant position which I am now called on to occupy’, wrote Grant, ‘[i]t 
is truly an unenviable one and I wish I had never been in it.’
91
 Tellingly, Grant expressed his 
contempt for  partisan politics and Johnson’s behaviour: ‘[a]ll the romance of feeling that 
men in high places are above personal conciderations [sic] and act only from motives of pure 
patriotism, and for the general good of the public has been destroyed. An inside view proves 
too truly very much the reverse.’
92
 
Grant’s concerns about creeping partisanship threatening independent institutions like the 
army almost certainly played a part in his decision to accept the Republican nomination. 
Writing to Sherman in June 1868, he explained that he had not accepted the position ‘for any 
mere personal consideration, but, from the nature of the contest since the close of active 
hostilities, I have been forced into it in spite of myself.’
93
 The political infighting of the last 
three years had affected Grant deeply and left him distrustful of both parties. Grant believed 
he ‘could not back down without, as it seems to me, leaving the contest for power for the next 
four years between mere trading politicians, the elevation of whom, no matter which party 
won, would lose to us, largely, the results of the costly war which we have gone through.’
94
 
The results of the war, he believed, were being squandered by partisan politicians more 
interested in power than the country’s welfare.  
Grant clearly believed an antiparty man – like himself – was needed to save American 
politics from the politicians. He also hoped his nomination would have a moderating effect 
on the Democratic Party by forcing them into nominating a similar man above the party fray. 
                                                 
90











Grant wrote that ‘[n]ow the Democrats will be forced to adopt a good platform and put upon 
it a reliable man who, if elected, will disappoint the Copperhead element of their party. This 
will be a great point gained if nothing more is accomplished.’
95
 Grant clearly hoped his own 
popularity would force the Democrats to abandon their opposition to Reconstruction and 
pursue patriotic – and by extension antipartisan – policies.  
Sherman, for his part, reiterated Grant’s opinions in his reply stating that he would be 
outraged if a Copperhead (a Democrat who opposed fighting the Civil War, also known as a 
Peace Democrat) such as George Pendleton or Horace Seymour were nominated by the 
Democrats.
96
 He underscored his opinion with the statement that ‘[t]he War, no matter what 
its cause, or conduct was an epoch in our National history, that must be sanctified, and made 
to stand justified to future Ages.’
97
 Grant then – in order to make himself perfectly clear – 
forwarded copies of his own and General Sherman’s letters to Sherman’s brother, John, a 
prominent Radical Republican Senator.
98
 Grant’s intentions were clear: he wished to purge 
politics of the evils of partisanship. 
Grant’s acceptance letter and his correspondence with prominent Republicans illustrate how 
he expected to redefine the presidency. Grant’s vision of politics, which can be rooted in an 
antiparty tradition historians have begun to recover over the past two decades, harked back to 
the early republic and the halcyon days of George Washington: he lamented the increasing 
overlap between branches of the government, especially executive interference in the 
legislative process.
99
 Objectivity in politics – which Grant thought required independence 
from party discipline – and the highest regard for the law were the keys to peace. He was 
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imbued at West Point – and in his early schooling – with a belief that politics should be 
conducted for the public good without regard to selfish individual interests.
100
 His distaste for 
partisanship, indeed, long predated the struggles of Reconstruction. Grant had never voted 
‘an out and out’ party ticket, and – albeit for one week only – had been a member of the 
Know-Nothing party, which he probably joined for its antiparty stance as he had no known 
hostility to immigrants.
101
 The only presidential vote he cast in his lifetime was in 1856 for 
James Buchanan, purely because he knew the Republican candidate personally and did not 
believe he held the necessary republican qualities for high office; Grant believed John 
Fremont’s partisanship would tear the country asunder.
102
 But his antipartisanship needs to be 
defined more broadly. It did not just entail a rejection of self-serving candidates, but also the 
spoils system that distributed patronage to supporters of the victor, which he had opposed 
before and during the Civil War.
103
 Grant, like more Americans than historians of the ‘party 
period’ once recognised, was profoundly suspicious of party political culture defined in its 
widest terms. 
By 1868, concerned with how easily demagogic politicians could trifle with the sacrifice and 
lives of thousands of men, Grant became determined to inaugurate a more antipartisan order 
into politics. Grant’s acceptance letter, so different in tone to others in his era, codified ideas 
already hinted at in his private correspondence: a law, once passed, must be enforced; this 
was a matter of duty upon which the president’s honour rested; and a good republican like 
                                                 
100
 Baker, ‘From Belief into Culture’, American Quarterly, p. 534. 
101
 John Y. Simon (ed.), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume One: 1837-1861 (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville, 1967), pp. 350-352, and Grant, Personal Memoirs, pp. 111-112.  
102
 Grant, Personal Memoirs, pp. 113. See also Young, Around the World with General Grant, pp. 284-285. 
103
 Grant had once failed to get an appointment as a County Engineer in St Louis, Missouri, due to the party 
spoils culture. Though reputable men of the city had recommended his appointment, the Free Soilers, who had 
the majority position on the Board, desired a party man. Grant, though closest to one of the Free Soilers on the 
Board, was not strongly associated with the party which lost him the position. See Simon (ed.), The Papers of 
Ulysses S. Grant Volume One, pp. 350-352. Grant also despised the party politicking that accompanied the 
dispersal of positions of rank at the beginning of the Civil War and refused to engage in the practice, see Simon 
(ed.), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume Two, pp. 20-22. 
84 
 
Grant would not retreat from that duty.
104
 The letter also implied efforts should be made to 
ensure prosperity and peace and guarantee the rights of citizens.
105
 By promising to uphold 
the people’s will rather than a partisan programme, he implied that the president should be 
independent of his party.
106
 The idea that the president should remain above politics in order 
to implement policies in the best interests of the country resonated with the Revolutionary 
republicanism of the country’s origins.  
Republicans, chastened by their losses in 1867, seemed to follow the General’s lead to claim 
the partisan prize of Grant’s authentic antipartyism. Senator Sherman’s response to Grant’s 
letters indicated their willingness. ‘Your nomination’, Sherman claimed, ‘was not made by 
our party but by the People and in obedience to the universal demand that our Candidate 
should be so independent of party politics as to be a guarantee of Peace and quiet. You are 
the only man in the Nation who can give this guarantee and that without pledges or 
platform.’
107
 The Republican convention platform reiterated this sentiment.
108
 Aside from 
pledges to protect the Reconstruction settlement as it stood, the platform focused mainly on 
finance.
109
 The Republicans promised to honour the debt and redeem it ‘over a fair period’ 
whilst endeavouring to ‘reduce the rate of interest … honestly’.
110
 They also agreed to lower 
taxes as soon as feasibly possible.
111
 Otherwise there was little in the way of new policies – 
the suffrage question in Northern states for instance was left as a matter for the states 
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themselves – and such vagueness ensured that Grant could run on his reputation and promise 
to adhere to the public will.
112
  
Grant’s silence on political issues allowed the Republicans to campaign as antipartisans who 
desired the nation’s best interests with little reference to future policies. They had used this 
campaign strategy during the Civil War to great success. One historian in particular – Adam 
I. P. Smith – has explored this strategy in-depth. Smith, in his book No Party Now, examines 
how the Republicans used antipartisan strategies to win elections, a practice known as 
‘partisan antipartisanship’.
113
 The method preyed upon the ‘disdain for partisan practices’ by 
alleging ‘that the only issue of consequence was the survival of the republic.’
114
 By claiming 
they represented the national interests of the country, instead of selfish partisanship, the 
strategy effectively allowed the Republican Party to assail their opponents on the basis that 
they lacked patriotism.
115
 It ensured success for the party that eschewed partisanship and 
defeat for those who campaigned on party issues.
116
 The party which supported the war effort 
and promoted national unity while exposing their opponents’ partisanship won elections.
117
 
As Brooks D. Simpson has claimed, Grant’s silence allowed the Republicans’ a ‘safe, easy, 
and wise’ canvass.
118
 If Grant in his correspondence with Sherman is to be believed, though, 
he intended his candidacy to force the opposition to adopt a legitimate position. His broader 
ambition was not the spoils of office but the reconstruction of American politics along 
patriotic and antipartisan lines.  
Though it appeared as a tactical stance to many, Grant’s silence was borne from a mix of 
respect for tradition and a determination to keep the army free from politics. Although both 
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Johnson and Lincoln made speeches during their presidencies, neither had campaigned for 
their election for vice-president and president respectively. They both left it to their party to 
campaign on their behalf, adhering to the precedent set down by Washington in 1788 and 
every other presidential nominee, bar Stephen A. Douglas, since.
119
 As a good republican 
Grant followed the course outlined by his predecessors: to covet the office indicated 
unworthiness for its august traditions. However, silence was even more imperative for Grant, 
as he remained Commanding General of the United States Army throughout the campaign, 
and the possibility remained that he would retain the position after the election; thus he 
refused to issue any partisan statements for fear he would compromise his role.
120
 If he issued 
anything which amounted to a manifesto, he would not only compromise his position as a 
military man, but also threaten his character, as it would deny him the freedom to act as each 
occasion merited. Grant, like Lincoln, understood that in politics a certain amount of 
flexibility was needed at times, but unlike a consummate politician like Lincoln, he saw party 
as a baleful influence.  
This reluctance to voice his political opinions was also part of his understanding of the 
presidency as an office. Grant believed that the president’s duty was to enforce the laws of 
Congress regardless of personal interests. However, unlike both Lincoln and Johnson, Grant 
believed Reconstruction was a joint endeavour. Though the president could suggest 
legislation he could not direct Reconstruction efforts alone. Furthermore, the veto power 
could only be used if a law was unconstitutional, or threatened the national interests of the 
country.
121
 In contrast to Johnson, Grant believed Congress had a right to legislate on 
Reconstruction: civil rights, in this respect, were a national issue and not one purely for the 
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 But Grant also differed from Lincoln in his belief that Congress had an equal, or 
greater, right to decide the post-war settlement.
123
 Though Grant believed the executive 
should remain independent from Congress, he did not believe the president alone should 
decide the future of the country. In a letter complaining about Johnson’s stance on 
Reconstruction, Grant mocked the President for believing ‘that the nation has not now the 
power, after a victory, to demand security for the future’, indicating that Grant’s own 
interpretation of congressional powers was more liberal than his predecessor.
124
 Another 
example of Grant’s stance on Reconstruction appeared in a letter written to one of the district 
commanders of the unreconstructed states where Grant instructed him to implement ‘what the 
framers of the reconstruction laws wanted to express, as much as what they do express, and to 
execute the law according to that interpretation.’
125
 Intent, then, was just as important as law. 
Grant’s understanding of the presidency was different to the two preceding incumbents of the 
office both in terms of his hostility to partisan culture and his strict division of labour 
between legislative and executive branches. For a man who eschewed a programme, he had a 
clear republican blueprint for what the presidency ought to be, but the very strengths of his 
candidacy threatened to be his weakness. 
‘The Peace of Despotism and Death’: the Democratic Attack on Grant 
Restraint – so prevalent at the Republican convention – was absent at the Democratic 
convention in New York. Their speakers, who met on the propitious date of 4 July, spoke of 
congressional usurpations of presidential power and the oncoming Republican dictatorship 
aided and abetted by the army.
126
 They denounced the army’s ongoing presence in the South 
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as ‘military despotism’ which constituted the destruction of the republic.
127
 Meanwhile 
Johnson was praised for preventing a congressional dictatorship and attempting to restore 
power to the states.
128
 Decrying congressional attempts to help the freedmen as ‘negro 
supremacy’, they promised to repeal all the Reconstruction Acts except the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
129
 The platform also called for the restoration of all the states and amnesty for 
all former Confederates.
130
 Promising to use taxes for the diminution of the national debt and 
– except where stated otherwise – repay that debt in any form of legal currency, the 
Democrats effectively committed themselves to meeting their obligations to the Union’s 
creditors with devalued paper currency.
131
 Drawing on sectional and inflammatory language, 
they threatened to overthrow the post-war order, and return to the minimalist Reconstruction 
of Johnson’s Southern state governments.
132
  
In stark contrast to the Republicans, the Democrats chose both a controversial candidate and 
platform. The Republicans had sought to remove all traces of partisan politics from their 
canvass – including playing down their commitment to African-American suffrage – but the 
Democrats renewed the partisan battles of the war years. They chose for president the former 
Governor of New York and Peace Democrat Horatio Seymour, who called the New York 
Draft rioters in 1863 ‘my friends’.
133
 Seymour had spoken to the crowd in an attempt to calm 
the rioters and claimed to have their interests at heart which had caused much outrage in 
Republican circles.
134
 Seymour did not support the war and encouraged its cessation, and in 
Union circles he was denounced as a traitor. Both Generals Grant and Sherman had hoped 
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Grant’s nomination would preclude the selection of such a man for the Democrats, but their 
calculations had proved misplaced. The choice immediately placed the canvasses in sharp 
relief to each other. 
The Democrats immediately proceeded to attack the republicanism of the Republican 
candidate, turning the election, in part at least, into a referendum on Grant’s credibility. They 
focused on Grant’s character and nationalism and characterised the nominee as a man lacking 
in republican self-restraint. The Democrats tried to hurt Grant on three main issues: General 
Order No.11 (an incident concerning Jewish citizens during the Civil War); allegations of 
drunkenness and (to a lesser extent) butchery; and his potential as a tyrant. However, though 
they sought to illustrate Grant’s lack of fitness for republican government, there were many 
contradictions in the Democrats’ allegations, not least in their desire to simultaneously 
portray him as an inebriated incompetent and a master planner plotting to dissolve 
constitutional government. Furthermore, his supposedly tyrannical intentions had surprising 
appeal in parts of the South, where disaffected whites sought a strong leader who would 
oppose the Radical Congress. Lastly, their strategy, by focusing on aspects of Grant’s 
military career, moved attention away from the more divisive issue of Reconstruction, to the 
benefit of the Republican campaign. The Democrats then, unwittingly, set up the perfect 
platform for the Republican Party by concentrating on Grant’s republicanism. Yet though 
Grant and the Republicans would win the battle, it was something of a Pyrrhic victory. For 
many of the accusations levelled at Grant would be seized upon by others – Liberal 
Republicans, independent newspapermen, and even Republican stalwarts – over the 
following eight years, and each time the old fears were invoked they would diminish his 
capacity to enforce Reconstruction measures.  
The least important prong of the Democratic trident – General Order No.11 – had been issued 
by Grant in 1862 when he was in charge of the Department of the Tennessee. Smuggling was 
90 
 
endemic in the area, and even Grant’s friends attempted to use their personal influence with 
the commander to ask for favours transporting various commodities.
135
 The smuggling, Grant 
believed, amounted to unrepublican corruption, and undermined the Union war effort by 
aiding the Confederate economy.
136
 He therefore reacted badly when asked by his father and 
the Jewish Mack brothers for passes which would enable them to smuggle cotton across the 
lines in return for a cut of the profits.
137
 In anger at the willingness of these men to undermine 
the Union war effort for their own personal gain, Grant very rashly pursued what he 
perceived as the only option open to him: he banished all Jews from his Department.
138
 
Although the order was delayed due to a cut in communications and rescinded by President 




Although the Order was well-known in the Jewish community, it was unknown to many 
Americans until the Democrats drew on it during the presidential campaign.
140
 It called into 
question whether General Grant would protect all sections of society in the Union, and many 
American Jews were unsure whether to vote for the party they preferred knowing its 
candidate had previously undermined their civil rights.
141
 It greatly divided the Jewish 
community, some of whom campaigned for General Grant, whilst others produced anti-Grant 
pamphlets promising that Jewish citizens would not vote for him regardless of his 
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 Jonathan Sarna has recently suggested that the importance of the Order on 
electoral votes can be seen in the substantial amount of newspaper space it received even in 
areas where the Jewish population was very low.
143
 Sarna cites the Flemingsburg Democrat 
(Flemingsburg, Kentucky) which ‘devoted two full columns in its issue of March 6, 1868, to 
‘Gen. Grant and the Jews’’ which denounced the Order as ‘outrageous’.
144
 For the 
Democrats, the Order clearly undermined Grant’s integrity by illustrating his lack of self-
restraint, but it was far from ubiquitous in the party press.
145
 
The second most important issue promoted to undermine Grant’s reputation was his supposed 
alcoholism. Allegations of drunkenness comprised a central component of the Democratic 
campaign. The origin of the allegation is unknown, but it was raised during the Civil War, 
and most likely came from disgruntled colleagues, including General Henry Halleck, who 
used it early in the conflict in an attempt to remove Grant from his command during a 
dispute.
146
 The Democrats denounced Grant as ‘[n]otoriously a drunken debauchee’, a 
‘[d]runken sot’, and ‘Phillips’ and Tilton’s drunken friend’; the last of which conflated Grant 
with two radical abolitionists in an attempt to link him to the cause of African-American 
suffrage.
147
 The allegation of drunkenness held much potency in nineteenth-century America 
as it suggested that a person was incapable of controlling his passions. Temperance societies 
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had flourished since Andrew Jackson’s era in an attempt to reform the drinking habits of the 
American public.
148
 Their advocates believed that drunkenness resulted from an inability to 
exercise self-restraint. Here the critique of the drunkard became political, for men without 
self-restraint, could not be good republican citizens.
149
 At least one newspaper questioned the 
logic of replacing one White House drunkard – Andrew Johnson – with another.
150
 An 
indication of the strength of concerns over alcoholism in politics was implied by the 
formation of the first temperance party – the Prohibition Party – only a year later. 
Furthermore, Republicans themselves had first broached the issue – during debates over their 
presidential nomination – which gave it credence and made it a usable political tool.
151
  
In trying to deny Grant the Republican presidential nomination several Radical Republicans 
called him a drunkard publicly in the press.
152
 In particular, Radical abolitionist Wendell 
Phillips wrote frequent editorials in the National Anti-Slavery Standard spreading rumours 
about Grant’s drunkenness; Phillips’ objection to Grant’s nomination sprang from Grant’s 
refusal to confirm his radicalism, which led Phillips to conclude that the General was a 
conservative opponent of civil rights.
153
 Despite the Republican losses in the 1867 elections, 
Phillips slandered Grant’s name, claiming that ‘rumors reach us from Washington, coming 
from different and trustworthy sources, that Gen. Grant has been seen unmistakenly drunk in 
the streets of that city within a few weeks.’
154
 Phillips had hoped that by accusing Grant of 
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drunkenness he would persuade temperance men of Grant’s ineligibility for Office.
155
 
Opponents of Johnson formed a Congressional Temperance society in January 1868, as 
Johnson’s drinking was well-known in political and public circles.
156
 Phillips repeatedly 
warned of the fallacy of electing another drunkard for the presidency lest a man similarly 
lacking in self-discipline repeated his predecessor’s errors.
157
 Following Phillips’ lead, 




Charges of drunkenness also fed into another Democratic accusation which sought to 
demonstrate Grant’s unfitness for positions of power; the General, the Democrats alleged, 
had butchered his troops on the battlefield. Though a contentious charge – many white 
Southerners admired Grant’s magnanimity to his opponents at the close of the war – it was 
nevertheless a popular refrain. However, despite its inherent link to the drunkenness charge, it 
did not appear as often in denunciations of Grant, perhaps due to the use of statistics to prove 
the statement which resulted in multitude inconsistencies throughout the Democratic press.
159
 
One newspaper, which wisely omitted these statistics, nevertheless suggested two different 
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figures in the same brief article for the number of men Grant was responsible for killing.
160
 
But more common were simple statements such as ‘Grant, the butcher’ or ‘‘[b]utcher’ Grant’ 
rather than in-depth analysis of the accusation.
161
 But the allegation fitted neatly into the 
drunken depiction of Grant which one newspaper highlighted when it claimed that Grant was 
‘a military blunderer and a wholesale human butcher ... who, in the midst of battle, revelled 
in drunken debauchery’.
162
 Yet Grant was assailed in this manner fewer times than he was 
described as a drunkard or even a military blunderer; most likely the problem lay in the 
inconsistencies of the number of men killed by Grant which these newspapers suggested, or 
possibly the memory of the Confederate losses proved too compelling for some. Either way, 
‘butcher’ Grant held less potency for the electorate than ‘drunkard’ Grant.  
The most prevalent and enduring of the three issues which formed the Democratic attack on 
Grant, however, consisted of warnings of tyranny and military despotism. Voiced throughout 
the convention proceedings they found sympathy with nominated men, too, especially with 
the vice-presidential candidate General Frank P. Blair. In his acceptance letter, Blair warned 
– as had many speakers at the convention – that Grant’s election would entail a continuation 
of the so-called military despotism already existing in the South after the passage of the 1867 
Reconstruction Acts.
163
 Yet Blair went further. Blair alleged that Grant was a new Napoleon: 
a permanent autocrat.
164
 Blair’s acceptance letter – so different in tone to the man he assailed 
– stated how Grant ‘exclaims: ‘Let us have peace.’ ‘Peace reigns in Warsaw,’ was the 
announcement which heralded the doom of the liberties of a nation. ‘The Empire is peace,’ 
exclaimed Bonaparte when freedom and its defenders expired under the sharp edge of his 
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sword. The peace to which Grant invites us’, Blair declared, ‘is the peace of despotism and 
death.’
165
 Blair implied that the election of Grant would entail more than a willingness to 




Although often represented as a radical viewpoint – Blair was widely ridiculed and James 
Gordon Bennett Senior of the New York Herald attempted to oust him from the ticket – the 
letter simply built upon the ground laid by Democratic public figures at the convention and in 
the Democratic press.
167
 The convention was replete with accusations of military despotism 
inflicted by a usurping tyrannical Congress.
168
 Accusations of a Radical congressional 
tyranny were also promoted by prominent Democratic newspapers: the Daily National 
Intelligencer (a semi-official administration newspaper), the La Crosse Democrat, the 
Chicago Times, the New York Herald (Democratic leaning in the 1860s under Bennett Sr.) 
and the New York World. The Herald had called the Republican convention the ‘council of 
war at Chicago’ whilst the Chicago Times stated how the Republicans ‘proposed to make 
Grant dictator’.
169
  The Chicago Times claimed this was so ‘that he may, through military 
despotism, reduce the noblest, most intelligent, and gallant white men of the South to 
subjection to the brutalized negroes who have just emerged from the degradation of life long 
and abject slavery.’
170
 The Democrats already believed the restrictions on former 
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Confederates’ political rights and the absence of several Southern states from Congress 
resembled despotism. Though Blair’s accusations were slightly more extreme, he did not 
create the idea of a military despotism which was a long-running charge the Democrats had 
made against Lincoln and congressional Republicans.  
Blair’s letter therefore played on real fears. The assassination of a president and the failed 
conviction on impeachment charges of another had, along with the long shadow of the Civil 
War itself, left Americans seriously concerned about the stability of their republic. Paranoia 
ran riot within politics. Johnson and his Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, believed the 
Radical Republicans were plotting to overthrow his presidency, whilst the Radicals feared 
Johnson had planned a coup d’état of Congress.
171
 There is evidence to suggest Johnson 
considered dismissing the thirty-ninth Congress in 1866 – evidence possibly leaked to a 
Philadelphia newspaper which reported the idea.
172
 The Democratic allegations of despotism 
were made more plausible when they were tied to fears about what the former slaves might 
do with their new civil rights as Southern whites, in particular, raised the old cry of servile 
insurrection. Many recent works have explored this paranoia which permeated the post-Civil 
War nation by looking at republican suspicions of centralised power and the importance of 
rumour.
173
  Studies by historians on issues as diverse as ‘mexicanization’ and ‘monarchism’ 
have illustrated that in uncertain times some citizens entertained fears that with hindsight 
seem outlandish: that the United States might descend into a perpetual cycle of war and 
revolution, or that only a king could hold the nation together.
174
 Reconstruction led some to 
fear the destruction of the United States and increased support for extreme solutions: Blair’s 
concerns were not as extraordinary as they might appear at first glance.  
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Blair was acquainted with Grant. He had fought on the Union side at Vicksburg under 
Grant’s leadership, which gave him first-hand knowledge of the General, and he could find 
among Grant supporters comparisons of their man to Napoleon I.
175
 General Halleck wrote of 
Grant after Vicksburg, for instance, that ‘[i]n boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and 
brillancy of routes, these operations will compare most favourably with those of Napoleon 
about Ulm.’
176
 Once nominated by the Republicans, authors began churning out biographies 
replete with Napoleon comparisons. One Grant biographer – John S. C. Abbott – had 
previously written a highly favourable biography of the French Emperor. Another writer, 
Albert D. Richardson – whose work was reprinted in many newspapers – compared Grant’s 
lucid concise speech to the words of another destroyer of republics, Napoleon III.
177
 He 
claimed both were ‘no flowers of rhetoric’ and spoke ‘in the plainest, homeliest words’ 
commenting that ‘Napoleon’s memorable sayings are all of this order’.
178
 The Democratic 
convention took place two months after the Republicans had met, allowing for the press to 
pick up on such double-edged praise.
179
 Grant himself, despite his abhorrence of Napoleon 
III, had signed his acceptance letter with ‘[l]et us have peace’ which bore remarkable 
similarity to Napoleon III’s rallying cry after his coup, ‘[t]he empire is peace’.
180
 Under these 
circumstances, Blair’s connection of the themes of tyranny and Napoleon became 
understandable. 
Blair spoke openly on the issue on the campaign trail, illustrating that his allegations were not 
simply a campaign trick. He gave a speech at Leavenworth, Maine in which he warned about 
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the dangers of underestimating Grant.
 181
 In response to a man who called Grant ‘a fool’, 




Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas are good men, but Grant is worth more than all of 
them. Oliver Cromwell and Napoleon Bonaparte were both great men, but, sir, I 
tell you that Grant is a greater man than Cromwell and Bonaparte put together. 
He is not a talker, but he is one of the greatest thinkers in the world. He is 
ambitious, but he don’t show it; and I tell you, that if he is elected President, he 
will set up a monarchy and establish himself Emperor. I tell you, that the people 
are mistaken when they suppose Grant to be a fool. They have good reason to fear 
his greatness. The man that can spring right up from poverty and obscurity, and 
do what he has done, is no mere creature of circumstances. Circumstances don’t 
run so much in one way.
183
 
Blair’s speech and acceptance letter showed how real concerns over power existed in both the 
North and the South. The words were widely printed (and often ridiculed) but they were not 
unwarranted especially as he repeated concerns over Grant’s silence.
184
 Both politicians and 
the press had expressed concerns over Grant’s unwillingness to voice his opinions on 
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political matters. It led to fears, on both sides, that he held extreme views.
185
 Democratic 
newspapers across the country mocked Grant’s silence and chided him for his elusiveness. 
One speaker claimed, for example, that ‘[s]peech is silver, silence is golden. Grant’s silence 
is leaden.’
186
 The implication here was that Grant’s tight-lipped posture was a reflection of 
his stupidity but for others, like Blair, it hinted at a malevolent political genius. To answer 
Democratic allegations, an artist at Harper’s Weekly had, a year earlier, drawn the General as 
a Sphynx, who remained indecipherable to civilians but a towering monument to soldiers.
187
 
But such messages were hard to control. Educated Americans would have known, indeed, 
that Napoleon III was also often compared to this mythical and enigmatic creature.  
Oddly, though, Democratic attempts to tar Grant with the brush of tyranny actually 
accentuated his appeal in parts of the South. Few white Southerners desired the election of 
their old enemy (though Sherman or Butler would have been worse). Yet though these men 
feared Radical victory, they did not despair over the election of Grant. ‘Gen. Grant, so far as 
he is personally concerned, is most respected by the Southern people’ declared a Baltimore 
newspaper.
188
 White Southerners declared their admiration for Grant’s ‘magnanimity to 
General Lee’, his honesty, and his lack of vindictiveness towards the South.
189
 Furthermore, 
they saw potential benefits in the election of Grant. A former ‘messmate’ from West Point 
claimed ‘Grant had the ambition of ten Caesars ... but his ambition would be to build up 
instead of destroying the country’ and in particular, this situation ‘would be better for the 
country at large, and especially the South, to prosper under his empire than to be ruined by 
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this radical Congress and their thieving emissaries.’
190
 The despotic ambitions of Grant, then, 
were far from frightening for Southern Democrats. 
In an oft-reprinted article, entitled ‘General Grant in the South’, a Southern author sought to 
calm fears existing in the South over a Republican victory.
191
 His hopes rested on Grant’s 
‘character and capacity’.
192
 The author asserted ‘[h]e is arbitrary, but he will have no orders 
but his own’ before claiming that Grant ‘will not have much respect for these bogus 
governments in the South. But he will aim to keep up a sort of order by the military.’
193
 The 
implication here was that Grant’s tyranny need not be feared: he had no sympathy with the 
former slaves and ‘[w]hen he comes to be tried, when his peculiarities are allowed to come 
out, just as he would have been cruel as a slaveholder he will be cruel and violent as a 
ruler.’
194
 Seymour, the author claimed, would offer the ex-slaves more protection than 
Grant.
195
 The tyranny of the General would result in the absence of ‘anarchy and a disregard 
of his edicts’.
196
 Under the tyrannical Grant ‘order will be preserved. The peace of Warsaw 
will prevail. Their republican governments will be gone, but as a general thing, the people 
will not be disturbed in their homes. They can live—not so prosperously as before—but still 
life and property will be untouched.’
197
 As Andrew Heath has pointed out, in early 1869 
some white Southerners hoped Grant would become a tyrant; a benevolent dictator, they 
believed, would be preferential to Radical democracy.
198
 
This article was reprinted throughout the Southern press indicating at the very least white 
Southern interest in its suggestions. The fears of Northern Democrats, then, were not 
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necessarily reflected in their Southern counterparts. The message Democrats in the South 
promoted indicated a preference ‘for a white man’s government against a black man’s 
despotism.’
199
 Grant, they believed, would govern the South as ‘a disciplinarian’.
200
 Southern 
newspapers claimed Grant had convinced a friend ‘that he would wash his hands of 
Radicalism.’
201
 Some white Southerners therefore desired the despotism of Grant believing it 
preferable to the governance of white Republicans in the South and Radical Republicans in 
Congress. Blair’s warning, then, did not provoke fear among these men in the South. Grant’s 
silence – though often mocked – provided an unlikely source of hope to white men in the 
South who loathed congressional radicalism. 
If Blair’s warnings exposed sectional divisions within the Democratic alliance, it also 
exposed contradictions in the party’s line of attack. To Blair, Grant was a master planner, but 
to most Democrats, he was an imbecile; it was hard to see how a dimwit could become a 
despot. The reprinting of Grant’s short speeches formed a favourite tactic of the 
Democrats.
202
 They particularly liked speeches in which Grant referred to other speakers. At 
Toledo, Ohio, in 1865 Grant greeted the crowd before introducing the ‘Rev. Mr. Vincent, 
who has come out on the train from Chicago, [and] has kindly consented to return my thanks 
for this hearty welcome, which you have given me.’
203
 On another occasion, Grant stated ‘I 
am not going to reply to the address, gentlemen. I could not do so if I should try.’
204
 Other 
Democratic newspapers sought out former acquaintances of Grant to attest to his intellectual 
unsuitably for the presidency. One such person claimed Grant was ‘one of the most 
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stupendous humbugs ever known in this or any other age.’
205
 The author wrote how a short 
‘conversation with him will clearly convince any one that he does not possess military genius 
or the first elements of statesmanship.’
206
 Tales of incompetence, such as this one, were more 
common in Democratic newspapers than Blair’s contradictory claim of a masterminding 
genius planning his future empire. 
Indeed more Democrats believed that the country would descend into military despotism 
through Grant’s ineptitude and impressionability than his calculating genius. He would, they 
assumed, quickly fall under the sway of silver-tongued congressmen, who would continue to 
erect their legislative tyranny. Here, an unrepublican lack of independence became a crucial 
part of the case against the General. Several newspapers asserted ‘that any man willing to 
assume the guardianship of Grant has easily secured his unreasoning acquiescence in all 
political questions.’
207
 ‘In politics’, the Democrats claimed, Grant had ‘always taken up with 
the minds that mastered him.’
208
 Another newspaper described the matter less eloquently, 
stating that when Grant was asked in 1861 whether ‘the war was to be prosecuted for the 
abolition of slavery’, he ‘first avowed himself to be a democrat, and then said he did not 
believe such to be the object, but that if such were the object of the war, upon being 
convinced of the fact, he would resign his commission in the Federal army and go over to the 
enemy.’
209
 It was an accusation repeated frequently that Grant, ‘like many other weak 
mortals’, did not have ‘a mind or an opinion’ which he could ‘justly claim as [his] own’, and 
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as a result he would be ‘a tool, and fit representative of Radical corruption.’
210
 Grant, they 
contended, was not a genius but an impressionable fool: a slave rather than a master. 
In this depiction, Grant’s malleability meant he could easily be manipulated into enacting 
tyranny upon the South. In the estimation of many Democrats, Grant was a soldier who could 
‘be lead [sic] around by the nose by demagogues and unprincipled public thieves’ but who, 
unlike Johnson, had ‘the army at his sole command’.
211
 Thus, ‘urged on by a vindictive and 
section hating ring of usurpers and political cancers, with no principles of justice to restrain 
him’, Grant would allow ‘the despotism that now holds sway in the outraged and abused 
South’ to become ‘what we may expect the whole nation to become, if Grant and his party 
are successful.’
212
 This ‘despotism once inaugurated throughout the country will never go 
backward, but push on from worse to worse, unless crushed and totally destroyed by insulted 
justice.’
213
 In this respect, the Democrats turned the Republican portrayal of Grant’s 
antipartisanship and silence on political issues into a weakness by surmising that the General 
used silence to hide his complete lack of judgement on political issues. As he had no 
restraining conscience to direct his actions, he would be complicit in enabling despotism to 
take root in the United States, and thus preside over the destruction of the republic. It was his 
incompetence, rather than any claims of intellectual genius, which most Democrats believed 
would install a dictatorship in the country. 
Yet the contradictory nature of the Democratic campaign did not aid the party’s course. The 
Democrats presented a campaign of paradoxes that even their own supporters found baffling. 
Their controversial platform, though often popular among white voters in the South, was 
divisive in the North. Conservative party journals were particularly critical of Blair’s 
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histrionic warnings about Grant’s designs, for instance, while the prospect of paying the war 
debt in greenbacks alienated New York’s hard money men. Moreover, the Democratic 
courting of Grant prior to 1868 enabled Republicans to rebuke claims of Grant’s despotism, 
drunkenness and discrimination. The Democratic campaign, as a result, was full of 
contradictions. Grant was a genius and an idiot, a despot when some Democrats longed for 
despotism and a man whose service to the nation supposedly made him a threat to the nation 
itself. These were difficult ideas to hold simultaneously and cracks soon showed. Even the 
most radically antiwar wing of the party in the North, the Peace Democrats, denounced the 
attempts to asunder Grant’s military reputation with accusations of tyranny and drunkenness. 
The Copperhead Clement Vallandigham’s Dayton Daily Ledger newspaper reportedly 
labelled ‘the frequent abuse of General Grant, as ‘the weakest and most foolish thing that the 
Democratic press or Democratic orators can do.’’
214
 
Vallandigham – a Copperhead who fled to Canada during the war – underlined the problem 
which the Democrats faced. By focusing on undermining Grant’s reputation they merely 
increased attention on his Civil War career rather than the more divisive issue of 
Reconstruction. When Democratic newspapers scolded Grant for ‘victories [that] were too 
costly to be valuable’, lambasted him as a ‘military blunderer’ and labelled him as the ‘man 
who needlessly sacrificed one hundred thousand lives in his Potomac campaign’ they were 
countered with the Democratic New York World’s 1865 opinion that ‘[his] last brilliant 
campaign sets the final seal upon his reputation.’
215
 The World added how it had ‘stamp[ed] 
him as the superior of his able antagonist as well as of all the commanders who have served 
with him or under his command in the great campaigns of the last year.’
216
 As Vallandigham 
indicated, these statements merely highlighted the foolishness of attempting to undermine 
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Grant’s republican reputation. They only aided the Republican depiction of Grant by showing 
that the nominee was able to win praise from the Democrats. Over time, though, the fears that 
the likes of Blair had stoked would take root, and threatened to strangle Grant’s presidency.  
The Model Republican 
As per the American tradition, Grant made clear he would not campaign personally for the 
presidency.
217
 Although many congressmen and many more American citizens pressed Grant 
in person, in writing, and in the press for his political opinions, the General kept to both 
tradition and the policy of the army and stayed silent. Grant had staunchly attested to his 
belief that the army should remain separate from politics – a position held since his education 
at West Point.
218
 During Johnson’s ‘swing around the circle’ Grant told a reporter that ‘he did 
not ‘consider the Army a place for a politician’’, which the Mexican minister Matias Romero 
acknowledged, stating that ‘the General … holds the maxim that soldiers ought not mix 
themselves in politics.’
219
 Grant had also previously informed a group of Republicans who 
visited him that as the Commanding General of the United States Army, ‘[i]t is not my 
business to go about the country making political speeches; but when it is in the line of my 
duty to express my opinion on Reconstruction, I shall do so freely, as I have done in the 
past.’
220
 As a republican and as Commanding General of the United States Army – with the 
possibility of retaining this position – he would not campaign for the presidency.
221
 
This compelled the Republicans to focus their campaign on Grant’s character and 
nationalism, which they tied to their role in uniting the nation during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.  Grant’s neutrality and the Republican losses in the 1867 elections allowed 
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the General and his supporters to fight the canvass on their preferred terrain.
222
 Most 
Republicans embraced Grant’s republican lead and used it to focus on the meaning of the 
Civil War and the importance of loyalty to the Union. The Democrats decision to run on a 
platform that promised to turn back the clock to 1865 made the Republicans’ job that much 
easier.  
Even though Grant remained aloof from the campaign in 1868, he played a central role for 
the first time in his career in shaping his own national image. For Grant’s silence ensured his 
supporters focused on his past deeds rather than his future programme, and judged him on his 
reputation rather than on his policy. His supporters therefore used his military career and his 
humble upbringing to tell a story of a plain, simple man who – through his own efforts – had 
risen to great heights by fulfilling his duty to the United States. General Grant’s words, 
letters, and military orders showed his patriotism, his sacrifice and his republican virtue. The 
portrayal of Grant in this election reflected the way he wished to be portrayed as he had 
communicated to Radical Republican Senators.
223
 To John Sherman he had sent his 
correspondence with General Sherman which detailed his desire to remain above the party 
fray and act for the national interest.
224
 His letters made implicit that he had acted out of 
republican duty.
225
 Patriotism and antipartisanship were his guides: his election was for the 
nation, not the party.
226
 The image of General Grant in 1868 was the image of Grant the man, 
derived from his own words, his own actions and his own beliefs, but packaged and 
reproduced for a mass audience. 
The Republican campaign did not simply focus on presenting an image of Grant but on 
countering Democratic claims which meant portraying the nominee as a man marked by 
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republican self-restraint. Republicans delved into Grant’s past to present to the nation a 
picture of a model republican. As in combat, the Democrats would attack and the 
Republicans would repel the allegations in a constant attempt to illustrate their candidate’s 
suitability for the presidency. It was a war of attrition in which a man’s character was the 
battlefield. 
Take for instance the charge of insobriety. The potency of the allegation in American society 
is suggested in the vigor with which Grant’s supporters refuted it. They countered the charge 
with examples of Grant’s republican restraint. Those who had travelled with the army during 
the Civil War came to Grant’s defence immediately, as did prominent temperance men, such 
as Republican Senator Henry Wilson and the President of the National Temperance Society, 
who both gave testimony to uphold Grant’s reputation as a sober man.
227
 Former 
Pennsylvania Governor John W. Geary told an audience that he ‘never knew [Grant] to touch 
spirits of any kind’ and stated that he thought ‘there is no man who has been more 
ungenerously treated on that subject during the last few months than Grant.’
228
 A 
Pennsylvanian woman, who was associated with the Sanitary Commision, told several stories 
that attested to Grant’s temperance, including one that recounted an occasion when a doctor 
prescribed alcohol and the General refused to take the medicine telling his wife that ‘he will 
not die’ but nor would he ‘touch a drop upon any consideration’.
229
 The Reverend J. L Crane 
recounted his experience as a Colonel in 1861. Whilst marching, some soldiers had acquired 
liquor, and were well on their way towards getting themselves drunk.
230
 Grant stopped his 
regiment for a break and examined his soldiers’ canteens before ridding them of their 
                                                 
227
 ‘The “Last Card”’, The Highland Weekly News (Hillsborough, Highland County, Ohio), 29 October 1868. 
228
 ‘Governor Geary’s Opinion of General Grant’, Daily Cleveland Herald (Cleveland, Ohio), 1 June 1868. 
229
 ‘Anecdotes of General Grant—His Habits’, The Union and Dakotaian (Yankton, South Dakota), 16 May 
1868. 
230





 He then ‘had the offenders tied behind the baggage wagons till they had sobered 
into soldierly propriety.’
232
 The soldiers were taught ‘no whiskey nor intoxicating beverages 
were allowed in his camp.’
233
 However, the most influential and reprinted defence of Grant 
came from Admiral Horace Porter. A pro-Grant newspaper – Frank Leslie’s Illustrated 
Newspaper – received a letter which detailed a conversation between a merchant and 
Porter.
234
 The merchant had commented that ‘we must elect Grant, especially in view of the 
new revolution now threatened by the rebels and their sympathizers; but what a pity that the 
General drinks!’
235
 Porter proceeded to describe his long acquaintance with Grant and 
denounced the accusation as ‘a falsehood’ with the statement ‘that, during the whole period 
of my acquaintance with him, I have never known him to taste, nor have I ever heard of his 
touching intoxicating liquors of any kind, not even wine.’
236
  The claim of alcoholism was 




But refuting charges of drunkenness were just one part of the pro-Grant campaign. The 
Republicans reprinted and distributed copies of Grant’s letters and military orders to prove 
Grant’s republicanism and his commitment to the prosperity of the nation.
238
 Grant’s own 
words illustrated not only his character but what could be expected of him if he were to 
become president. Military men – such as George Washington – could seem desirable as 
political leaders because of their selfless patriotism.
239
 The nation’s history tended to indicate 
the electorate’s preference for military heroes, with George Washington, Andrew Jackson, 
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William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor all using their martial backgrounds as a 
springboard to office.
240
 Although Harrison and Taylor died during their first terms in office, 
both Washington and Jackson had served two terms and remained popular in the 1860s. 
Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin have noted that ‘military heroism and sacrifice 
[offered] a sounder basis of patriotism and republican virtue’ than the partisan environment in 
which career politicians operated.
241
 
This preference made the spread of General Grant’s letters, military orders and personal 
history of the Civil War extremely important. For as the Democratic campaign showed, 
military leadership was a double-edged sword. If on the one hand it conveyed republican 
selflessness, on the other it gave the potential president immense power, which enabled 
critics to compare Grant in 1868 to military vanquishers of republics like the Bonapartes. 
How the story of Grant’s military service was told therefore mattered a lot. And in the 
Republican canvass Grant’s writings were used to show wisdom, respectful leadership, and 
patriotism. In many respects, Grant’s campaign biographers followed a form which had been 
established by many other writers, but crucially, Republican authors in 1868 relied on 
‘adherence to truth and didactic purpose’ to elevate their works above the arena of ‘petty 
politicking’.
242
 Biographies formed a standard but important part of election campaigns in the 
nineteenth century.
243
 But though these works followed a ‘formula’ they also had to rely 
solely on the subject at hand in order to somehow persuade their readers that their works were 
absent of political purpose.
244
 Perhaps what is most interesting about Grant’s biographies was 
that his biographers, believing they had rich material, did not feel the need to obscure any 
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area of Grant’s life: they did not have to create the illusion of antipartisanship. In stark 
contrast stood biographies of the Democratic candidates, especially Seymour’s which glossed 
over his early life (often covered in a couple of pages) and focused on his political career.
245
 
While Republican biographers sought to illustrate Grant’s antipartisanship, Seymour’s were 
keen to stress his partisanship, especially his loyalty to Democratic ideals. As a result, the 
biographies of each candidate reflected their party platforms.  
In line with familiar American campaign strategies, numerous biographies were 
commissioned by the Republican Party, as well as newspapers, which detailed Grant’s early 
life and Civil War career.
246
 The works were often written by journalists, such as Charles A. 
Dana of the New York Sun (as a former special investigative agent of the War Department, 
Dana was charged with discerning the truth in rumours of Grant’s alcoholism and reported 
their groundless basis to his superiors) and Albert D. Richardson of the New York Tribune, 
but also by historians, such as John S. C. Abbott (the admirer of the Napoleons).
247
 The 
biographers all told a similar story of Grant’s record during the Civil War – and sought to 
explain away incidents which had reflected badly upon their hero. Their descriptions of 
character and stories of dedication were quoted widely in the Republican press.
248
 
The Republicans endeavoured to show Grant’s dedication to the public good through drawing 
on his past deeds. They highlighted incidents which indicated the qualities necessary to 
govern the country effectively. These included Grant’s good judgement, his economy and 
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purging of corruption from the army, and his selflessness.
249
 All these qualities demonstrated 
how greatly Grant differed from his predecessor: a contrast Republicans understandably were 
eager to stress.
250
 They illustrated how differently Grant understood executive power and 
how he could be trusted in power.
251
 Grant’s life, the biographers argued, proved his claim to 
republican purity was valid.
252
 Contrary to the claims of Blair and other Democrats, he would 
not lead the country down the road to tyranny. 
The Republicans, in an effort to counter Democratic charges, highlighted two events, in 
particular, which portrayed Grant as a model republican. These examples indicated his 
selfless devotion to the nation: a vital quality in the chief executive. The first example was his 
return to the army. Grant volunteered his services a few days after the Confederate firing 
upon Fort Sumter in April 1861. Despite this he struggled to gain a fitting position in the 
army, though he eventually received some unexpected help from his Congressman Elihu B. 
Washburne. Expressing his gratitude, he wrote to Washburne (in words reminiscent of 
Washington): ‘I left the Army, expecting never to return. I am no seeker for position, but the 
country, which educated me, is in sore peril, and, as a man of honor, I feel bound to offer my 
services for whatever they are worth.’ 
253
 In highlighting this quotation, the Republicans 
implied Grant’s Cincinnatus-like qualities: he was a warrior drawn from civilian life to save 
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the nation from peril before returning to his farm. Though not a direct comparison, it 
illustrated the republican qualities desired during Reconstruction including a commitment to 
the public good over personal interests. The second incident reinforced this: it concerned his 
demotion by his commander General Halleck in 1862 after Grant’s capture of Fort Donelson 
and promotion to Major General. Grant – eager to continue Union successes – had visited 
Nashville and lost contact with his commander.
254
 Angry at his own lack of promotion, 
Halleck complained to his superior General George B. McClellan that Grant had not 
responded to inquiries on troop numbers and movements.
255
 Grant protested that he had 
provided Halleck with this information.
256
 Lacking the information due to a rogue telegram 
operator, the disgruntled Halleck sent several messages to Grant, and eventually demoted him 
for deserting his command.
257
 Aghast, Grant responded ‘I have done my very best … to carry 
out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not 
wish in any way to impede the success of our arms.’
258
 Fortunately officials at Washington 
had been alerted of the situation, and Halleck rushed to rectify the situation.
259
 Both instances 
were used to indicate Grant’s readiness to place the national interest ahead of his own 
ambition. 
Grant’s biographers attested to his desire for fairness, justice and ‘republican simplicity’.
260
 
These qualities were shown in how he shared the hardships of his troops. An oft recounted 
story described the situation before the second day of battle at Shiloh in 1862. Grant gave 
orders to his commanders before ‘he lay down on the ground, with a stump for a pillow, and 
without shelter from the storm that raged, slept until the dawn called him again to unremitting 
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 The care that Grant showed for himself during the Civil War was minimal and 
endeared him to his troops. Washburne told of another incident, which also appeared in 
several biographies, about Grant’s participation in the diversion at Haines’ Bluff in 1863.  
‘His entire baggage for six days was a tooth-brush’, Washburne recalled. Grant, he explained, 
had ‘fared like the commonest soldier in his command, partaking of his rations, and sleeping 
upon the ground with no covering but the canopy of heaven.’
262
 These stories illustrated 
Grant’s humility and self-restraint: even as a commander he was content to share the fate of 
his soldiers.
263
 This was no aggrandising dictator. 
Perhaps in part as a riposte to Grant’s expulsion of the Jews, justice formed another key issue 
in the election campaign. A popular story during the canvass described Grant’s troops’ first 
journey home after the Mississippi river opened to trade.
264
 Grant discovered the captain of a 
boat had greatly overcharged his troops.
265
 Once informed of this circumstance, he refused to 
allow the vessel to disembark until the captain had reimbursed his soldiers and officers the 
five to seven dollars they had overpaid.
266
 His staff reported his statement: ‘I will teach these 
fellows, that the men who have perilled [sic] their lives to open the Mississippi for their 
benefit cannot be imposed upon with impunity.’
267
 Another incident also illustrated this 
dedication to justice. Grant received news from Union troops that the Confederates were 
executing African-American soldiers and their white officers in 1863. In response he wrote to 
Confederate General Richard Taylor, who commanded troops in Louisiana, whom he 
reminded that ‘[t]he government, and all officers under the government are bound to give the 
same protection to these troops that they do to any other troops.’
268
 This example reinforced 
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Grant’s statement in his acceptance letter that he would protect all citizens of the United 
States and uphold their rights. It also helped to dispel uncertainties regarding General Order 
No.11, and sought to assure Radical Republicans that Grant was committed to African-
American equality, while equating that equality with patriotic military service. Grant also 
made it clear that if this was Confederate policy towards African-American troops, then in 
the interests of fair treatment, he would deny quarter to all Confederate troops.
269
 Grant’s 
actions in this case showed that, regardless of colour, he would uphold and protect the rights 
of his soldiers who endeavoured to win the Civil War. 
The Republicans were also eager to attest to Grant’s magnanimous self-restraint, not least as 
they saw this as a way to entice the votes of the white Southern electorate. In an effort to 
portray this type of restraint, they reprinted Grant’s message to troops on assuming command 
of the Army of the Tennessee in February 1862.
270
 Speaking directly to his troops, Grant 
proclaimed:  
Let us show to our fellow-citizens of these States that we come merely to crush 
out this rebellion, and restore them to peace and the benefits of the Constitution 
and the Union, of which they have been deprived by selfish and unprincipled 
leaders. They have been told that we come to oppress and plunder. By our acts we 
will undeceive them. We will prove to them that we come to restore, not violate, 
the Constitution and the laws. In restoring to them the glorious flag of the Union, 
we will assure them that they shall enjoy under its folds the same protection of 
life and property as in former days.
271
 









The message illustrated Grant’s magnanimity and statesman-like qualities, and indicated he 
was a national candidate who desired peace and prosperity on both the battlefield and in the 
halls of power. To further stress this aspect of Grant’s character, numerous newspapers 
reminded their readers of Grant’s gracious behaviour at Appomattox Court House (where he 
ended the Civil War), when he allowed the enemy to keep their horses as they would need 
them for the spring sowing.
272
 Pro-Grant newspapers repeated this incident in an effort to 
convince the white South that not only was Grant above partisan concerns but that he was 
self-restrained in victory.
273
 Once more fears he would be a vindictive tyrant were allayed by 
pointing to moments where he had near absolute power, but chose not to wield it 
capriciously.  
Republicans also sought to answer doubts about Grant’s capacity for office. For material they 
referred to both Grant’s military career as well as his duties after the war. To reinforce 
Grant’s republican credentials they contrasted his use of power with Johnson’s. In particular, 
they sought to hold up the purity of Grant against the corruption of Johnson. In the nineteenth 
century, corruption encompassed ‘misuse of power’ or ‘the social, economic, and moral 
changes that could undermine the basis of republican society.’
274
 This could entail anything 
from the abuse of patronage to the enlargement of the United States’ debt.
275
 ‘‘Honest graft,’ 
in the form of government employees using their positions to supplement their income 
through a variety of illegal or extralegal means’ was nevertheless ‘the norm’, and provoked 
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 Republicans therefore emphasised instances when Grant vigorously fought 
corruption in the army. In 1862 Grant had written to the Quartermaster of the Department of 
Missouri that ‘[e]xtravagance seems to be the order of the day, and now I am investigating 
every Department, and all that is done here. I find that contracts are not given to the lowest 
bidders. I would recommend that Capt. Baxter, A. Q. M., now the purchasing Quartermaster 
here, be allowed to purchase in open market until the atmosphere is purified somewhat.’
277
 
Grant continued to explain that ‘nearly twenty per cent can be saved to the Government by 
annulling present contracts, made without my knowledge, and adopting the purchasing 
system.’
278
 Grant later stated to General Halleck that ‘[a] law should be passed providing that 
‘all fraudulent contractors be impressed into the ranks, or, still better, into the gunboat 
service, where they could have no chance of deserting.’’
279
 Biographers used this affair to 
indicate their candidate’s economy of administration and his fidelity to reducing the debt of 
the United States. Once more self-restraint was the key.  
American voters tended to conflate high White House expenditures with partisan rulers. 
Campaign biographers therefore highlighted Grant’s economy during his tenure as ad interim 
Secretary of War and Commanding General of the United States Army where he reduced the 
expenses of government significantly.
280
 These examples were of great importance as finance 
formed one of the main campaign issues in the 1868 presidential election. A pro-Grant 
Wisconsin newspaper reported that Grant ‘saved millions to the Treasury’ while he was ad 
interim Secretary of War.
281
 Grant’s actions in this respect built on his behaviour during the 
Civil War and earlier in his life. Republicans cited several instances of Grant’s economy 
during the Civil War, and during his time in St Louis, Missouri, in the 1850s whilst out of the 















army. They cited Grant’s frugality as a civilian in Missouri when he helped his father-in-law 
install a more efficient system of coal-fired heating in his house.
282
 Analogies between 
domestic and national economy were not uncommon in mid-nineteenth century American 
politics – Lincoln famously compared the nation to a house – but here it helped connect 
Grant’s thrifty personal character to his public administration. 
The debt contracted from the war greatly concerned many citizerns. The issue was highly 
divisive and both parties initially attempted to avoid it.
283
 However, in 1867, despite its 
controversy, the local Democratic Party in Ohio had run successfully on a platform which 
sought to reduce the debt.
284
 The Pendleton Plan (named after Senator George H. Pendleton) 
promised to repay the war bonds contracted by the federal government in greenbacks.
285
 But 
the Plan split the Democrats, with the party’s wealthy New York backers opposed,  and 
Pendleton failed to secure the Democratic presidential nomination.
286
 Yet despite Seymour’s 
nomination, Pendleton’s plan was still included in the Democratic platform.
287
 This brought 
the issues of finance, taxation and debt to the forefront of the campaign. The fragile state of 
the economy remained a concern in a country unused to such high indebtedness, and this only 
increased the desirability of a candidate who had a history of economy. It was hardly 
surprising then that campaign biographers would make so much of Grant’s frugal ways. Both 
the Republicans and Grant made clear that repudiation was not acceptable: the debt and the 
bonds issued to fund the Civil War would be paid in gold as a matter of honour regardless of 
the economic situation of the country.
288
 This commitment would later cause great problems 
within the Republican Party and federal government, but as the Republicans had highlighted, 
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Grant was not a man to change course when he believed he was pursuing the right action.
289
 
The antipartisan, tenacious man whom they had championed could not be controlled for 
political purposes when circumstances suited a change in direction for the Republican Party.  
Nowhere was this antipartisanship better represented than Grant’s role in Johnson’s power 
battles with Congress. Biographers highlighted how Grant’s staunch antiparty conception of 
politics and his adherence to the law helped foil Johnson’s attempts to relax enforcement of 
the Reconstruction Acts. After Johnson dismissed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, General 
Grant agreed to act as ad interim Secretary to protect Southern Reconstruction from the 
President’s politicking.
290
 Grant accepted this role despite the compromised position in which 
it placed him; many political commentators – especially Radical Republicans – interpreted it 
as support for Johnson’s actions and policies.
291
 During the last days of Johnson’s presidency, 
Grant’s supporters leaked many of his letters to the press, which were widely reprinted during 
the 1868 campaign, to indicate why he had reluctantly agreed to serve.
292
 In one of these 
missives Grant contrasted ‘the expressed wish of the country’ to the decision of the President 
to remove a general from command.
293
 ‘This is a republic,’ Grant claimed, ‘where the will of 
the people is the law of the land. I beg that their voice may be heard.’
294
 The correspondence 
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once more contrasted Johnson and Grant, but this time pitted a selfish politician against a 
man who respected the popular will. 
The silent man – named for his refusal to give speeches or express his political opinions –
demonstrated his strong opinions on the use of power in these battles over Reconstruction 
with Johnson. Such episodes were grist for the mill of campaign biographers whose job was 
to sell their nominee and counter Democratic narratives about a drunk despot. Yet Grant’s 
refusal to make public speeches, while encouraging his supporters to look to his past, also 
presented a challenge. The stance intrigued journalists who both denigrated him (the Daily 
National Intelligencer called him a ‘speechless sphynx’ and ‘a silent, stubborn man’) and 
lauded him for his dignity.
295
 The Harper’s Weekly artist and loyal Republican, Thomas Nast, 
addressed this point in a cartoon (see Figure 1.1) shortly before polling commenced.
296
 
Figure 1.1 ‘Dignity and Imprudence’ 
 
Source: Thomas Nast, ‘Dignity and Imprudence’, Harper’s Weekly, 24 October 1868. 
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Grant’s silence indicated a statesmanship which many orators and journalists praised. His 
stance contrasted sharply with Blair’s revolutionary and undignified statements.
297
 Nast 
praised Grant’s dignified and statesman-like behaviour, while many Republican newspapers 
expressed their preference for gracious silence over the ‘yappy’ Democratic ticket.
298
 Yet as 
we have seen, some Democratic newspapers – and Blair himself – used Grant’s silence to 
their advantage, by claiming his tight-lipped stance hid authoritarian sympathies. Nast 
addressed the claims that Grant would become a dictator through this drawing; Grant’s 
representation as a relaxed and benign German Shepherd – with his sword to the side under 
his laurel-decorated hat – emphasised his guardianship of the nation in the time of war and 
indicated that he now intended to guard the nation against the outbreak of a similar 
conflagration. Blair in comparison – depicted as a young agile terrier with the collar ‘War’ – 
was attempting to rouse the disinterested old warrior, and looked far more ready for a fight 
than the sad, tired dog content to repose in peace. Grant – who knew war – was ready to lay 
aside his sword and bring harmony to the country, and his silence – which was here read as 
an asset – indicated this. In some ways, indeed, it was a logical extension of Grant’s own take 
on party political culture. If politicians were a self-serving lot, who in pursuing selfish 
interests undermined the public good, then the less they said the better. 
Grant had always been a man of few words but the words he used conveyed his thoughts 
perfectly. Grant’s orders during the Civil War were noted for this tendency: they were brief 
but concise. Grant, it was said, never left a man in doubt over his intentions. Where Grant 
differed from previous presidential election nominees – notably his two predecessors, 
Johnson and Lincoln – was his reticence before his nomination to give speeches offering his 
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beliefs and preferred policies; there was no Cooper Union address for Republicans to fall 
back on. The nation – as journalists and biographers noted – had in the previous seven years 
become used to pithy speeches and long declarations of policies and beliefs from their 
candidates. For Radical Republicans and former slaves, who would have been reassured to 
know more about Grant’s own beliefs, his silence was hardly satisfactory.
299
 But Grant’s 
stance indicated that his conception of the presidency differed from career politicians’ 
understanding of the office. Blaming partisan political culture for many of the nation’s 
travails over the past ten years, he sought to purify the presidency, and from his acceptance 
letter to the stories his biographers told about him, he was presented to the electorate as a man 
of true probity: a pure and simple republican. 
Conclusion 
The General received news of the election results at Washburne’s house in Galena, Illinois.
300
 
Grant trounced Seymour in the electoral college by winning 214 electoral votes to his rival’s 
80 votes.
301
 The Republicans carried 26 states including several Southern states such as 
Alabama, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee.
302
 In comparison, the Democrats only 
won eight states including Louisiana, Georgia and Kentucky.
303
 The states of Mississippi, 
Texas and Virginia were unable to vote as they remained unreconstructed. Yet the popular 
vote was much closer: Grant achieved 52.7 percent whilst Seymour gained 47.3 percent.
304
 
The Republican majorities in many Southern states were very low. Grant won by under 
20,000 votes in some states and by as few as 4,000 votes in Alabama.
305
 African-American 
votes – despite the prevalence of violence by the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan – proved 
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decisive in several of the Southern states: black men cast 400,000 votes in the South giving  
Grant an overall majority of 300,000 votes.
306
 Historians have understandably looked at the 
1868 race from the perspective of the South, where former slaves cast ballots for the first 
time, but elsewhere, in a highly partisan election, support for antipartisanship may have 
swung the balance in Grant’s favour. Certainly Republicans saw this as a great asset to the 
Grant candidacy. 
The 1868 presidential election illustrated the continuing importance of republicanism in the 
late 1860s. It showed that the concept was not merely rhetoric but had a much greater 
significance within American politics and society in the Reconstruction era. Both parties 
focused on different aspects of the concept throughout the election, while also trying to work 
through how the implications of the upheavals of the previous three years had shaped the 
electorate’s expectations of the presidency. The Democrats focused on the necessity of 
vigilance against tyranny, seeing the actions of Congress as despotic and warning that Grant 
would merely extend the reign of unrepublican misrule. They used republican anxieties over 
tyranny and drunkenness to caution voters about the supposed dangers of the Republican 
candidate. Although often considered a campaign tactic, concerns about despotism were 
genuine in a politically fragile nation still recovering from the Civil War, and would haunt 
Grant long after 1868. The Republicans in response drew on republican tropes to illustrate 
how their candidate would not plunge the country into darkness but rather had the personal 
qualities to act for the universal prosperity of the nation. A significant part of the campaign 
revolved around which Grant was more plausible: the unrepublican tyrant or the patriot and 
self-restrained war hero? Enough votes ended up opting for the latter to put him into power. 
A statement repeated throughout the campaign claimed that Grant had earned the Republican 
nomination ‘not because he was a politician, but because he was not a politician; and he is 
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trusted now because it is believed he will not seek mere party ends but the country’s highest 
good.’
307
 This encapsulated his own ideas of what a president should be rather well. In 1868, 
partisan Republicans found Grant’s hostility to party politics a useful route to office, but they 
would be less pleased when he started to put these ideas into practice. 
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The One Term Principle: A Battle over Presidential Power 
 
It came as a surprise to many Republicans in March 1869 that the republican simplicity of 
General Ulysses S. Grant, which they had championed during the 1868 presidential election, 
had more than a semblance of truth. The battles over presidential power – which came to 
dominate the presidency of Andrew Johnson – were seemingly over. They thought that 
despite their failure to convict Johnson on impeachment charges, Congress had won, and the 
new president would acquiesce to their will.
1
 Republican congressmen believed that the 
period of a strong, independent presidency had come to an end, and that they would exercise 
control over the executive during Grant’s presidency.
2
 The General’s acceptance letter to the 
Republican convention in 1868 had indicated he perceived his role as ‘a purely 
Administrative officer’ who would accede to the will of the people.
3
 Congress, most 
congressional Republicans believed, was the representative of the people.
4
 It followed, then, 
that loyal Republican politicians would be given a share in distributing Grant’s spoils and 
dictating his policies. Yet, in March 1869, when Grant revealed his cabinet appointments, 
Republican congressmen were severely disappointed to find the antipartisan general they had 
sold to the electorate the previous November had become an antipartisan president. 
Republican congressmen had expected places within Grant’s cabinet in order to shape his 
administration both inside and outside the White House.
5
 At the very least they expected to 
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be consulted on his choices.
6
 As the people’s representatives, they believed they had a right 
to guide and direct the President in his endeavours.
7
 Yet Grant chose few congressmen for 
appointments, preferring instead former politicians, businessmen and military figures.
8
 
Grant’s refusal to consult the party outraged many Republicans who saw the shadow of 
Johnson’s intransigence in the President’s independence.
9
 The legal and political restraints 
they had placed on the White House over the preceding years seemed in danger of 
slackening.
10
 Republicans dissatisfied with aspects of Grant’s course looked to retighten the 
shackles. 
The new president’s independence from the familiar machinery of party politics led to a rift 
between the executive and legislative branches in his first term. Historians who hold the 
Grant administration in low esteem often blame this on his incompetence or his desire to 
reward his friends.
11
  However, reviewed in light of the literature on the enduring strength of 
antipartyism in U.S. politics, Grant’s presidency appears as an attempt to change the way 
politics was practiced. This vision inevitably placed the President on a collision course with 
Republican congressmen as Grant’s republican conception of the executive office chafed 
with the congressional desire to rein in the President. Congressional critics of Grant avowed 
that the President should be subject to their direction.
12
 In Grant’s contempt for politics as 
usual and his autonomy from the legislative branch they saw a familiar trend towards 
tyranny: Grant’s predecessor had attempted to use his patronage to build a new party which 
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would re-elect him president, and so too could the former general.
13
 The President’s 
republican outlook, which needs to be understood as more than political naiveté or 
incompetence, could ironically seem like the harbinger of despotism.  
The solution to this problem, many Republicans believed, lay in civil service reform.
14
 
Historians have often seen civil service reform as a modernizing impulse originating in the 
desire to remove corruption from politics.
15
 Committed civil service reformers identified the 
potential savings to the nation by removing partisan interests from the nation’s 
administration.
16
 Thus the cry for administrative independence was part of a wider post-war 
reform movement which sought to limit the partisan style of politics. However, historians 
have overlooked how concerns over presidential power specifically preoccupied congressmen 
in the early 1870s, and spurred their reform efforts. For Liberal Republicans, civil service 
reform was a method of reining in presidential power. But the most recent historian of the 
Liberal Republican movement, Andrew L. Slap, does not really consider the centrality of 
presidential power to his subjects’ efforts to enact reform.
17
 Yet these men believed that only 
by reforming the methods through which the President chose his appointees could they guard 
against despotism.
18
 Admittedly, the proposals for reform were often wider-ranging. In 
contrast to the Johnson-era Tenure of Office Act, which controlled only the president, for 
example, the various civil service reform bills presented to Congress also sought to exert 
control over congressional representatives by curtailing their right to recommend men to 
office.
19
 However, as the people’s representatives, many congressmen did not believe they 
                                                 
13
 Foner, Reconstruction, pp. 265-267. See also ‘General Grant’, New York Herald, 12 November 1867 and 
‘General Grant’, New York Herald, 19 November 1867. 
14
 Schafer (ed.), Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz 1848-1869, pp. 471-175. 
15
 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils; Slap, The Doom of Reconstruction, pp. 92-95; and Summers, The Era of 
Good Stealings, p. 9. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 13-16. 
17
 Slap, The Doom of Reconstruction. 
18







 As a result, when the Civil Service commission appointed by the 
President reported to Congress in December 1871, its recommendations were rebuffed by 
Republican Senator Charles Sumner who announced that the only civil service measure worth 
discussing was a constitutional amendment limiting the president to a single term.
21
 
The one term principle, as the amendment came to be known, sought to reform patronage 
appointments by preventing the re-election of a president. Sumner’s idea revolved around the 
belief that presidents used their patronage to ensure re-election by appointing men who could 
be relied upon to support the president both personally and financially.
22
 This army of 
appointees, loyal only to the president, could then be relied upon to re-elect their commander-
in-chief perhaps not just once, but two, three or more times.
23
 The drastic increase in 
presidential powers that came with the war and Reconstruction made the executive 
increasingly susceptible to tyrannical actions; both Lincoln and Johnson had faced 
accusations of tyranny for attempting to direct the nation’s affairs without consulting 
Congress, while as the previous chapter discussed, Democrats accused Grant of coveting 
imperial power before the 1868 presidential election.
24
 It followed that banning the 
president’s re-election would not only prevent despotism but lead to more responsible 
patronage appointments: Congress was seeking to reassert control over the wayward 
executive branch. The President’s independence, by accumulating power in the executive, 
simultaneously made him a model antiparty republican and a potential despot. 
Sumner’s proposal failed to garner enough support to procure a vote from either house of 
Congress, but it proved extremely popular with those discontented with Grant’s 
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administration, especially a faction of the Republican Party which broke away and created a 
new party: the Liberal Republicans.
25
 These renegade Republicans perceived the one term 
principle as an effective method of restraining executive power and supported it in the 1872 
presidential election.
26
 Their support for the principle emanated from their inability to control 
a president who seemed to be arrogating power to himself by manipulating antipartisan 
sentiment. Their concerns about unrepublican rule were heightened by the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871 – which enabled the President to bypass state authorities in prosecuting outrages by 
the Klan – and Grant’s doomed attempt to annex the Caribbean republic of Santo Domingo.
27
 
These principled dissenters worried that this unprecedented amount of power concentrated in 
the hands of one man could destroy the republic; executive power, they argued, needed 
constraints, and the one term principle became their weapon. Their republicanism led them to 
very different conclusions to Grant.  
The Liberal Republicans illustrated that exaggerated fears over executive power continued to 
play a vital role in the perception of the President’s actions during Reconstruction, and the 
images of the President derived from these anxieties proved powerful in diminishing his 
political capital.
28
 The image of an unrestrained, despotic President was used vigorously 
throughout the 1872 presidential election by the Liberal Republicans in an effort to persuade 
the electorate of the necessity of deposing the incumbent president. Grant’s attempt to 
redefine the presidency in a republican vein was misinterpreted by these congressional 
representatives who saw tyranny in his independence. Regardless of Grant’s support for 
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numerous Liberal Republican issues, such as specie resumption and the reform of the 
patronage appointments system, the President’s reluctance to consult Congress renewed fears 
of executive aggrandisement increasingly apparent since the outbreak of the Civil War in 
April 1861.
29
 The fears emphasise how the nature of Reconstruction and the ever expanding 
boundaries of executive power continued to cause concern for many Republicans, who, 
acting on their fears, proceeded to hinder the ability of the President to implement 
Reconstruction. Republican conceptions of power continued to define the presidency, both 
augmenting and subtracting power from the President.  
The one term principle signifies a different conception of Grant’s presidency to familiar 
depictions of a naive, incompetent, and weak President who conceded his powers to an 
emboldened Congress.
30
 Instead it shows a strong executive, who, in exerting his 
independence, continued the battles over presidential power which had critically undermined 
his predecessor’s administration.
31
 In examining the role of the one term principle in Grant’s 
first administration and the 1872 presidential election, this chapter illustrates how the 
President’s republican antipartisan independence from Congress ironically led to accusations 
of unrepublican despotism by influential members of his own party. The accusations, though 
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as unsuccessful in undermining Grant’s power in 1872 as similar Democratic charges had 
been four years earlier, would haunt him in his second term by fuelling genuine fears over the 
undefined limits of presidential power.  
The Model Republican 
The nomination of General Ulysses S. Grant as the Republican presidential candidate seemed 
to herald an end to the battles between the President and Congress. Yet despite ‘the accession 
of a friend to the Executive Chair’ the political infighting over presidential power continued 
unabated.
32
 Even before his inauguration, some within the party anticipated that Grant would 
follow Johnson’s lead and abuse his power before long.
33
 The Republican Party had 
promoted General Grant during the 1868 presidential election as the epitome of republican 
simplicity – he was said to embody the virtues of antipartisanship, sacrifice and honour – 
only to discover how close the representation reflected reality when Grant became president. 
Republicans – especially the Radicals – had believed that Grant’s silence masked his true 
sentiments.
34
 Many in the party – along with plenty of historians since – did not believe the 




The Republicans needed to look to history to predict Grant’s path. The General’s hero, the 
Mexican War victor President Zachary Taylor, provided a clue as to how Grant would act. A 
classical republican, like Grant, Taylor believed his election in 1848 rested on a broad 
coalition, which had come together on account of an antiparty election campaign by the 
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 In many ways the historical circumstances bore similarities, which Grant almost 
certainly noticed. Taylor, like Grant, had come to the presidency after leading the nation to 
victory in a divisive war, and with the divisions caused by the war very much still in 
evidence. Taylor had been presented to the electorate as a man of patriotism and honour and 
little else: the Whig platform that year was silent on the salient issues of the day as Grant 
would be in 1868.
37
 And Taylor’s hostility to partisan culture is hinted at in his claim to have 
never voted before 1848.
38
 In power Taylor dispensed patronage equally between different 
political factions, and despite being one of the nation’s richest slaveholders, appointed a 
significant number of antislavery men to his cabinet.
39
 Taylor, like Grant, fervently believed 
that his duty lay in placing the public good above partisan interests.
40
 Grant’s history as an 
antiparty man can be seen in his correspondence during the war and in Johnson’s presidency. 
He had already expressed his disgust for ‘mere trading politicians’ in an 1868 letter to 
General Sherman, to whom he explained how politicians subverted the public good to the 
detriment of the gains of the late Civil War.
41
 The phrase ‘mere trading politicians’ had been 
popular in pre-Civil War antiparty discourse, which suggested Grant’s familiarity with the 
tradition.
42
 Heralded by Republican supporters as the purest incarnation of republicanism 
since Washington, Grant promised to be true to his word.  
 
The first indication that Grant’s antipartisan image was not simply rhetoric came in the form 
of his cabinet appointments. Grant’s hostility to the spoils system is evident even before the 
Civil War. In 1859, he had written to his father regarding the position of County Engineer 
                                                 
36
 Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, pp. 67-76. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 72-73. See also Smith, No Party Now, pp. 19-20; and Voss-Hubbard, Beyond Party, pp. 40-47.  
38
 Thomas G. Mitchell, Antislavery Politics in Antebellum and Civil War America (Westport, Connecticut, 
2007), p. 40. 
39
 Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, pp. 70, 73-76. See also William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: 
Volume 1: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (Oxford, 1990), p. 497. 
40
 Ibid., pp. 73-76. 
41
 Simon (ed.), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 18, pp. 292-293. 
42
 Ibid. For an examination of this antiparty discourse in the antebellum era, see Voss-Hubbard, Beyond Party, 
pp. 11, 14, 125, 176. The term ‘wire-pulling’ was another way of describing – often corrupt – machine politics.  
133 
 
which he had applied for and lost upon a vote.
43
 Grant sought to clarify that, although the 
Democratic Commissioners had voted for him, he was not a Democrat.
44
 In his letter, Grant 
explained that he only voted a straight Democratic ticket once.
45
 ‘In all other elections,’ he 
claimed, ‘I have universally selected the candidates that in my estimation, were the best fitted 
for the different offices and it never happens that such men are all arrayed on one side.’
46
 
This method of ‘scratching’ pre-printed ballot papers was strongly encouraged by critics of 
partisan culture. And such principles continued to inform his wartime behaviour. After he 
received a position in the Union Army in 1861, Grant wrote to his father that ‘he was 
perfectly sickened at the political wire pulling for all these commissions and would not 
engage in it’, a stance that resulted in him receiving a lower position than would be expected 
considering his West Point background.
47
 Little did the Republicans realise they had elected 
an antipartisan man for whom character mattered as much as policy. 
 
Eager to avoid the influence of ambitious politicians, Grant kept as silent on his cabinet picks 
as he had on policy. He even shielded his recommendations from his wife. Her questioning 
led Grant to issue a light-hearted warning: ‘Jule, if you say anything more about it I’ll get a 
leave of absence, go off West, and not come back till the 4th of March.’
48
 Grant later 
commented that he slept with his vest under his pillow and woke up several times during the 
night to check that his wife had not found his list with the names of his chosen cabinet.
49
 
Only Alexander T. Stewart – Grant’s Treasury appointment – received advance notice of his 
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selection – and this was only due to his business commitments.
50
 With the exception of Elihu 
B. Washburne – who received the temporary position of Secretary of State to give him 
gravitas as Minister to France – Grant’s choices were based entirely on his own judgement.
51
 
As he affirmed with Stewart’s appointment, Grant sought appointees for their aptitude in each 
area, not their party loyalty; Grant desired Stewart as he ‘wanted the Treasury conducted on 
strict business principles.’
52
 The appointments illustrated that Grant wished to have experts in 
charge of each department rather than treat each position as a political reward. 
 
Indeed, just as in 1856, when he voted on his estimation of a candidate’s merit rather than his 
faction, Grant chose his appointees based upon their abilities (or rather his perception of 
them) regardless of party, race, colour or gender. Particularly striking here were his 
appointments of Ely S. Parker – a Native American – and Elizabeth Van Lew to influential 
patronage positions. Parker, from the Seneca tribe, was made Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, the first Native American to hold this position, while Van Lew became the 
postmaster at Richmond, a politically-sensitive position given it had been the Confederate 
capital and a role much coveted by partisan politicians eager to broaden their base.
53
 Grant 
chose independently – apparently he consulted no-one – in order to shield himself from the 
machinations of office seekers.
54
 
Historians have tended to attribute Grant’s cabinet appointments to incompetence or as 
rewards for gifts.
55
 They have recalled Henry Adams’ claim that Grant was ‘a baby 
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politician’ who did not know how politics worked to explain his choices.
56
 Yet Grant’s 
correspondence illustrates that his selections were a calculated move derived from his 
conception of politics. Grant strongly believed in the separation of powers and the necessity 
for executive independence in order to implement the peoples’ will. He sought to redefine the 
presidency by re-establishing Washington’s republicanism in the executive office. As an avid 
watcher of politics and an astute political thinker, Grant followed politics with great 
interest.
57
 He argued with his father-in-law over slavery and carefully weighed up the merits 
of various candidates in each election.
58
 The new president also was knowledgeable about 
previous administrations: in 1878, for example, he asserted that Hamilton Fish, his Secretary 
of State, had been the best ‘in fifty years’.
59
 The only possible exception, he noted, was 
Taylor’s appointee, William Marcy.
60
 These were not the opinions of someone with a limited 
knowledge of politics. By claiming Grant had no interest in politics (and only voted once in 
his life) historians – who have measured political engagement by party loyalty – have created 
a skewed portrait of the President as an apolitical man rather than an antipartisan man. 
Grant’s selections astounded congressmen, but praise came from newspapers of all stripes. 
The shock which the country expressed is evident in the nation’s press. One of the leading 
independent dailies, the Philadelphia Public Ledger – run by a close Grant ally – noted that 
‘[f]or the first time in many years a State secret has been so well kept as to baffle the most 
ingenious and persistent efforts to worm it out, for when the telegraph brought the 
nominations to the public, they were entirely different from the ‘slates.’’
61
 The Ledger was 
impressed. ‘These gentlemen’, it concluded, ‘have all been invited into the public service by 
the President without any agency or procurement of their own—a circumstance as rare in 
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these latter days as it is honorable to both the President and the recipients of his 
confidence.’
62
 Newspapers of all stripes agreed on the candidates’ independence and distance 
from political circles, and commended the new president for his choices. Several commented 
on ‘the absolute independence of every member of [the cabinet] upon any merely [sic] party 
ties’.
63
 ‘[T]hey are all untrammelled’, remarked one.
64
 Grant’s cabinet in this way was more 
astute than it might have seemed. Ex-Confederates – who had sometimes looked forward to 
the promise of Grant acting in an authoritarian manner in 1868 – welcomed the absence of 
Radical Republicans.
65
 For the Northern middle class, meanwhile, the subordination of party 
politicians had its own appeal. The New York Times, a moderate Republican newspaper 
known for its independent leanings, commented that the cabinet’s ‘members are business 
men rather than politicians, and are likely to make the practical interests of the country their 
first care’.
66
 The Public Ledger called one nominee ‘an able and intelligent representative 
man of his class, and a man of the strictest honor and integrity ... he is a man of the highest 
type of mercantile honor and probity, and universally esteemed for his purity of character.’
67
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Leading newspapers across the country did note the ‘disappointment’ of the politicians with 
the President’s appointments, but as the New York Times observed ‘[t]he considerations 
which lead partisans to view with impatience the composition of the new Cabinet are 
precisely the considerations which make it satisfactory to the main body of people.’
69
 But, the 
Times perceived, ‘[t]he politicians regard coldly, if not with dislike, the application of a 




There was dissent from familiar quarters. The Democratic New York World – a paper which 
was uneasy about the tone of Seymour and Blair’s campaign in 1868 – commented that 
Grant’s selection ‘fills his political opponents with wonder’ and conceded that he ‘had not 
only deviated from the beaten path, but deviated into absolute oddity’.
71
 The ‘only 
hypothesis’ the journal could come up with was ‘that General Grant means to be the 
candidate of the Republican party for a second term, and will tolerate in his Cabinet no 
statesman from whom he would have anything to fear as a rival.’
72
 The paper’s analysis of 
Grant’s choices hinted at more sinister motives in the President’s selections: Grant was not 
merely antipartisan but potentially tyrannical in his intent to control those around him as he 
pursued, at least, a second term. It was an accusation levelled at Grant during the 1868 
presidential election and one the Democrats would continue to use throughout his presidency. 
Yet despite the deviation from the traditional method of appointing the foremost members of 
the party, there was a general acceptance that the appointees meant business, for it was ‘not 
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an ornamental Cabinet’; the World conceded that ‘the new Cabinet is ‘fearfully and 
wonderfully made’’, indicating the possibility of an oncoming tyranny but also highlighting 
that the President was neither incompetent nor a slave to patronage.
73
  
Stronger opposition came from within the Republican Party. The contempt felt towards the 
President for his antipartisan-style cabinet was palpable. Grant’s deviation from the use of 
patronage for party rewards – the spoils system associated with President Jackson – met with 
intense dissatisfaction from the politicians. Many Republicans, especially the Radicals, 
believed the ascension of a Republican president meant the return of access to presidential 
prerogatives.
74
 Sumner wrote to a friend on 29 December 1868 that ‘the Senate is again in the 
cabinet’.
75
 His words indicated how many congressmen felt they had a natural role in the 
President’s inner circle.
76
 Similarly, when Missouri Senator Carl Schurz approached the 
President to discuss the selection of the St Louis postmaster (a significant patronage 
position), he was appalled to find Grant had already made the appointment.
77
 Schurz’s 
‘remonstrance’ was met with Grant’s delightful response: ‘Why, Mr Schurz, I know Missouri 
a great deal better than you do.’
78
 Over in Cincinnati, Republican newspapers publicly 
bickered between themselves over the role of the party in appointments, leading the Enquirer 
to question whether ‘the Gazette think[s] [the President] ought to pay no attention to those 
men who elected him?’
79
 
Republicans who wanted the prioritisation of Reconstruction and Radical policies, such as the 
civil rights of African Americans, remained discontented with the antiparty cabinet. Veteran 
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abolitionist Wendell Phillips complained that Grant’s choices ‘[gave] no indication of the 
President’s plans. It rather shows that he has none, for it means nothing.’
80
 Moreover, Phillips 
claimed that Grant ‘excludes every one that any body ever thought of.’
81
 Other partisans, 
such as Schurz, insisted that Grant did not understand politics, and sought to give the 
President lessons, boasting that after ‘several conferences with [Grant] … he is becoming 
steadily more cooperative.’
82
 Schurz – amongst other Radical Republicans – desired to be 
involved in Grant’s decisions, and hinted at his coming conflict with the new president in 
letters to his wife.
83
 Writing of Grant’s collision with Congress over Stewart, Schurz 
informed his wife that the President had ‘ask[ed] Congress to repeal the troublesome law’, 
however, ‘Congress showed itself so little disposed to do it that Grant quickly saw his 
mistake and recalled his message.’
84
 Though Schurz was satisfied with Grant’s conduct, in 
this instance, it was clear that tension already existed between the two branches of 
government. The letters illustrated that the President and congressmen held two different 
conceptions of the presidency and its role within politics which would inevitably clash in due 
course.  
But Republican opposition rested on more than fears over the future of Reconstruction. 
Naturally, many members of Congress did not appreciate Grant’s attempt to remain above 
party. Lyman Trumbull, in particular, believed the president was ‘just as much subject to our 
control as if we appointed him, except that we cannot remove him and substitute another in 
his place.’
85
 Schurz, too, after the Stewart debacle, announced the necessity for the President 
to consult Congress in patronage matters, claiming in its aftermath that ‘Grant received a 
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most salutary lesson in this connection.’
86
 Their comments indicated that the battles over 
presidential power would inevitably continue to define the presidency. The New York Herald 
correctly analysed the motives of the executive noting ‘the moral of this Cabinet is that it is 
President Grant’s Cabinet, and he intends to be master of his administration.’
87
 
Whilst Republicans like Schurz and Trumbull believed it was the party’s role to shape and 
guide the President’s administration, Grant indicated with his appointments and 
correspondence that administrative duties were best kept in the hands of capable and 
disinterested public servants.
88
 Office seekers, especially politicians, sought power to sate 
their own ambition, and not with the country’s best interests in mind. A statement attributed 
to Grant cropped up in a number of newspapers which claimed that the new president had 
said ‘he would tolerate no idlers in any department of the Government ... the people were too 
poor to pay salaries as a mere bonus to professional politicians.’
89
 Whether hearsay or not, 
the statement had a ring of authenticity, as it corresponded to the President’s previous 
statements and actions which had indicated that he did not believe his appointive powers 
should be used for mere party political reward.
90
  
Many congressmen interpreted this attempt to define the presidency as an abuse of power. 
These figures, still suspicious of presidential power in the wake of Johnson’s presidency, saw 
Grant’s departure from the status quo as a sign that he would rely upon his own ideas of 
governance, as Johnson did, and would act aloof from Congress; fears abounded that Grant 
was ‘about to Johnsonize.’
91
 Where Grant saw the republicanism of Washington, then, 
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congressmen saw tyranny. The ascension of a Republican did not diminish their fears of the 
potential abuses of power that a president could commit in the name of the nation. After years 
of misrule by Johnson, they regarded deviations from ‘established practice’ as a sign of 
corruption.
92
  The New York Sun, a Grant supporter in 1868, gave an indication of this train of 
thought when it wrote of how ‘a ring of disappointed politicians has been formed, with the 
intention of smashing the ring [of disappointment] at all hazards’
93
 The implication, here, was 
that the President, by refusing to nominate the leading Republican politicians, operated upon 
sinister, corrupt objectives which the Republicans sought to destroy. Grant’s antipartisanship, 
then, was corruption.  
In particular, those who disliked his appointments – especially some Republican congressmen 
and Democratic newspapers – hinted that behind the nominations lay nepotism. Soon after 
the cabinet selections were made, Schurz wrote to his wife with the charge that Grant’s 
decision not to nominate ‘the most conspicuous lights and managers of the dominant party’ 
rested upon his wish to reward friends and provide for his family.
94
 Similarly, a Democratic 
Illinois newspaper noted that ‘the General adheres to his friends’.
95
 An Ohio Democratic 
paper, too, alleged that Republicans believed Grant’s choices were ‘not because of any 
special fitness, but because they were all warmly attached to him, and had promoted his 
personal ends.’
96
 It was an indication of the allegations which would later be levelled at the 
President. Nepotism, after all, was decidedly unrepublican.  
However, though the likes of Schurz and Trumbull perceived Grant’s selections as relying on 
nepotism and cronyism, Sumner read even more sinister motives into Grant’s actions, seeing 
a dangerous trend towards the militarisation of civil offices. Sumner understood Grant’s 
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appointments as ‘breathing the military spirit’ into government, and called it ‘a species of 
Caesarism or personalism’.
97
 The independent nominations, as well as the appointment of a 
high number of military men to civil service positions, unnerved these reformist Senators 
who feared the presence of the ‘military ring’ which they believed corrupted and controlled 
power in the presidency.
98
 Only a month later, a semi-satirical newspaper, The Imperialist, 
would mock these fears by hinting that Grant was using the Union veterans’ organisation, the 
Grand Army of the Republic, as a route to perpetual power.
99
 The paper had plenty of 
material to work with. Some newspapers, especially those in the Democratic camp, alleged 
that ‘Grant has formed his Cabinet on the military principle—that is to say, just as he would 
have appointed a general staff’, thus implying that ‘his Cabinet are only there to obey his 
orders ... he does not propose to have any bickering among his advisers to the Presidential 
succession’.
100
 The newspaper insinuated that military behaviour had seeped into the highest 
echelons of civil life and Grant would firmly control his administration. The infiltration of 
military power into civilian politics foreshadowed the end of the republic. Americans, after 
all, believed it was a victorious general – Julius Caesar – who had turned Rome into an 
empire. 
 
Power and Patronage 
These fears motivated the first of many power battles over executive power during Grant’s 
first term. Even before Grant announced his cabinet appointments, Sumner’s correspondence 
highlighted fears among abolitionists of the potential abuse of power by the new president. 
One wrote to Sumner that he hoped ‘the Senate will not be in haste to repeal laws which 
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lessen the President’s power. It is now too great and although Grant might not abuse it no one 
can tell how soon we may have another Johnson who will.’
101
 The motion to repeal the 
Tenure of Office Act came before the Senate prior to the receipt of Grant’s appointments. 
Although passed by the House, the Senate rejected repeal by 35 to 15 votes.
102
 But Grant 
desired its removal which led the House to lead the battle for repeal again, though senators 
remained cautious.
103
 It was only natural for them to regard Grant’s actions with suspicion in 
light of Johnson’s behaviour. Instead, then, senators compromised on an amendment to the 
Act after Grant promised only to fill vacant offices.
104
 This would allow Grant to remove and 
appoint officers subject to approval by the Senate; but it removed the presidential necessity to 
justify dismissals to the Senate.
105
 The battle illustrated that although senators were willing to 
compromise they were still reluctant to concede power to the President. 
A more significant battle was going on concurrently to the Tenure of Office repeal debate 
which may have affected the senatorial reticence to increase presidential power. Grant’s 
nomination of Stewart to the Treasury contravened Alexander Hamilton’s little known 1789 
law which prohibited the appointment of a person who ‘directly or indirectly [was] concerned 
or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce’.
106
 None the wiser, the Senate 
had unanimously confirmed the appointment; upon learning of the restriction, Senators John 
Sherman and David Patterson had moved to repeal ‘this disabling provision.’
 107
 It was 
suggested by the press that initially a majority of Republican senators, especially 
conservatives and moderates, were inclined to acquiesce, until Sumner intervened.
108
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Motivated by fears over the abuse of power, Sumner suggested the motion should first face 
‘consideration by a committee.’
109
 Shortly afterwards Congress received a message from the 
President which asked for Stewart’s exception from the law.
110
 Sherman reacted by 
attempting to pass his motion, only for Sumner to interject stating ‘the bill ought to be most 
profoundly considered before it is acted upon by the Senate’; years later the New York 
Tribune suggested ‘that Sumner’s ‘sonorous voice’ arrested the proposed exemption’ and 
after consideration, senators – especially Radicals and moderates – appeared reluctant to 
exempt Stewart, which led Grant to recall his request.
111
 Schurz, for his part, remarked that 
‘the matter looked quite threatening for some days’.
112
 
Some historians have contended that this opposition derived itself from lingering malice over 
patronage appointments, especially among those who later became Liberal Republicans. 
Sumner, in particular, had been tipped for the Secretary of State position by numerous friends 
and commentators, such as John Russell Young of the New York Tribune and Samuel Bowles 
of the Springfield Republican.
113
 Sumner never explicitly stated he desired the cabinet 
position, just as he never expressed a desire for the vacant Massachusetts Senate seat, instead 
he  remained coy stating he would accept the position if the country wanted him.
114
 The 
Senator wrote to a friend the day after Grant was elected in 1868 reiterating that ‘[n]obody 
has ever heard me say that I would accept a place out of the Senate,’ but he conceded that, ‘if 
it were offered to me … I admit, however, that my country has a right to determine where I 
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 Furthermore, he told a friend that he ‘was still expecting ‘the possible or 
probable offer to him by General Grant of the office of Secretary of State’’.
116
 His 
acquaintance commented that ‘[h]e would dislike to leave the Senate, and still I fancy he 
would like the Secretaryship.’
117
 One of his letters to William H. Seward, Johnson’s 
Secretary of State, contained a hint of this desire: instead of writing ‘Secretary of State’ 
underneath his name to mark the intended recipient of the letter, Sumner wrote it adjacent to 
his own name perhaps indicating to Seward the future direction of foreign affairs.
118
 Yet, 
despite this wish, there is no indication that Sumner’s course was determined by ambition. 
Indicating his principled stance to executive power, Sumner had objected to legislation 
increasing presidential power before the Senate received Grant’s nominations. It implies, 
then, that his actions were motivated by republican concerns over presidential power 
heightened by Johnson’s abuse, and his desire to protect the gains of Reconstruction which 
many Radicals believed Grant would fritter away. 
However, whilst Sumner’s opposition arose from genuine worries, there exists less evidence 
to suggest that the hostility of other senators such as Schurz and Trumbull’s arose from 
principled concerns. Trumbull, in particular, had engaged in fraudulent actions in Congress. 
During Johnson’s presidency, Grant – as ad interim Secretary of War – sought legal services 
from Trumbull in relation to a Supreme Court case from Mississippi for the War 
Department.
119
 Trumbull initially accepted before passing the case onto Senator Matthew H. 
Carpenter, yet Trumbull demanded a fee of 10,000 dollars to which he had no entitlement as 








 University of Sheffield Library: Charles Sumner MSS, Western Bank Library Wolfson Microfilm 509, Series 
2, Reel 82, Charles Sumner to William Seward, 11 January 1869. 
119
 The Reform Leaders: Trumbull, Schurz, Doolittle, Farnsworth, and Hassaurek Before the Bar of Public 
Opinion (n.p., 1872), p. 1. See also Horace White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull (Boston and New York, 1913), 
pp. 330-332. White was the Liberal Republican editor of the Chicago Tribune. 
146 
 
he did not present the case in court.
120
 Similarly, Schurz’s correspondence indicates a similar 
disregard for principle. His letters indicate his desire to return to the status quo when it came 
to patronage appointments, and this seems to have been a priority ahead of any genuine 
objections to Grant’s misuse of power.
121
 In a letter to his friend James Taussig, Schurz 
described Grant’s system of appointments as ‘a lottery’, and claimed ‘heaven knows upon 
what mysterious theory the distribution of prizes is made.’
122
 He explained: ‘I have worked 
very hard for my friends’ to little avail.
123
 Schurz also claimed that this system made the job 
of a senator ‘the meanest drudgery a human imagination ever conceived’ and labelled Grant’s 
system one of ‘utter absurdity’.
124
 Though he claimed a lifelong affinity for civil service 
reform, his claim was slightly dubious and seemed to rely more upon his belief that the best 
men should gain office; it was upon this basis that Schurz vowed to pursue civil service 
reform.
125
 Grant himself would later complain that calls for civil service reform often came 
loudest from those most in want of patronage ‘who expected offices as a right.’
126
 
Yet despite their personal desire for patronage, both senators with genuine fears and those 
who misinterpreted Grant’s motives in his selection of cabinet officers sought legislative 
redress to curtail executive abuse of power. Under Johnson they had moulded genuine civil 
service reform efforts into an attempt to undermine executive power, and they pursued an 
identical route with Grant. Senator Thomas A. Jenckes desired civil service reform to reduce 
both executive and congressional power, but his bill, which would have made  ‘competitive 
open-examinations’ for civil service appointments not chosen by the president compulsory, 
and created an administering board of three commissioners with fixed five year terms, 
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received scant attention when first introduced in December 1865.
127
 Only when President 
Johnson broke with the Republican Party did civil service reform gain popularity in the 
legislature.
128
 However, despite increased interest – and the tailoring of Jenckes’ bill to cater 
to the anti-Johnson sentiment – Congress remained more interested in a bill which promised 
to curb executive power without weakening congressional power.
129
 A majority of 
Republicans remained convinced ‘that executive power was dangerously strong and needed 
clipping’, while Congress could be safely left alone.
130
  
Despite Jenckes’ lack of success with his Civil Service bill, he raised the issue again during 
Grant’s first term. Here, he garnered Grant’s support, but his bill still lacked a congressional 
majority. However, just as Johnson’s missteps led to the curbing of executive power, Grant’s 
attempt to define the presidency led to renewed interest in a measure which would lessen 
executive power. Both Schurz and Trumbull – the breakaway leaders of the Liberal 
Republican Party – brought forth civil service reform bills which vested more powers in 
Congress than anything Jenckes’ had proposed.
131
 Schurz’s bill failed to remove the practice 
of rotation in office, which denied civil servants’ tenure beyond the incumbency of the 
president who had appointed them, whilst Trumbull’s effort endeavoured to keep 
congressmen’s role in making recommendations.
132
 Both their efforts illustrated their 
discontent with the President’s attempt to enforce the separation of powers and a lack of 
sympathy with genuine civil service reform.  
These Senators’ disillusionment with the President’s course, especially over patronage 
appointments, led them to desire the creation of a new party. Schurz, in a speech at Nashville, 
                                                 
127
 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, pp. 15-19. 
128
 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
129









Tennessee, in September 1871, pronounced ‘the need for reform and a new party’.
133
 Of all 
Grant’s policies, the first Schurz spoke about in his speech was civil service reform. He 
described how Grant’s ‘system of government patronage has scandalously demoralized our 
political life’ and that the ‘civil service ought to be reformed, the abuses of patronage 
abolished, and all good citizens should cooperate to restore our public life to the purity and 
high tone of the first years of the republic. Shameless corruption, open and covert, has 
developed itself in many places.’
134
 Schurz charges rarely contained any specifics, but as 
Andrew L. Slap has indicated, he did have concerns over executive corruption and abuse of 
power which were rooted in his German heritage.
135
 Yet these anxieties seemed less apparent 
in his desire for genuine civil service reform which embodied itself most poignantly in the 
Liberal Republican support for the one term principle. But neither Schurz nor Trumbull 
crafted the principle. 
Yet despite Schurz and Trumbull’s accusations of corruption and executive abuse of 
patronage, the President declared his support for reform of the civil service in his second 
annual message to Congress on 5 December 1870. Several senators had raised the issue and 
Grant approved of the prospective measures. Grant highlighted the inadequacies of the 
present system of appointing men to civil service offices stating that it was not conducive to 
securing ‘the best men, and often not even fit men, for public place’.
136
 Grant stated in his 
message that: 
Always favoring practical reforms, I respectfully call your attention to one abuse 
of long standing which I would like to see remedied by this Congress. It is a 
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reform in the civil service of the country. I would have it go beyond the mere 
fixing of the tenure of office of clerks and employees who do not require ‘the 
advice and consent of the Senate’ to make their appointments complete. I would 
have it govern, not the tenure, but the manner of making all appointments. There 
is no duty which so much embarrasses the Executive and heads of Departments as 
that of appointments, nor is there any such arduous and thankless labor imposed 
on Senators and Representatives as that of finding places for constituents. The 
present system does not secure the best men, and often not even fit men, for 
public place. The elevation and purification of the civil service of the 




It was clear Grant desired reform, though beyond identifying with the cause, he did not make 
any suggestions. He does hint though at a system of examinations through the reference to 
‘elevation’ and ‘purification’: a possible nod to removing nominations from the hands of both 
the executive and legislators.
138
 But his message signalled his distaste for the scramble over 
offices by politicians and their constituents at every level of the civil service. It bred, Grant 
implied, incompetence and inefficiency, which was not in the interest of the public good. 
Patronage, he suggested, was burdensome and desperately required reform. Yet Congress did 
not echo Grant’s support for this measure despite the drafting of several different bills, and 
after much infighting, some members managed to set up a commission through the addition 
of a rider to a civil appropriations bill (a result of the immense opposition to bills on civil 
service reform itself).
139
 When the commission finally reported, Grant adopted the measures 
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through executive orders. However, Sumner raised an objection to the new rules, stating that 
civil service reform would mean nothing without the one term principle. 
Grant, Sumner, and the One Term Amendment 
Perhaps taking inspiration from Senator Benjamin Wade, who raised the issue in 1866 with 
presidential power in his sights, Sumner introduced, on 21 December 1871, ‘a Joint 
Resolution proposing an Amendment of the Constitution confining the President to one 
term.’
140
 The Senator claimed this amendment ‘is the initial point of Civil Service Reform; 
that is the first stage in that great reform.’
141
 Without the one term amendment, he argued, 
civil service reform would be ineffectual, as it would not curb executive power.
142
 Sumner’s 
actions had precedent: he had previously introduced a civil service reform bill – without 
mention of the one term principle – in 1864 just before the Republican convention in order to 
derail President Lincoln’s re-nomination, but there was little interest in his measure then.
143
 
Along with other Republicans he had fought to ensure Johnson remained a one term 
president. Now, in 1871, his long battle to augment congressional power continued. The one 
term principle was an attempt to illustrate the supremacy of the legislative branch whilst 
rebuking the President by accusing him of using corrupt methods in dispensing patronage 
appointments.
144
 Congress and the party represented the people, Sumner affirmed, and the 
president must bow to their will.
145
 
However, the resolution greatly confused other Republican senators, who failed to understand 
Sumner’s motivations. Ostensibly, Sumner targeted the President’s power, yet the proposal 
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would not have come into effect until the 1876 presidential election: too late to stop a Grant 
second term. Seemingly, then, it was an attempt ‘to embarrass the Administration’, and those 
who opposed the measure regarded it as ‘merely an electioneering document, designed to 
injure Grant.’
146
 The amendment – especially the portion of it suggested by a constituent of 
Sumner’s that made any known drunk ineligible for office – comprised an attempt to deprive 
Grant of the 1872 Republican presidential nomination.
147
 Whilst Grant’s civil service reforms 
aimed to remove congressional influence by enforcing independent examinations to ascertain 
a candidate’s fitness for office, Sumner’s amendment sought to curtail executive power. 
Although it would have placed no legal limit on Grant’s candidacy in 1872, it marked a 
symbolic assault on the sitting President’s hopes of re-election, borne out of Sumner’s fears 
that Grant was becoming too powerful.  
The amendment in this regard must be understood as part of a battle over presidential power 
tied to the President’s attempts to annex Santo Domingo (the present day Dominican 
Republic). For Sumner the Santo Domingo case was particularly dangerous as it threatened 
the independence of a black nation in the Caribbean. But it also illustrated for him the 
dangers of executive usurpation. Sumner had previously opposed annexation when it was 
suggested by Fish’s predecessor Seward, and he had not changed his mind in the intervening 
years. Sumner and his allies in the Senate interpreted Grant’s pursuit of Santo Domingo as a 
sign of executive aggrandisement, and the one term principle offered them a means to curb 
what they argued was a dangerous instinct. 
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The proposal arose when the Santo Domingo President Buenaventura Baez offered the 
United States the opportunity to annex his country to protect it from European empires.
148
 
Grant negotiated a treaty for annexation as per his executive powers. Breaking with 
precedent, though, Grant called on Sumner (as the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign 
Relations in the Senate) at his house to discuss the treaty rather than call him to the White 
House.
149
 The President arrived unannounced but was welcomed into Sumner’s house for 
discussion.
150
 Grant left with the impression that Sumner would support annexation – he had 
said nothing to suggest otherwise – though Sumner’s exact words to the President have been 
debated with the three witnesses present changing their statements.
151
 He purportedly told 
Grant: ‘I am a Republican and an Administration man, and I will do all I can to make your 
Administration a success. I will give your subject my best thought, and will do all I can 
rightly and consistently to aid you.’
152
 Later, Sumner, in an attempt to denigrate the 
President’s reputation, would say Grant showed up at his house drunk.
153
 Grant felt betrayed 
by Sumner’s efforts to destroy his treaty, incorrectly asserting that it had little to do with the 
merits of the treaty, and everything to do with his decreasing power in the Senate.
154
  
Ironically, though, the President and Sumner were vying over different means to the same 
end. Grant desired annexation as he believed it would help improve race relations in the 
United States.
155
 A memorandum he wrote sometime between 1869 and 1870, which he 
                                                 
148
 Love, Race Over Empire, p. 37. 
149
 Blue, Charles Sumner and the Conscience of the North, p. 190. 
150
 Library of Congress: Charles Sumner MSS, Charles Sumner to unknown, 10 March 1871, and Guyatt, 
‘America’s Conservatory’, Journal of American History, p. 979. 
151
 Guyatt, ‘America’s Conservatory’, Journal of American History, p. 979; Donald, Charles Sumner and the 
Rights of Man, p. 437;.and Love, Race Over Empire, pp. 50-51. 
152
 Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man, p. 437. 
153
 McFeely, Grant, p. 351. 
154
 Roscoe Conkling, ‘The Presidential Battle of 1872’, (Buffalo Commercial Advertiser Campaign Document 
No.1, 1872), p. 11. See also John Y. Simon (ed.), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 22: June 1 1871-
January 31 1872 (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1998), pp. 231-232, and John Y. Simon (ed.), The Papers of 
Ulysses S. Grant Volume 23: February 1 1872-December 31 1872 (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 2000), p. 238. 
155




never sent to the Senate, explains his views.
156
 He wrote ‘[t]he present difficulty in bringing 
all parts of the United States to a happy unity and love of country grows out of the prejudice 
to color. The prejudice is a senseless one, but it exists.’
157
 Grant then clarified that ‘[t]he 
colored man cannot be spared until his place is supplied, but with a refuge like San Domingo 
his worth here would soon be discovered, and he would soon receive such recognition as to 
induce him to stay’.
158
 He viewed annexation as a way for ex-slaveholders to learn the value 
of their former property’s labour, and hoped it would improve conditions in the South for 
African Americans. Grant also believed that annexing Santo Domingo would accelerate the 
demise of hemispheric slavery. The President asserted that ‘San Domingo in the hands of the 
United States would make slave labor unprofitable and would soon extinguish that hated 
system of enforced labor.’
159
 He clarified that the United States remained ‘the largest 
supporter of that institution’ as the country received the majority of exports from slave 
countries Cuba and Brazil, who both charged export duties ‘to support slavery and 
Monarchy.’
160
 Like Sumner, then, Grant saw his stance as elevating people of African 
descent. 
Sumner, however, interpreted annexation very differently and, despite Grant’s good 
intentions for African Americans, the harder the President tried to convince the Senate to pass 
the treaty, the harder Sumner opposed him. Initially, Sumner simply planned ‘to smother 
[rather] than to stab Grant’s favourite project’ by delaying a vote on it, but Grant’s wish for 
annexation meant Sumner could not bury the treaty.
161
  After Sumner successfully 
highlighted problems with the treaty and prevented a vote on it, Grant suggested that the 
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Senate appoint a commission to visit Santo Domingo and report on the issues raised.
162
 
Sumner even taunted the President, questioning why he bothered to consult the Senate, when 
he had – in Sumner’s opinion – already disregarded its prerogatives during the negotiation 
process.
163
 Sumner implied Grant had usurped his constitutional powers in pursuing 
annexation, and he seemed to be attempting to push Grant to continue in this vein rather than 
consulting Congress as the Constitution decreed.
164
 In an effort to kill the treaty, Sumner 
launched – during a debate on whether to send a fact-finding commission to Santo Domingo 
– what one Boston newspaper called ‘a violent personal attack upon the President for the San 
Domingo negotiation.’
165
 Sumner’s speech, entitled ‘Naboth’s Vineyard’, seemed 
incongruous with the Senator’s commitment to racial equality.
166
 Sumner relied upon racial 
prejudices and used popular theories regarding races and climates, promoted by the Harvard 
scientist Louis Agassiz, in order to undermine the annexation scheme.
167
 Agassiz’s theory 
rested on the idea that those with light skin tones flourished in temperate climate zones, 
whilst those with dark skin tones thrived in hot climates, thus explaining the proliferation of 
slavery in the South.
168
 In his desire to prevent annexation, Sumner was turning to ideas 
others’ used to justify white supremacy, which illustrated how strongly he believed the 
scheme must be prevented. Sumner had decided to use improbable weapons in his arsenal to 
stop the passage of the treaty. 
The Senator analysed the situation in Santo Domingo as more detrimental to the continent 
than favourable. Whilst Grant and Sumner were men of similar intellect, they each 
interpreted the proposed annexation in completely differently ways. The President saw a safe 
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haven for the former slaves – a place where they could be United States citizens but without 
the discrimination they faced in the South associated with the country – and the triumph of 
free labour in the Western Hemisphere. Sumner, in contrast, saw danger for the 800,000 
black citizens of the adjacent Republic of Haiti.
169
 Though Grant did not wish to annex Haiti, 
acquiring Santo Domingo would open up the possibility of future annexation of its neighbour. 
Sumner found this an unacceptable prospect that would violate the Haitians’ right to self-
government and would never have been attempted on a white republic.
170
 Just as many 
senators – including Sumner – had ratified the treaty to buy Alaska in the hope of acquiring 
Canada, Sumner feared the acquisition of Santo Domingo would lead to the annexation of 
Haiti. It was upon this fear that Sumner initially opposed annexation. 
However, as Sumner discovered the process which led to the negotiation of the treaty, he also 
began to oppose it on the basis of his fears over executive power. Particularly appalling to the 
Senator was the grandiose name assumed by Grant’s presidential secretary during the 
negotiations on the treaty: General Orville E. Babcock referred to himself as the ‘Aide-de-
camp to his Excellency, Ulysses S. Grant’.
171
 A discussion with a supporter of annexation 
unaffiliated with Grant’s administration – General Joseph W. Fabens – also suggested plans 
existed to annex other Caribbean countries.
172
 These two fears – danger for the freedom of 
Haitians and the abuse of executive power – merged to form the substance of Sumner’s 
opposition to the annexation of Santo Domingo. Sumner’s correspondence shows these fears: 
he wrote that Grant ‘was guilty of the greatest crime in our political history, revealing a 
heartless, lawless & tyrannical nature.’
173
 He also clarified his motivations for his actions 
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stating ‘[y]ou know well I look to principles and care nothing for the names I am called. Call 
me whatever you choose, I shall do what I can always for Human Rights.’
174
 Referring to 
Haiti, Sumner wrote to another recipient that Grant’s behaviour towards the republic ‘is one 
of the crimes of our history, and has exercised a painful influence on that struggling 
people.’
175
 Sumner’s concern lay fully with the Haitians and he expressed this sentiment most 
poignantly in a letter of advice to a number of African Americans who had requested his 
opinion on the presidential canvass. Sumner claimed that Grant’s actions towards Santo 
Domingo showed ‘he cared nothing for the colored race’, as he threatened the existence of 
Haiti ‘with its eight hundred thousand blacks, engaged in the great experiment of self-
government.’
176
 Sumner believed the incident was ‘a most instructive antecedent, revealing 
beyond question his true nature, and the whole is attested by documentary evidence.’
177
 He 
then proceeded to recount his perception of events, in which he claimed: 
Conceiving the idea of annexing Dominica, which is a Spanish part of the island, 
and shrinking at nothing, he began by seizing the war powers of the government, 
in flagrant violation of the constitution, and then at a great expenditure of money, 
sent several armed ships of the navy, including monitors, to maintain the usurper 
Baez in power, that he might obtain the coveted prize. Not contented with this 
dictatorship, he proceeded to strike at the independence of the black republic, in 
open menace of war, and all without the sanction of Congress, to which is 
committed the warmaking power.
178
 
Sumner illustrated his two-pronged objection to Grant’s actions in this extract, which 
proceeds in the same vein as the letter continues. Human rights and sympathy for the African 
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race strongly intertwined with concerns over the expansion of executive power, especially in 
foreign policy. Sumner contended that the militaristic Grant had usurped congressional 
powers, used those powers to support another usurper, and threatened a free republic: a 
threat, he believed, that would not have been made ‘to any white ruler’.
179
 The fears of 
executive tyranny and the abuse of a weaker nation with a black population weighed heavily 
on Sumner and formed the basis of his principled opposition towards Grant. Propelled by a 
sense of honour, Sumner told one correspondent: ‘[a]s a servant of duty and a devotee of 
principle, I cannot accept Grant’.
180
 
Yet in public, Sumner seldom opposed the treaty on human rights grounds, preferring to 
attack Grant on issues which appealed to other senators – such as executive usurpation – and 
topics which appealed to popular belief about the President, especially his reputed 
drunkenness and corruption. Power was a central part of Sumner’s speech against annexation. 
At one point, the Senator declared that ‘[w]hen I think of all this accumulated power in those 
waters, those three war-vessels, with the patronage naturally incident in their presence, it is 
not astonishing that there is on the seaboard, immediately within their influence, a certain 
sentiment in favor of annexation.’
181
 Patronage, Sumner charged, had enabled the President 
to pursue his wishes in Santo Domingo. By surrounding himself with military men and 
personal friends, Grant, Sumner suggested, had bought unswerving allegiance to his 
presidency and could use the military tyrannically as a result. Sumner believed that Grant had 
degraded the presidency by allowing a ‘military spirit’ into government which submitted to 
him alone.
182
 The loyalty of these military men, Sumner argued, allowed Grant to abuse 
power. The misuse of executive power and the usurpation of congressional powers formed 
the basis of Sumner’s argument. Sumner was echoing the case against a Bonapartist Grant 
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presidency made by the Democrats in 1868, but in his eyes, he was using the argument to 
preserve rather than destroy the advances towards racial equality made in the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. 
The one term principle formed one part of Sumner’s attempt to highlight the President’s 
misrule. In his efforts to rid the Republican party of Grant, Sumner publicly attacked the 
President in two speeches – one in the Senate on 31 May 1872 and one in print in August 
1872 (due to illness).
183
 His Senate speech, given immediately prior to the Republican 
convention on 5-6 June 1872 in Philadelphia, tore into the President and his first 
administration’s record. As he had been conspicuously absent from the Liberal Republican 
convention of May 1872, his position was of great interest in the political arena due to his 
influential position within the African-American community. The speech, entitled 
‘Republicanism versus Grantism’, amounted to a vicious tirade against the President.
184
 The 
Senator levelled myriad accusations against the President, claiming he had turned the 
presidency into a ‘personal government’ and a ‘one man government’.
185
 Sumner intended to 
deny Grant the Republican nomination and boasted afterwards that ‘[t]here will not be 3 
states to vote for him’.
186
  
Sumner’s principal biographer David Donald has labelled the speech as ‘one of Sumner’s 
poorest efforts’.
187
 Containing little substance and much slander, Sumner alleged Grant had 
become ‘autocratic’, successfully converting the nation’s republican government into a 
‘despotism’ where ‘nepotism’ and ‘gift-taking’ became its main attributes.
188
 Sumner claimed 
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that ‘[i]n exhibiting this autocratic pretension, so revolutionary and unrepublican in character. 
I mean to be moderate in language and to keep within the strictest bounds’.
189
 Yet Sumner 
was anything but restrained.
190
 His perception of Grant’s misuse of power featured 
prominently in his accusations as he claimed the President treated his position ‘as little more 
than a plaything’.
191
 In his attempt to portray Grant as unfit for the presidency, Sumner used 
every accusation ever voiced against Grant. Sumner even recounted Democratic slurs from 
1868 which charged Grant was a Caesar.  
These charges took root in a soil fertilised by the ongoing battle over Reconstruction. As a 
quasi-military occupation, Reconstruction raised many of the same issues as the annexation 
of Santo Domingo over the influence of the army. Sumner himself actually supported the 
further use of military power in the South. He backed the Enforcement Act of 1871 (also 
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act), which allowed Grant to bypass the States in prosecuting 
Klan outrages, and argued against the Liberal Republicans who accused the bill of 
perpetuating a ‘despotism’ and having no constitutional basis.
192
 Trumbull, for instance, said 
he would not sanctify the federal government interfering in the States ‘against their 
authority’, because, if given the power, the federal government (most likely referring to the 
President but not explicitly) would enforce ‘despotism’ and ‘tyranny’.
193
 Schurz, too, refused 
to support a measure which allowed the President to intervene ‘in a State without the request 
of the Governor or the Legislature, when in his (the President’s) opinion the State authorities 
do not enforce their own laws’.
194
 He further contended that the Act contained ‘the first step 
toward a doctrine of constructive treason’ whereby the President could use his ‘discretionary 
power’ to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon the slightest suspicion of ‘conspiracy, with 
                                                 
189




 Ibid., p. 5 
192
 Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 1st session, p. 579. 
193
 Ibid., pp. 578-579. 
194
 Ibid., p. 687. 
160 
 
the mere purpose and ability’ by people in the States ‘without having actually by overt act 
attempted to do any of them’.
195
 Effectively the President could arbitrarily arrest men 
suspected of criminal activity towards African Americans without any evidence. This, they 
claimed, was despotism in its very essence, yet Sumner supported this great extension of 
presidential power. 
Sumner shocked those in attendance during the Senate debate on the Enforcement Act when 
he countered both Liberal Republican and Democratic assertions of despotism by arguing that 
it was ‘a just centralism ... a generous imperialism’ which would allow the President to 
intervene in the states, ‘for the safe-guard of rights national in character, and then only as the 
sunshine, with beneficent power, and like the sunshine, for the equal good of all.’
196
 It 
illustrated Sumner’s willingness to break all the rules, in regard to his fears and tyrannical 
conceptions of executive power, when the human rights of the African race were concerned: 
in a Senate speech from February 1869 he had announced ‘anything for Human Rights is 
constitutional.’
197
 Yet Sumner failed to see the irony of his position, even when challenged 
by an abolitionist who asked him to consider ‘[i]f you weaken the confidence of the country 
... in our President, will you not palsy the arm on which we depend to save life and liberty in 
the Southern States?’
198
 Either Sumner hoped there would soon be a new president to 
implement this Act or he could not see the correlation between his efforts to hamper 
executive power and the effective protection of African-American civil rights.
199
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The abolitionist’s question was a pertinent one. For the most serious charge Sumner raised – 
that of Caesarism – would have potent repercussions in later years. Sumner’s influence 
ensured it carried weight, and it acquired a life of its own soon after he dropped it. The 
Senator accused Grant of ‘breathing the military spirit, being a species of Caesarism or 
personalism’ into the presidency.
200
 Here, he targeted Grant’s appointment of military figures 
in his cabinet; this ‘military ring’, he alleged, would support the White House without 
question.
201
 Caesarism, he contended, had allowed Grant to abuse and usurp power in his 
quest to acquire Santo Domingo, and had equipped him to act tyrannically towards both 
Congress and Haiti. Sumner’s accusation implied that the military gave Grant the power to 
act as he wished, potentially allowing him to continue as president indefinitely. The 
Caesarism accusations were tied to Sumner’s allegations of nepotism. Sumner gave a long 
history of nepotism which begun in ancient Rome, moved to Britain, and subsequently 
crossed the Atlantic to America. He accused Grant of using nepotism to a greater extent than 
any other president. Untold numbers of Grant’s relatives had received patronage positions, 
the Senator insisted, yet Sumner’s inability to account for all these family members 
undermined his claim.
202
 Still, Sumner argued that Grant’s system of choosing his cabinet 
constituted ‘good rules unquestionably for the organization of a household and the choice of 
domestics’, but rather less useful ones for running a republican administration.
203
 
Summarising his accusations, he alleged that – with the exception of George Washington and 
Andrew Jackson – military men were unsuitable for the presidency.
204
 This suggestion, 
grounded in republican suspicions of military rule, would fuel fears of executive power and 
the danger of maintaining a large peacetime army; by attacking these aspects of federal 
government Sumner, unwittingly, threatened the foundations of Reconstruction.  
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Sumner’s principled stance, which fused his desire for racial equality with his worries that 
untrammelled executive power in Grant’s hands would lead to the very opposite, would be 
misunderstood by his contemporaries who interpreted it as simply ‘disappointed malice’.
205
 
Several Republican senators took to the floor of the Senate to refute Sumner’s allegations in 
the succeeding days. They denounced Sumner’s speech as ‘brutal,’ ‘vile,’ and ‘malignant’, 
and suggested it cast ‘aspersion’, ‘falsification’ and ‘slander’ upon the President.
206
 John A. 
Logan, a Grant supporter from Illinois, accused both Sumner and Schurz of supporting a 
cause ‘so weak to-day before the land that they must vomit forth their venom on the heads of 
at least as good men I will say as they are themselves, and no time can be afforded in 
Congress for a reply to it, be it so.’
207
 Another party man, Roscoe Conkling of New York, 
called the speech ‘an unjust and bitter speech aimed at another ... an effort full of joy for his 
enemies—full of sorrow for his friends.’
208
 James Flanagan of Texas urged Grant ‘to stand 
firm against the internal foes who have tried to pour their fire upon him’.
209
 He offered 
further support when in response to allegations of nepotism, he claimed that ‘if I was 
President of the United States, and I had a thousand relatives who were worthy I would bring 
them in every one, and help them as far as I could, but I would hold them to a strict 
responsibility.’
210
 It was both an illustration of how widespread nepotism was within 
senators’ distribution of offices and evidence of the lengths loyal Republicans would go to 
defend their chief against accusations they believed were without evidence. 
Just as loyal congressmen rose in support of the President, so did the loyal Republican press. 
A Republican Ohioan newspaper claimed Sumner had merely repeated the slanders ‘run for 
months by the Democratic Press, and a few Republicans who have allowed their personal 
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hostility to isolated acts of the administration to warp their judgement, and lead them to 
condemn it as a whole.’
211
 The paper  accused Sumner of producing ‘the stale charges of 
nepotism, ignoring the fact that it has been proved beyond cavil that the President has not 
erred in this respect to a greater extent than nearly all our public men’.
212
 Another newspaper 
mocked the suggestion of using the speech as a Democratic electioneering document stating 
‘Sumner’s speech would disgust any honest Democrat.’
213
 
Even supporters of Sumner’s speech did not understand much of its substance. The 
Democratic anti-Reconstruction Atlanta Constitution, though pleased with the assault on the 
President, could not comprehend Sumner’s attacks on military reconstruction which upheld 
African-American civil rights.
214
 As a vigorous supporter of the military in the South, 
Sumner’s attack on this aspect of the President’s Reconstruction policies made little sense. 
Democratic newspapers heralded the speech with great mirth: the Constitution described how 
Sumner ‘nabbed Grant as we have seen a vicious terrier clutch a rat, and the way he used him 
was terrier all over.’
215
 It reflected with unbridled glee on its substance and declared that 
these points were but ‘a portion of the sugar-plums showered with a lavish hand over this 
portion of this robustious [sic] denunciation.’
216
 The New York Sun (now Democratic) wrote 
that though the accusations were not new ‘they have never before been summed up in so 
impressive a manner or presented with historical illustrations so instructive and so 
forcible.’
217
 The New York World, too, rejoiced that such allegations ‘from a man whose 
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biography is the history of the Republican party, will carry conviction where Democratic 
voices would pass as idle wind.’
218
 
But in 1872 the intensity of Sumner’s attack negated much of its influence. By levelling too 
many accusations at Grant – and denying the administration’s achievements – Sumner 
obscured the real concerns, held by many, over the use of executive power and its potential 
tyranny. Even Liberal Republican newspapers balked at the charges stating ‘that Sumner’s 
portrait was ‘drawn in such colors that … the people will reject it as a truthful representation 
of General Grant’s character’’.
219
 ‘Mr Sumner has consulted rather his resentments and 
prejudices than his judgement’, concluded the New York Evening Post, which lamented that 
his attack did ‘not assail the administration in its more vulnerable places’.
220
 The Republican 
New York Times alleged that Sumner’s friends ‘were disappointed and embarrassed at the 
exhibition ... and some of them [had] advised him never to make it.’
221
 The speech failed to 
achieve its aim: Grant received unanimous re-nomination from the 1872 Republican 
convention. 
Yet Sumner espoused real fears about the expansion of presidential power. The danger of 
Caesarism in particular would arise again the following year in a series of editorials written 
by a supporter of Grant.
222
 The Liberal Republican championing of the one term principle in 
the 1872 presidential election illustrated these fears. The issue was chosen by the Liberal 
Republicans as a central plank of their platform and they rallied behind their candidate – 
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Horace Greeley – partly as a result of his keenness to endorse the measure.
223
 Carl Schurz, in 
particular, backed Greeley principally because he supported a term limit.
224
 Schurz told 
Greeley that civil service reform was ‘of great interest’ when sounding him out on policy.
225
 
He asked Greeley of ‘how the problem of civil-service reform presents itself to [his] mind’ 
after he announced support for the issue ‘in general terms’ in his acceptance letter of the 
nomination.
226
 Greeley’s response would form the substance of a campaign speech by Schurz 
which linked the candidate to the reform.
227
 In his letter, Greeley had confirmed his belief 
that the problem with patronage originated with ‘the eligibility of our President to reelection 
[sic]’; this, he affirmed, was ‘the main source of this corruption.’
228
 ‘Let it be settled that a 
President is not to be reelected [sic] while in office,’ Greeley stated, ‘and Civil Service 
Reform is no longer difficult.’
229
 The president, Greeley believed, was the real culprit in 
circumventing reform, though he also saw the necessity of examinations for candidates.
230
 
For Schurz, this confirmation was evidence enough for him to pronounce his support for 
Greeley.   
Greeley had a lifelong commitment to the one term principle and he had heartily endorsed 
Sumner’s amendment.
231
 His support originated from the belief that the executive through 
patronage could ‘coerce a renomination’ by leaving a man in a patronage position unable to 
support another candidate lest ‘he seals his own official death-warrant’ due to ‘hostility to the 
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 Patronage, in his view, bound men to the incumbent president as strongly 
as a slave was bound to his master.
233
 It was clear that Greeley fervently supported the one 
term principle and had not, with the exception of Lincoln, wavered in his support.
234
 While he 
may have disagreed with Liberals on other matters – not least free trade – here he was 
perfectly in accordance with their views. Their republican fear of executive power appeared 
in the fifth plank of the Liberal Republican platform. The plank stated:  
The Civil Service of the Government has become a mere instrument of partisan 
tyranny and personal ambition, and an object of selfish greed. It is a scandal and a 
reproach upon free institutions, and breeds a demoralization dangerous to the 
perpetuity of republican government. We therefore regard such thorough reforms 
of the Civil Service as one of the most pressing necessities of the hour; that 
honor, capacity, and fidelity constitute the only valid claim to public 
employment; that the offices of the Government cease to be a matter of arbitrary 
favoritism and patronage, and that public station become again a post of honor. 




Here, the Liberal Republicans read Grant’s own understanding of republicanism which 
entailed independence from party as corruption. The President’s desire to act above-party 
ironically made him more open to accusations of unrepublican aggrandisement. The phrase 
‘arbitrary favoritism’ illustrated the Liberal Republicans’ inability to understand how Grant 
dispensed patronage.
236
 These men perceived the President’s desire to keep patronage 
appointments above the political fray and award positions on the basis of his perception of 
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the candidates’ merits as either disregarding political etiquette (in the case of disappointed 
partisans) or Caesarism and nepotism (in the case of those who feared a despotic White 
House). Grant used the presidency as he wished ignoring recent precedent: Sumner called it 
his ‘plaything’.
237
 An independent president was not the weak executive which many 
historians have seen in the Grant administration, but rather a strong presidency, which, if left 
unchecked, could act tyrannically. 
The prominence of power in all these arguments over civil service reform and the one term 
principle was conspicuous. It did not escape many Americans – especially the newspapers – 
that Sumner (who joined the new party in August 1872 after he published another venomous 
attack on Grant) and the Liberal Republicans sought to remove power from the President but 
not from their own hands.
238
 The power to elect or re-elect a president had been the 
prerogative of the people since the 1820s, yet Sumner in his one term amendment – and 
throughout Grant’s first administration – had sought, as the Cleveland Morning Herald so 
succinctly described the one term amendment, to abrogate power to Congress by controlling 
the executive and preventing reforms which would limit congressional power: ‘[n]othing 
more completely shows the arbitrary rule of party than this very suppression of public 
opinion’, the paper argued.
239
 The division of the Republican Party in the 1872 election and 
the Liberal Republican championing of the one term principle illustrated this ‘arbitrary rule 
of party’.
240
  The one term principle sought to prevent misuse of executive power whilst 
failing to acknowledge that fidelity to party could be as tyrannical as the President’s 
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The one term principle illustrated that republican anxieties over the strength of the executive 
branch, especially in relation to the enlarged patronage, continued under Grant’s 
administration to the detriment of Reconstruction. Fears of despotism caused by the 
President’s independence ensured the continuation of battles over presidential power which 
had raged since the outbreak of the Civil War. The fight over constricting executive power 
showed that Johnson’s near-conviction by the Senate on impeachment charges had not 
dampened fears of a strong White House: these were embedded within republican ideology 
which cautioned of the necessity to guard liberty vigilantly. Grant’s independence – which 
reminded critics of Johnson’s actions – concerned Republicans like Sumner. Their 
accusations of tyranny proved powerful, especially when levelled by influential (and 
principled) Republicans. By undermining presidential power, these men hindered the 
President’s ability to exercise his prerogatives. Symbolic as the one term amendment may 
have been – and limited though Sumner’s speeches against ‘Grantism’ might have proved in 
their immediate impact – they had practical implications for Grant’s power. 
By accusing Grant of tyranny and pushing for the one term principle, the Liberal Republicans 
fuelled concerns over executive power by implying that the President had abused and usurped 
power. They contributed to the groundwork laid by the Democrats in the 1868 presidential 
election by giving some credibility to fears over the undefined limits of executive power. 
Essentially, these Republicans alerted their fellow Americans of the need to be wary of 
Grant’s use of power and his potential to abuse it, which would come to the fore when Grant 




This contrasts starkly with the existing picture of Grant’s presidency in Reconstruction 
historiography. The principle indicates a different conception of Grant’s presidency and 
shows how his role in Reconstruction has been misunderstood. Grant’s attempts to redefine 
the presidency by acting independently and refusing to appoint leading Republican politicians 
to his cabinet fuelled exaggerated concerns over executive power. His independence showed 
a willingness to conduct his administration upon his own rules and not the wishes of 
Congress. His actions – backed up by his strong personal popularity among the electorate – 
threatened to create a much stronger White House than historians have observed. The 
independent, antipartisan President, backed by loyal patronage appointees, was perceived as a 
threat to the safety of the republic. The model republican had the potential to be a tyrant.  
By accusing Grant of unrepublican activities Sumner inflamed existing fears of presidential 
power and impeded future efforts to use executive power to protect African-American civil 
rights. Sumner seemed to realise his mistake when allegations of Caesarism surfaced the 
following year; then, he remained conspicuously quiet throughout the debate. It is small 
consolation – and probably unknown to Grant – that in the months before Sumner’s death he 
informed a fellow Massachusetts Congressman that he had been wrong about Grant.
242
 Yet 
the republican fear of aggregated power which motivated the principled Sumner to oppose 
Grant would hinder the Reconstruction Sumner wanted.
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‘Even now we have all the tyranny and despotism of an empire, with the outward forms 
and semblance of a republic’:  
Caesarism and the Third Term Movement 1873 
 
A few months after the inauguration of President Ulysses S. Grant for his second term, the 
New York Herald, one of the country’s most popular and influential newspapers, published a 
series of editorials whose reverberations were still being felt years later. On 5 July 1873, 
during the dry days of the congressional recess, the newspaper printed the first piece in a 
series named Caesarism, or the Third Term Movement as it was sometimes called. The 
Herald warned its readers over the course of six days of the dangers of the power of the 
executive office and how – in the wrong hands – it could lead to despotism.
1
 It lectured its 
readership on the fallibility of the country’s Constitution and how – unlike European 
countries, such as France and Spain – Congress was unable to control or overthrow a dictator, 
citing (rather dubiously) the case of the un-convictable tyrant President Andrew Johnson as 
evidence. The author – a well-respected journalist and former editor of the New York Tribune 
John Russell Young – suggested the solution to the problems of executive power resided in 
the one term principle that Charles Sumner had advocated prior to the 1872 election.
2
 
The editorials have been dismissed as a hoax invented to drum up newspaper sales in a slow 
news season by the only historian to explore them, but the response to the articles in the press 
indicated that they drew upon real fears of presidential power which were increasingly 
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prevalent since the outbreak of the Civil War.
3
 By exploring the newspaper reaction to the 
editorials this chapter intends to illustrate how the coverage, though initially greeted with 
ridicule, heightened anxieties over the growth of presidential power when support for a third 
term for Grant was raised in response. These concerns led to a discussion in the press over the 
dangers of the ever-expanding powers of the executive office and exacerbated worries over 
the future of the republic. The response by the press to the Herald’s articles illustrates that 
unease existed over the apparently boundless powers of the President and that many 
Americans contemplated whether these powers threatened the very safety of the nation’s 
liberty. 
Although initially dismissed by some as sensationalist nonsense, the editorials had roots in 
real fears of executive power that had increased dramatically since the outbreak of the Civil 
War. Though not a Liberal Republican supporter, Young had concerns over the abuse of 
federal power, and in particular, the arbitrary application of patronage by the President, which 
he had discussed in his own newspaper, the New York Standard, which had since ceased 
publication.
4
 As the last chapter showed, warnings over the power of the presidency had been 
raised during the 1872 presidential election by the Liberal Republicans, who charged Grant 
with abuse of the patronage system for personal gain. In particular, the late Liberal 
Republican convert Charles Sumner played a central role in fighting fears of ‘Grantism’.
5
 In 
advocating his own one term amendment, Sumner coined the phrase ‘Caesarism’, which 
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spoke to concerns over the number of military men given patronage appointments by the 
White House.
6
 The Senator believed these men – who were loyal to their commander – 
enabled the President to use undemocratic means to carry out his personal plans: most 
notably the proposed annexation of Santo Domingo.
7
 Though Grant saw himself (not without 
reason) as simply enforcing a strict republican separation of powers, his antiparty stance 
accumulated power in the executive office, and restricted congressional influence. This, in 
turn, heightened fears of an aggrandizing presidency: a familiar concern in the Civil War era. 
The election of the model republican had not diminished republican fears of executive 
tyranny. 
The White House’s reaction to the post-election situation in Louisiana particularly troubled 
those anxious about executive power. Reconstruction politics in Louisiana had rarely been 
peaceful but the election results of 1872 had further deteriorated democratic politics in the 
state. The elections were marred by voter fraud and intimidation, and as one historian has 
noted, ‘ballot-box stuffing, ballot-box vanishing acts, [and] secret polling places’ were 
common place.
8
 The disputed election returns saw the returning board split and declare 
victory for both parties, which encouraged the rival factions to inaugurate their own officers 
throughout the state.
9
 Violence gripped Louisiana as each party struggled for dominance, and 
the contest culminated in the Colfax Massacre of 13 April 1873, when a fierce battle raged 
between white conservatives and black Republicans for control of the parish.
10
 The battle 
ended in the deaths of three white men and between seventy to one hundred African 
Americans.
11
 In the aftermath, the assailants were arrested and the disputed election results 
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 However, Congress adjourned without decision leaving the issue for 
the President to adjudicate.
13
 In May 1873, Grant ruled that the Republicans had won the 
election and supported the new Governor with federal troops.
14
 Despite the difficulty of the 
situation and the loss of life, the President’s intervention gave the impression of executive 
tyranny: the usurpation of state power, congressional power, or both.
15
 
White House interventions in state politics therefore stoked fears of executive power and 
vividly reminded political observers of the most recent usurper of the republic: Andrew 
Johnson. Observers worried that Grant’s action in Louisiana marked an executive coup made 
possible by the powers he had accrued and the patronage he had to dispense. Moreover, there 
were suggestions that Grant already planned a third presidential term. Grant’s campaign 
manager in Virginia – former Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby – had announced around 
the time of the President’s inauguration that he would support Grant in 1876.
16
 The 
seemingly arbitrary use of power in Louisiana and the suggestion of a third term proved 
alarming coincidences for republican citizens who were alert to threats to their liberty. 
If on the one hand the Caesarism scare stoked these fears of a permanent presidency, they 
also hinted at concerns about the workings of American democracy. Indeed the two issues 
were not disconnected. As historians like Sven Beckert have noted, opposition to universal 
suffrage was on the rise among the Northern upper-class in the 1870s.
17
 Public figures, 
among them some Liberal Republicans, believed less educated or property-less voters could 
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not be trusted to use their suffrage sensibly.
18
 Charles Francis Adams, for example, claimed 
that ‘[u]niversal suffrage can only mean in plain English the government of ignorance and 
vice’.
19
 Such figures advocated for a reduction of elected men in favour of appointed men, 
and ‘educational and property qualifications for voting’.
20
 The prospect of Grant using his 
immense personal popularity to win office for a third time from an ignorant electorate 
unaware of the consequences of their decisions troubled critics of the President. Grant here 
could appear like other ‘demagogues’, not least the New York Democratic political boss 
William M. Tweed, who had, in his opponents’ eyes, used popular issues and monetary 
bribes to mobilise an easily-swayed people.
21
 Caesar himself, after all, had supposedly 
destroyed the Roman Republic through winning the support of the mob. 
The response to the Caesarism editorials epitomised these underlying fears of executive 
power and democracy during Reconstruction. Initially, Republican newspapers treated the 
editorials with derision, with journals calling them the ‘third-term babble’, and ‘a bugaboo’ 
or ‘bugbear’.
22
 Some Republican newspapers even wrote their own pieces of sensationalist 
ridicule to mock the Herald’s suggestions. See for example, an editorial by Melville Landon 
– better known as the humorist Eli Perkins – in the New York Daily Graphic which was 
reprinted in many newspapers, including the popular Atlanta Constitution.
23
 Landon’s 
satirical article depicted Grant as a Roman warrior who took pleasure in summary executions, 
human sacrifice and cannibalism.
24
 Others cautioned that although a third term was not 
inimical to the future of the republic – and an amendment unnecessary – they opposed such a 
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possibility. Only Grant’s opponents took the warnings seriously: Democratic and Liberal 
Republican newspapers warned of impending doom for the republic if Grant served a third 
term. However, the debate changed when a few influential Republican newspapers declared 
their support for the third term in late July 1873. Immediately, the response transformed into 
a discussion of the dangers of such an eventuality. Humour and ridicule gave way to real 
anxieties as even Republican newspapers began pointing towards Louisiana for evidence of 
the administration’s undemocratic use of executive power, and the possibility of further abuse 
if Grant was elected a third time. The response to the Republican support for an 
unprecedented third presidential term illuminated the genuine concerns many Americans held 
about the reach of the federal government and presidential power during Reconstruction.  
The transformation of the discussion illustrated that even if the editorials were simply a hoax 
intended to fill the dry news season, real concerns over the extent of presidential power 
shaped Reconstruction politics long after Johnson’s near-conviction on impeachment charges. 
The Caesarism scare highlighted the treacherous path the White House had to tread in 
protecting civil rights without falling foul of accusations of tyranny. As long as Republicans 
and Democrats feared the centralizing tendencies of the presidency, any attempt to use the 
presidency to enforce Reconstruction risked diminishing the White House’s political capital. 
In 1868, Democrats Horatio Seymour and Frank P. Blair had tried to bring Grant down in that 
manner; in 1872, it was the unlikely figure of the committed advocate of black equality, 
Sumner. A year later Caesarism played the same role. 
 
The Republic in Peril 
John Russell Young was an unlikely man to have been behind the Caesarism scare. In April 
1870, he had begun his own newspaper – the Republican New York Standard – but due to 
poor sales it folded in 1872, and Young joined the staff of the New York Herald. Young 
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certainly admired Grant in the early days of his presidency, having compared his repute to 
George Washington, and he supported the White House’s quixotic bid to annex Santo 
Domingo when other Republicans wavered.
25
 But in the Standard, Young had expressed 
concerns over ‘legislative corruption’ and patronage allocation.
26
 It is possible, though, that 
Grant’s intervention in Louisiana left him troubled by the grasp of the executive on power, 
especially the power to direct Reconstruction. His editorials in his own paper attest to his 
concerns about corruption and his awareness of the ability of the executive to control and 
influence politics. It is difficult to know for sure as Young’s personal papers do not mention 
Caesarism and his autobiography simply claims the idea belonged to Herald publisher James 
Gordon Bennett Junior who assigned the project to him.
27
 To what extent Young’s wife (who 
finished the book) edited this segment is unknown, but in a letter to two congressmen Young 
defended his honourable intentions in writing the editorials by stating his loyalty to Grant: a 
point he made in the editorials themselves.
28
 His motivations for accepting the commission – 
which was dreamt up by Bennett in conversation with a group of Americans in Paris – remain 
obscure too, but Young appears to have been a principled man and it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the sentiments expressed in the articles reflected his genuine concerns.
29
 
Voicing fears of executive power and patronage, the articles explored the position of the 
president in the nation’s history, by describing how powerful and dangerous this one man 
could be for the country. The first two editorials discussed how the country’s most popular 
Presidents – George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln 
– had exercised extraordinary powers well beyond the remit allowed in other republican 
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countries, and had encountered no checks on their use of these powers.
30
 Young ventured that 
Congress remained ineffectual in its ability to counter such might, which led to eras named 
after the powerful man who controlled and influenced them.
31
 He argued this constituted a 
dangerous precedent, and illustrated the delicate nature of the country’s political order, which 
was further compromised by the never-ending stream of men seeking patronage, wealth, and 
honours.
32
 The paper warned that this political system remained open to abuse by an 
unprincipled figure, and history had shown that Congress was ill-equipped to deal with such 
threats to the republic.
33
 
The Herald, picking up on Sumner’s concerns of a few months earlier, cautioned that the 
open-ended nature of re-election was a potent feature of American politics, and warned that 
calamities would befall the country if Grant secured a third term. Though Young stated his 
belief that Grant would not abuse the country’s republican heritage, he asserted that plenty of 
men could not be trusted with the power of the presidency. He warned that Reconstruction 
and the retention of a sizeable peacetime army made the government particularly susceptible 
to a potential third term candidate. His suggestion implied recent events had shown that the 
President had too much power vested within his office which needed controlling for the 
safety of the republic. Young claimed that the unwritten precedent was not a sufficient 
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safeguard: it would not do to ‘depend upon the patriotism of one man for freedom.’
34
 He 
suggested that the time was right for the one term principle to be enshrined in the 
Constitution.  
The only historian to explore in-depth the Caesarism editorials – Mark W. Summers – has 
argued they were a creation of the Herald to increase sales during the congressional recess.
35
 
His claim is built on the Herald’s appetite for sensationalist articles which proved popular 
with its readership.
36
 A well-known independent newspaper that had leaned Democratic in 
the 1860s under James Gordon Bennett Senior, it became under his son – James Gordon 
Bennett Junior – an independent again from 1869 and attacked both parties during the 1872 
presidential election.
37
 Bennett Junior favoured creating news rather than merely reporting it, 
as for example in his financing of an expedition to Africa in 1871 to find the famous explorer 
Dr Livingstone.
38
 Yet part of the impetus for the Caesarism editorials rested with the paper’s 
foreign correspondent and known Grant-supporter Young.
39
 His desire, at first, to separate 
the incumbent from the office in his warnings of executive power implied genuine concerns 
over the presidency itself.
40
 The timing of the articles – over a month after Grant’s Louisiana 
decision – also suggested that, far from sensationalist scaremongering, they were a studied 
response to fears of executive power. 
Moreover, the response of the majority of newspapers to the editorials, surveyed over a 
period of five months, suggests that the expansion of presidential power to enforce 
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Reconstruction remained a concern for a significant portion of the American public. The 
scenario replicated another incident only a few years earlier, in 1869, when several satirists 
created a fictional newspaper which expounded on the merits of monarchism.
41
 Though 
intended as a joke, the publication of the newspaper resulted in serious contemplation of the 
satirists’ suggestions by some sections of the American public, especially former 
Confederates.
42
 As Andrew Heath has highlighted, these Southerners, fearing what they saw 
as ‘a majoritarian tyranny’ aided and abetted by their former property, believed monarchy 
provided a solution to the protection of their former positions.
43
 Surprised by the interest in 
their venture, the founders continued their ‘prank’ for several months.
44
 Saliently, the 
response to the newspaper – called The Imperialist – indicated that the possibility of 
monarchism in the United States ‘was far from unimaginable to readers.’
45
  
Caesarism, on the classical model, rested on the idea that democratic or republican 
government gave way to a more or less benevolent dictatorship.
46
 The response indicated that 
the possibility of monarchism subsuming the United States occupied enough minds for The 
Imperialist to be taken seriously. Even former President Johnson lent his support to this belief 
during the Caesarism scare when he told a reporter that ‘[t]he tendency of affairs is certainly 
toward a third term, if not a monarchy’ before ending his discussion of Caesarism with a 
direct quotation from The Imperialist: ‘[t]he magnificient destiny of this nation is 
predetermined and inevitable, and it is borne to empire on the resistless current of fate.’
47
 
Indeed a more serious publication also disturbed many Americans over the tyrannical use of 
executive power. The American Bastille written by John A. Marshall and first published in 
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1869 detailed the history of unlawful arrests by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.
48
 A 
convention held in New York in February 1868 had voted for Marshall to write the history of 
those detained and imprisoned without habeas corpus so a record would be available of this 
part of the nation’s past.
49
 The book aimed to inform Americans of the extent to which ‘their 
rights’ had ‘lately been trampled upon, and their liberties disregarded’, so another incident of 
this kind could be avoided.
50
 
Talk of Emperors and Bastilles highlighted concerns regarding the fragility of the nation 
which had beset the country since the outbreak of the Civil War. Another historian, Gregory 
P. Downs, has also explored these anxieties, which were sometimes espoused in the discourse 
of ‘Mexicanization’.
51
 Many Americans feared the war had left the nation too frail to 
withstand further fragmentation through conflicts like the battle of legitimacy in Louisiana.
52
 
The discussions, which became widespread after the disputed election of 1876, highlighted 
concerns that the republic was on the road to ruin, brought down by corrupt, power-hungry 
politicians.
53
 Crisis points in the nation’s stability, such as the events in Louisiana, seemed to 
reveal citizens’ inability to govern themselves, which in turn spurred both hopes and fears 
that a Caesar would rise to power to hold the Union together. In this context the Caesarism 
scare – whatever the motives of Bennett Junior and Young – should be taken seriously. Years 
after Johnson’s impeachment, indeed, the presidency still seemed the most likely seat from 
which that Caesar would emerge. 
The publication of the Caesarism editorials sparked great debate over the presidency and the 
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use of executive power. The Herald published six editorials initially, with the first appearing 
on Saturday 5 July 1873 and the rest following from Monday 7 July 1873, with each 
exploring aspects of the presidency and Reconstruction. At least one newspaper believed 
these were written in advance of publication and posted to the Herald’s office, but the lack of 
cohesiveness in the articles suggests they were written shortly before they went to print 
especially as Young often responded to their reception in other newspapers.
54
 Though they 
lacked the coherence of a pre-prepared series, the overarching argument was clear: the 
enormous power granted by the Constitution allowed the presidency to become a personal 
office which strong figures dominated, making commanders-in-chief the ‘master’ not only of 
their parties, but of an era, which took their name. The control exerted by these men gave 
them the potential to transform the republic into a dictatorship, and left the nation’s security 
reliant only upon their magnanimity in relinquishing power. The fault for this situation lay 
with the Constitution, which, as Sumner and the Liberal Republicans had complained, 
allowed for re-election.
55
 The great patronage at the President’s disposal, Sumner had 
insisted, albeit in less detail than Young, allowed his administration to become corrupted in 
the pursuit of re-election.
56
 To protect the republic’s liberty, Young asserted, the one term 
principle must be codified.  
These threats, Young claimed, had existed since the creation of the republic, but the power of 
the executive office had grown a great deal over the Civil War years, which had paved the 
way for less scrupulous men to enter politics and benefit from the increased patronage 
opportunities in government. The articles therefore tied together fears of republican decay 
with a liberal critique of the character of political representation. Though, Young believed, 
some previous presidents had abused their powers even after they relinquished power, he 
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argued that the present state of politics was more open to abuse than ever before.
57
 He 
admitted the danger lay not in the current president, but an office with augmented Civil War 
powers, and the prospect was all the more dangerous given the men in control were much 
younger and less experienced than the statesmen of other eras. Their lack of experience 
combined with the now extensive patronage of the executive office allowed for more 
widespread corruption; by extension, the presidency had entered a more powerful and 
dangerous era than previously experienced. Young echoed the sentiments of Mark Twain and 
Charles Dudley Warner’s Gilded Age novel – written but unpublished at the time – that greed 
and corruption beset the republic, but the focus of Young’s concern was the presidency.
58
  
The corrupting influence of power formed a central preoccupation of Young’s editorials as he 
argued that men changed on assuming the office. The first editorial highlighted this 
transformation by describing how Washington, as President, had commanded both Alexander 
Hamilton and Jefferson to ‘serve his purpose’, despite their differing views on governance.
59
 
Similarly, when Jefferson assumed the executive office, he used his influence to name two 
presidents who succeeded him, despite his ‘war upon ancestral rights, primogeniture, the 
aristocracy … all the forms and expedients by which monarchs strengthened their thrones’.
60
 
So ‘absolute’ was Jefferson’s power, Young argued, that even ‘when he retired his power 
remained’, which meant he ‘dominated politics from the death of Washington to the advent 
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 Young sought to show that even those most fervently against concentrated 
power could still find themselves susceptible to its charms when given the opportunity. No-
one was incorruptible. 
Yet, Young argued, the true power of the presidency was not revealed until the ascent of 
Andrew Jackson, who had illustrated how tyranny could be exercised by a president in the 
name of the public good. Jackson, he asserted, used the powers of the executive office to their 
fullest extent, bringing out into the open many aspects of the office which previous 
presidents, such as Jefferson, had ‘concealed’.
62
 Jackson dominated the presidency with ‘a 
rule of ever-mastering will’ and the belief ‘that degenerate courage makes one majority.’
63
 
Rather than represent the public will, Young claimed, Jackson had used the executive office 
as an outpost of his personal will, removing opposition to control the direction of politics 
even when motivated by his own prejudices rather than any coherent policy.
64
 Jackson’s 
potency, like Jefferson, was evident too in his ability to direct politics long after surrendering 
the office.
65
 However, Young contended, most Americans remained unaware of Jackson’s 
dangerous rule, which illustrated that the public was ill-equipped to block a tyrant from 
obtaining high office.
66
 Part of the problem with the office was the regard which many 
Americans held for the president, and the trust they put in a good officer. Democracy here 
was part of the problem. 
Although he asserted that the office was more problematic than the officeholder, Young 
claimed that Grant was more powerful than Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln; his only equal 
was Washington, due to the faith the country had in both presidents. Especially concerning 
for Young was that despite all of Grant’s errors during his first administration, he was not 















only re-elected, but returned to the White House by a landslide majority; his position had not 
been weakened by his mistakes in office. Young cried that Grant was ‘master’ of his time 
period – ‘because the country feels that Grant is the legitimate successor of Lincoln and 
means in honesty and good faith to carry out his governing ideas’ – and this left the 
incumbent in a position to demand a third term or at least to name his successor.
67
 Public 
reverence, Young believed, caused many Americans to overlook unrepublican actions by 
their presidents; he feared his countrymen were in danger of revering the man who saved the 
Union, and in doing so, would give party men the freedom to beseech him to accept a third 
term and compromise the sanctity of the republic. 
Furthermore, the Constitution had endowed the nation with another flaw: the inability of 
Congress to remove a tyrannical president.  Young argued that the power of the presidency 
did not have powerful checks on it. Johnson had shown the inadequacy of the impeachment 
process and thus the powerlessness of Congress in the face of a despot.
68
 Unlike the republics 
of Europe, he contended, it was near impossible to remove the President of the United States 
without creating ‘a revolution’; the United States’ system of government remained far more 
akin to monarchical England than to the republics of France and Spain, and would need ‘a 
revolution like that which overthrew Charles I. and James II. [to] remove a President who had 
become politically obnoxious.’
69
 Suspicions of executive power were further exacerbated by 
the tendency of Americans to elect their most celebrated soldiers; Young pointed to this 
danger by frequently referring to Grant by his former military rank, and through the titular 
allusion in the article to Julius Caesar, a soldier-hero who had reduced a republic to ruin.
70
 In 
sum the editorials contended that the powers available to the President – patronage, a 
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standing army, and the impotency of impeachment charges – once combined with Grant’s 
popularity and the corruption of the Republican Party constituted a greater danger than the 




‘Mere stuff and nonsense’ 
The initial response to the Caesarism scare divided upon predictably partisan lines: the 
majority of Democratic and Liberal Republican newspapers welcomed the discussion of 
presidential tyranny and questioned why the Herald had only just raised the alarm, while 
most Republican newspapers denounced the editorials as scaremongering. Quite a few 
Democratic newspapers, though critical of executive power, did not believe Grant would 
become a tyrant if he gained a third term. Naturally, the opposition newspapers were critical 
of Grant’s presidency, while his supporters denied that he had abused his power as President, 
and heaped scorn on the more lurid readings of Young’s accusations. However, both sides 
united in their opposition to a third term for Grant. Even the Republican newspapers – 
although uncritical of Grant – did not believe it was wise to go beyond Washington’s 
precedent of two terms.  
Republican newspapers across the country renounced the Herald’s claims vigorously stating 
that although they did not support a third term, nothing in Grant’s character suggested 
dictatorial instincts. The Herald’s editorials, they claimed, were ‘purely sensational’ and 
merely marked an attempt to create sales during the dry news season rather than raise genuine 
fears of executive power.
72
 Many Republicans reacted to the claims with derision, calling the 
editorials ‘mere stuff and nonsense’, insisting no danger existed, and mocking ‘the average 
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Democrat’ for being ‘always in terror about something terrible that is going to happen’.
73
 
Numerous newspapers simply ignored the issue, indicating their belief that the articles were a 
farce not fit for response, while others simply dismissed the whole affair as a scam and stated 
there was no point in discussing it as a result.
74
 One small Pennsylvanian newspaper summed 
up this attitude: ‘[i]t would be pleasant reading to learn from articles from the pen of some of 
those classical gentlemen something more than nicely dressed assertion.’
75
 Overwhelmingly, 
those newspapers which supported Grant in the early days of the scare mocked the Herald for 
its editorials on the subject and stated the subject was not worthy enough to garner serious 
discussion, especially so long before the next presidential election.  
The Republican newspapers who took on the challenge of countering the Herald’s assertions 
cast Grant as they had in 1868: as the embodiment of true republicanism. They praised the 
President for his record in government asserting that he acted in the interests of the public 
good rather than for personal gain. The Pennsylvanian journal noted how Grant ‘ha[d] 
repeatedly through ‘State’ papers defined his policy to be that of the will of the people as 
expressed through the ballot box.’
76
 A Virginian paper, meanwhile, claimed that ‘[t]he simple 
fact is, that General Grant is trying to do his duty faithfully to the country.’
77
 This moderate 
Republican journal stated that it was unfair to accuse Grant of planning to abuse his power in 
a hypothetical third term anymore than he would in his second term.
78
 The newspaper 
claimed ‘[t]he charge of ‘Caesarism’ is flagrantly unjust against him. So far from assuming to 
exercise doubtful powers, he has shown himself remarkably sensitive and cautious upon the 
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 It celebrated ‘this disposition to be severely just to all interests is one of the most 
salient points in his character’.
80
 The model republican – the image of Grant his supporters 
had been presenting to the electorate for years – would not become a tyrant. 
The Republicans also gained support for their case from some Democrats who agreed that 
nothing in Grant’s administration of the country suggested oncoming tyranny. The popular 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle had little time for Grant’s presidency in many respects. ‘We dissent 
from the tentative policy,’ it argued, ‘we disagree with most of the appointments,’ and ‘[we] 
do not relish the domestic or foreign tone of the administration.’ But they saw ‘in none of 
these things the slightest pretext on which to see the shadow of a shade of apprehension about 
absolutism or Caesarism. On the contrary, the reverse is what we find.’
81
 Another Democratic 
newspaper, the Memphis Public Ledger, which had briefly supported The Imperialist’s 
advocacy of monarchism, claimed it was not afraid of ‘the establishment of a Grant empire in 
this country,’ even though they conceded it was ‘more than likely that the President will 
succeed to a third term of office.’
82
 But they ‘believed there [was] enough patriotism and love 
of the republican form of government, even at the North, to prevent the role of Caesar from 
being played successfully by the man at Long Branch.’
83
  
Grant’s defenders here sought vindication in the antiparty themes which had characterised 
their portrayal of the President for five years. The powers of patronage, so troubling to Young 
in the Caesarism editorials (and to Sumner, whose one term principle was defended solely by 
reference to concerns over patronage), became in the hands of Grant’s supporters evidence of 
his republican virtue, for his attempt to disperse patronage spoils without regard to party not 
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only illustrated his devotion to republicanism but had gained him many enemies.
84
 They 
reminded their readers that the previous supporter of the one term amendment, Sumner, had 
desired the Secretary of State position.
85
 They then used the Senator’s failed amendment to 
show their readers that ‘where there is one office to be disposed of there are a hundred 
applicants.’
 86
 For them, the power of patronage created a mass of dissidents rather than loyal 
supporters; it was certainly no route to a permanent presidency, as the likes of Sumner and 
Young had alleged.
87
 Furthermore, the papers recalled the freedom Grant gave to his cabinet 
officers by allowing them to pursue their own policies rather than following his lead. If he 
had not tried to master his cabinet, how could he control the country?  
More significant, though unmentioned at the time, was the silence of Sumner on the issue. 
Although during the scare Sumner was away in Europe recuperating his health, plenty of 
newspapers in the United States printed the European, especially British, response to the 
Herald’s editorials.
88
 The Herald was popular in Europe, especially in London (where it had 
an office), and which Sumner visited, so it seems unlikely that the affair was not brought to 
his attention and his opinion sought. Yet there is no correspondence from Sumner on the 
topic in either the press or in his personal papers. The reason for this situation may well be 
that Sumner had realised his mistake in accusing the President of Caesarism, especially for 
the former slaves whose rights became the raison d’être of his life. Sumner did concede after 
the 1872 election that he had been wrong about Grant, though he never made this change of 
heart public.
89
 Such a vocal opponent of Grant – and such a supporter of the one term 
principle – would have been unlikely to keep quiet if he agreed with Young’s assertions. 
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In attempting to portray the President as the model republican Grant’s allies recalled a 
conversation from 1868 which showed the President did not consider himself vital to the 
future of the republic. Whilst discussing the necessity of certain men to the Republican Party 
and the country among army friends, Grant addressed his chief-of-staff, John A. Rawlins, and 
stated that  ‘my experience during the war convinced me that when an officer thought success 
depended upon his existence, army discipline required that such an officer should be 
disabused of his conceit.’
90
 Grant continued ‘when I hear politicians prate about ‘What can 
the party do without him?’ I say to myself, ‘What will the poor country do when that man 
dies?’’ Indicating his disregard for the necessity of a man over principles, Grant exclaimed 
that‘[i]t seems to me such notions are inconsistent with our form of government, where no 
man has absolute authority, and all are dependent upon the will of the people.’
91
 By repeating 
such anecdotes, administration journals indicated that Grant was no Caesar, but a true 
republican who saw government as a temporary stewardship rather than a personal office; he 
had no desire to stand for a third term. 
Grant’s supporters also scolded the Herald for its casual dismissal of the power of the people 
and their reverence for Washington’s example. Even the Democratic Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
reminded the Herald that the American ‘people are sovereign in a sense which panicky 
papers are too apt to forget.’
92
 For the Eagle, indeed, democracy itself was the greatest check 
on despotic power. The people, it argued, ‘don’t intend to tie themselves up from having a 
man whom they want a second time. Neither do they intend to allow any precedent to be 
made which will continue an Executive longer than that.’
93
 This respect for the robustness of 
popular sovereignty and democratic institutions was repeated in plenty of Republican 
newspapers, including a Michigan paper which denounced Caesarism, stating that ‘whether 
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serious or not, it equally implies a perfect contempt for the popular intelligence.’
94
 Others 
found security in past precedent. ‘The austere example of Washington’, one paper noted for 
example, ‘is something that it is more difficult to disregard than even a constitutional 
provision.’
95
 It insisted that ‘the severe majesty of that character,’ with, ‘its cold, snowy 
purity of patriotism, cannot be forgotten nor obliterated.’
96
 If the American electorate were 
not an effective block on Caesarist ambitions, then the ghost of Washington would be. 
It was clear, then, that many Republican journals, and even a few prominent Democratic 
voices did not consider the scare to be genuine and worthy of attention.
97
 The President, they 
claimed, epitomised the republican ideal of a government servant, and would not violate the 
sanctity of the republic. Others asserted, like a Southern Democratic paper, that the people 
would not allow Grant to become a dictator even if the possibility existed.
98
 The Herald was, 
at best, mistaken, or, at worst, stirring suspicions over executive power for financial gain. 
Though, at least initially, these newspapers did not believe Grant presented any danger to the 
republic, they also believed that Washington’s precedent should not be violated – no matter 
how worthy the claimant – and promised to oppose such an eventuality if ever Grant 
entertained such a possibility.  
Caesar Ascendant 
The tone of the responses changed from ridicule to panic, however, when five Republican 
newspapers declared their support for a Grant third term. These newspapers gave credence to 
fears over executive power by suggesting that Grant would be willing to violate perhaps the 
greatest unwritten principle in U.S. politics: Washington’s two term precedent. The Daily 
Union-Herald (Columbia, South Carolina), the Washington Chronicle (Washington D.C.), 
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the National Republican (Washington D.C.), the Boston Journal (Boston, Massachusetts), 
and Harper’s Weekly all declared support for Grant’s hypothetical third term between late 
July and early August 1873. Although, the Daily Union-Herald first stated its support, the 
most influential of the cohort were the National Republican – the semi-official newspaper of 
the administration – and Harper’s Weekly, a well-known Grant supporter which had national 
reach. An example of the reach of the scare caused by these newspapers can be seen with the 
Boston Journal, whose support of the third term led one journalist to publish a pamphlet, 
promoting a third term for Grant, in 1873.
99
 In supporting the hypothetical third term the 
newspapers gave Young’s Cassandra-like cry a credibility it had lacked before. Yet the 
papers support for the idea actually lessened the prospect of it ever being realised. Indeed 
their intervention undermined Grant’s political capital by lending legitimacy to the idea that 
he would disregard Washington’s guiding principle for power. Grant, it seemed, might yet 
become the tyrant after all. 
Grant, himself, kept strictly silent over the whole affair: a stance which Mark Summers’ 
claimed merely encouraged suspicions over his intentions.
100
 The President later revealed in 
1875 that he had refused to comment as he believed that ‘the cry of Caesarism’ was 
perpetrated by those ‘hostile to the republican party’.
101
 His decision to remain quiet (a not 
uncommon tactic for him) rested on his belief that it was ‘benath [sic] the dignity of the 
office ... to answer such a question before the subject should be presented by competent 
authority to make a nomination, or by a body of such dignity and authority as to not make a 
reply a fair subject of ridicule.’
102
 Moreover, he expressed astonishment, and disappointment, 
‘that so many sensible persons in the republican party should permit their enemy to force 
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upon them, and the party, an issue which cannot add strength to the party no matter how 
met.’
103
 In essence, Grant believed the scare, at least initially, was a weapon intended to 
weaken his administration, and the party, and as such should simply be ignored as no 
response would be adequate to calm the furore. 
Concerning the third term suggestion, and in the spirit of all good republicans, Grant denied 
any desire for office. He wrote in a letter to the President of the Pennsylvania State 
Convention which had passed a resolution opposing the third term, that he ‘never sought the 
office for a second, nor even for a first, nomination.’
104
 Nor did he seek a third term, and if 
tendered, unless exceptional circumstances demanded he serve, he ‘would not accept a [third] 
nomination’.
105
 He asserted that ‘no one can force an election or even nomination’, and that 
the choice for the presidency ultimately resided, until Congress decided otherwise, with ‘the 
will of the people’, whose responsibility it lay upon to decide who was suitable for the 
office.
106
 Moreover, he claimed that Washington’s precedent should not be binding, as a 
situation might occur ‘in the future history of the country that to change an Executive because 
he has been eight years in office will prove unfortunate if not disastrous.’
107
 It was clear, 
then, that the President did not fear the presidency falling into unsafe hands, but nor did he 
believe the violation of this unwritten principle of the nation would descend the country into 
despotism. The suggestion that one man could rule permanently was an insult ‘upon the 
intelligence and patriotism of the people’.
108
 Like many Republican journals here he asserted 
his faith in American democracy but did not altogether allay concerns that he might run 
again. 
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Those concerned over the potential abuse of power found no consolation, then, from the 
President or in the articles of his semi-official journal, the National Republican, which 
declared that the slander emanating from Democratic and Liberal Republican newspapers 
merely resulted in ‘a strong feeling in favor of his renomination among a large body of his 
supporters’.
109
 Furthermore, the paper stated that this ‘feeling’ was ‘as likely to sweep the 
country as not, and give him a third term in the Executive Mansion by a majority more 
overwhelming than he received in ’68 or in ’72.’
110
 Although as baseless as the accusations of 
tyranny (it is possible the newspaper was simply testing the waters), the suggestion from an 
administration paper that a third Grant term commanded such large support genuinely 
worried many newspapers, for it hinted that Grant was seriously considering standing again 
and thus planned to violate one of the great uncodified principles of the republic. 
However, the most important declaration of support came from Harper’s Weekly, which 
stunned readers by claiming that a good president should not be dispensed with, no matter 
how long he had served. It noted that the Constitution did not inhibit a president from 
pursuing three terms, and quoted Jefferson and his contemporaries to show how they did not 
believe ‘a third term would have involved a violation of the principles of democracy, or a 
menace to republican institutions.’
111
 The paper intended to prove that the founders did not 
find fault in such an occurrence, but rather did not wish to pursue another term themselves. 
Harper’s, in the midst of mocking the Herald for its ‘sneer’, also questioned the foundation 
on which the republic existed.
112
 Other newspapers, it noted, had warned that ‘[i]f the 
President can be elected thrice … why not four, five, or six times, or for life?’
113
 But 
Harper’s confronted the implication head on: ‘[w]hy not, indeed, if the people say so? If a 
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clear majority of the people vote to abolish the republic and set up an empire, who shall 
hinder them?’
114
 It asked: ‘[s]hall we, then, go into hysterics in advance? If the people choose 
to-morrow to establish Mormonism, or human sacrifices, we don’t see who could say them 
nay.’
115
 Harper’s argument essentially questioned whether democracy or republicanism was 
more important to Americans, and while its satirical tone took the former to absurd extremes, 
the journal clearly sided with the rule of the majority over a strict separation of powers. 
Indeed Harper’s intent was clear: it indicated that the people were sovereign, and not 
Congress, and a president should serve as many terms as the sovereign people determined he 
warranted. Though Harper’s proceeded to comment that the republic was not in jeopardy – 
and the country ‘would certainly require something more than the re-election of a good 
magistrate to office to prove its decay’ – its most frightening suggestion for some was the 
statement that ‘it is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance to the country of retaining 
the services of a faithful and experienced magistrate.’
116
  
Harper’s Weekly’s argument for the retention of a good president rested upon the danger of 
entrusting the increased power of the presidency to an incompetent officer. The journal 
argued that elections for the country’s president had always been ‘a lottery’ – a common 
claim after a string of weak antebellum presidents – and although this mattered little when the 
United States was small and its influence inconsequential, a large and powerful country could 
‘not afford now to have a blunderer or a blusterer in the Chief Magistracy of the republic.’
117
 
‘It is vital, essentially vital,’ the journal insisted, ‘that the Presidency should be held by a safe 
man.’
118
 The country, Harper’s continued, could ‘not afford to make any more experiments’ 
and have presidents elected ‘who may turn out well, but who, for the sake of personal 
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renown, may involve us in foreign wars, or rekindle the dying embers of domestic strife.’
119
 It 
concluded with the statement that ‘[w]e can bear with much for the sake of assured peace and 
safe government. It is hard to say what price we could not afford to pay rather than elect 
another Buchanan or Johnson.’
120
 This claim from such an important journal with a 
nationwide readership – and by reprinting in other newspapers – created considerable alarm 
throughout the country.
121
 Although Harper’s was concerned about the stability of the 
republic – an incompetent in office, it implied, could lead the country back into war – the 
implication that stabilisation may have required a third term troubled readers. 
For those who feared the extension of executive power – and the potential of the office for 
abuse – the admission, from a leading Republican supporter, that precedent could be 
sacrificed to save the country from another weak or incompetent president was truly startling. 
If Harper’s Weekly intended to allay fears after the Herald’s supposed scaremongering, it 
succeeded in achieving precisely the opposite. After the articles supporting a third term 
appeared in late July to mid August 1873, the focus of press coverage changed. Grant’s 
supporters’ fell silent as fears about the extension of presidential power grew in intensity. The 
support for the hypothetical third term gave credence to anxieties over Grant’s abuse of 
power. Whether the Herald’s author was genuine in his fears over presidential power became 
irrelevant; for a while, Caesar seemed to be waiting in the wings. 
These newspapers turned the supportive response and ridicule that met the Herald’s scare in 
July into real concern over Grant’s potential to abuse the republic’s traditions. The prospect 
of support for the third term led to vehement denunciations of such a prospect in August and 
September as many Americans worried that the Herald had raised a serious possibility. 
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Critiques of the White House’s questionable use of power now frequently appeared in articles 
responding to the Herald’s Caesarism editorials. Alongside commentary on the intervention 
in Louisiana, this included the reaction to a general appropriations bill, which had included a 
retroactive pay rise for congressmen – known as the Salary Grab – which Grant signed into 
law. For those suspicious of the extension of federal power, both instances highlighted 
Grant’s questionable use of power and called into question his antipartisanship. In this 
respect, Young’s articles were timely, which the Sacramento Daily Union acknowledged 
when it stated that‘[t]he Herald’s warning voice against Caesarism will not be poo-poohed 
out of hearing. The discussion has taken an earnest form in spite of the attempts of knaves 
and fools to ridicule it.’
122
 
Thus in the face of this support for a third term, Democratic and Liberal Republican critiques 
of Grant’s specific use of power gained credence. The suggestion that Grant would violate 
one of the most fiercely defended principles in politics – Washington’s two term precedent – 
implied a willingness to go further in the march towards executive domination than even the 
last president to serve two full terms, Jackson, had contemplated. If in 1872, Congress had 
tried to rein in presidential power, by 1873, plenty saw the executive and legislature marching 
hand in hand towards despotism. A Democratic Missourian newspaper complained how: 
[t]he petty nabobs and nobodies of Washington have seen Congress sit there and 
pass its tyrannical measures, and a horse-fancier dignified by the title of president 
enforce them so long, that they have become imbued with the idea that even its 
little police court overspreads the whole country with its tiny brass scales.
123
 
After the handful of Republican journals legitimised the third term movement, such fears 
spread beyond old slaveholding states like Missouri, and through the Republican and 
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independent press in the North. Previously silent Republicans and indifferent independents 
began denouncing the third term prospect after it garnered genuine support, whilst the 
triumphant Democrats became more vocal in their condemnations of the President.
124
 Grant’s 
potential re-election divided the previously united Republican press: the mixture of ridicule 
for the accusations and support for the White House dissipated as concerns over Grant’s 
ability to violate a vaulted republican principle were given voice.
125
 
Though these formerly indifferent newspapers did not assail Grant with the vituperation of 
some of the Democratic newspapers, their articles clearly indicated that Republican support 
for Grant’s third term disturbed them. Their reaction illustrated that the anxieties over liberty 
raised in alarmist Democratic newspapers were not simply partisan ploys. Initially, The 
Abbeville Press and Banner in South Carolina had declared that it remained far ‘more 
interested in the proper administration of our State government than even in the question of 
Caesarism or Republicanism.’
126
 However, it was not long before they began reprinting the 
New York World’s request for the Republican Party to define their position on the third term 
and explaining that their worries centred around ‘the increased power and patronage of the 
President’, especially ‘the disbursement now of a revenue of four hundred millions.’
127
 The 
concerns of these previously apathetic journals gave weight to denunciations from more 
starkly partisan newspapers such as the Democratic Albany Argus in New York, which 
contended that Grant ‘stamps popular rights into the ground’, ‘drown[s] the popular protest’ 
and was ‘obtaining despotic control’.
128
 It proceeded to claim ‘there is not an oppressor in the 
land who is not allied to the Imperial Republicanism under whose weight the country is 
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 Patronage had become imperialism. Such scaremongering, in the context of the 
widespread discussions of the abuse of federal power, built on unease over the rise of 
presidential power that had been growing since the onset of the Civil War. And at the height 
of the Caesarism scare those anxieties were widespread. Some sceptical newspapers even 
wrote of such concerns as a ‘symptom of the abnormal and pathological condition’ of U.S. 
politics, thus anticipating the clinical language Richard Hofstadter would use in his The 
Paranoid Style ninety-one years before it was written.
130
  
Yet rather than dismiss such fears through reference to mass psychology, we should read 
them seriously as an outgrowth of a republican political culture and the politics of 
Reconstruction. Echoing the Caesarism editorials, the newspapers warned that patronage 
provided Grant with a solid base of supporters, a claim vigorously refuted by Republican 
newspapers. Through the use of military language these newspapers hinted at his dictatorial 
ambitions, often using phrases like ‘army of officeholders’ and ‘army of politicians’ to link 
his appointing powers with his generalship.
131
 The Atlanta Constitution stated that ‘he is the 
candidate of the office holders and party magnates, and they can and will dictate the 
nomination.’
132
 This claim found resonance in many newspapers who warned Grant ‘has the 
power to force this nomination from his power.’
133
 Such claims showed how military might, 
patronage and executive power could reinforce one another, and helped to create a plausible 
narrative in which Grant turned a republic into a tyranny. 
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Concerns over Caesarism – in particular the ability of a president to enforce policy through 
patronage – appeared throughout the Democratic and Republican press, and came to 
represent a multitude of genuine grievances with increased federal power. Discussions of 
Caesarism, which tended to start with patronage, often morphed into critiques of presidential 
support for railroad and canal construction, or denunciations of ‘military despotism’ and the 
‘central, imperial power.’
134
 The readiness of papers usually supportive of the administration 
to voice some of these concerns suggests that Caesarism was no mere party trick. A 
Californian newspaper which supported Grant in 1872, for instance, expressed similar 
worries to its Democratic contemporaries on patronage and influence. While the paper 
conceded, like others, ‘that the Herald has magnified the danger’, it agreed that Young raised 
valid points and called for a one term amendment ‘to be adopted without delay.’ 
135
 In 
keeping with Young, indeed, the paper saw the greatest danger lay in future (possibly 
Democratic) incumbents in the White House. ‘[W]ith a President as popular as Grant, and as 
ambitious as the second Caesar, supported by such a vast army of the corrupt, the hungry, the 
knavish, the rich, the alien in heart’, the paper argued, it would be possible ‘to overturn the 
Government of the people, by the people and for the people, and establish that of one man 
upon its ruins.’
136
 Patronage provided a path to despotism and a new check on power was 
needed. 
Caesarism, like the one term principle in 1872, focused wider concerns about corruption on 
the abuse of executive power in particular. This Californian newspaper could see the 
corrupting influence of power in many sources.
137
 The newspaper detailed how during ‘the 
last five years treachery and perfidy have been the rule and not merely the exception’ in all 
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 It claimed representatives had ‘violated’ without explanation or 
‘remorse’ their election promises and ‘invariably sold the people out to the railway 
corporation’, which profited from the support of the federal government.
139
 Numerous 
representatives, elected to the previous two congressional sessions, received their votes on the 
basis of adhering ‘to the closest economy in expenditure, to no more land or bond subsidy for 
railways, and to the strictest accountability of public officers to the Government’ which they 
proceeded to disregard once in power.
140
 The paper declared that ‘every one of these pledges 
was studiously and deliberately violated by the majority.’
141
 As a result, these Californians 
could easily identify with the warnings issued in the Caesarism editorials as they had 
encountered these problems themselves. They believed the Herald’s fears as they were no 
stranger to the abuse of power and, in the support for a third presidential term, they saw the 
prospect of this abuse continuing indefinitely.  
However, the California newspaper proposed a more radical solution than the Herald: if 
elective representatives could not abide by the public’s wishes, the people themselves would 
elect a Caesar to sweep away corruption.
142
 Here, the paper echoed some of the support for 
monarchism that The Imperialist had exposed in 1869.
143
 Southern conservative support for a 
monarch had derived from dissatisfaction with Reconstruction – especially the removal of 
former Confederates from power – yet this article suggests support for a representative single 
leader garnered more widespread support than simply those despondent with the post-war 
settlement.
144
 It echoed, indeed, the fears of businessmen and merchants in New York who 
feared that the inability of the working classes to select the best men for office would 

















eventually lead to despotism.
145
 This situation was epitomised in the statement by the paper 
that the ‘loss of confidence by the people themselves in the men they select for 
Representatives and Senators’ constituted ‘the greatest danger to the republic’. 
146
 Though it 
did not intend to ‘artificially’ scare the public, it warned that if this regime – especially in 
regard to the railroads – continued, then ‘the desire for a Caesar to release the country from 
the strong and heartless grasp of the oligarchy will come up from the people themselves, no 
longer able to bear the burdens put upon them by the perfidy of their representatives.’
147
 
Caesar, it seems, could be found from within the populace too.  
Restrained, serious, and distinctly un-sensational discussion of Caesarism indicates that the 
scare was not just an amusing joke. Journals discussed what they saw as genuine abuses of 
power after Grant received declarations of support for the third term. Events in Louisiana 
particularly concerned those worried about the power of the federal government. Grant’s role 
in arbitrating the affair, which like Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War had a questionable 
constitutional basis, led the anti-Reconstruction Atlanta Constitution, along with many other 
papers – Republican ones among them – to declare that Grant ‘uses every inch of his power 
for the welfare of the party. Does he not steadfastly support the infamous Kellogg conspiracy 
in Louisiana?’
148
 This might have been a predictable line for an anti-Reconstruction paper in 
the South, but the vituperative Liberal Republican Chicago Daily Tribune also claimed the 
federal government represented a ‘bogus Government which is pushing the people headlong 
into bankruptcy and ruin’, and stated that the Democratic candidate for Governor had asked 
for a ‘protectorate’ for Louisiana which Grant denied by deciding in favour of the 
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 The request implied republican government no longer existed in Louisiana, 
which led to the question: would it soon disappear elsewhere?
 150
 
Newspapers around the country, indeed, stated that if Louisiana could fall into despotism, so 
too could other states. Democratic and independent newspapers all over the country pointed 
to Louisiana as evidence that corruption and despotism existed in the republic, and that in a 
manner, Caesarism had already ripened. The Council Grove newspaper in Kansas stated that 
Caesarism had been established in the ‘despotism over Louisiana’.
151
 One Democratic 
Louisiana newspaper claimed corruption in the state allied with Grant’s power aided the 
creation ‘of gigantic rings and monopolies’, which along with Reconstruction attempted to 
destroy the South.
152
 The solution it proposed would be to emancipate Grant from the 
Republican Party ‘making him Dictator’, which it contended the majority of white 
Southerners would support if it freed them from ‘carpet-baggers’ (Northerners who had 
migrated South, and taken up positions of power, after the Civil War).
153
 It was a claim 
supported by other Southern newspapers, who claimed they preferred the possibility of a 
magnanimous dictator to the rule of carpet-baggers and freedmen. Despotism, it seemed, in 
an echo of the pro-monarchist sentiment of 1869, was preferable to republicanism. 
Grant’s arbitration role in the electoral dispute in Louisiana in May 1873 caused a great deal 
of concern, but another incident in Washington D.C. during March 1873 proved particularly 
unsavoury. The so-called Salary Grab caused great consternation in many quarters, including 
in the newspapers of both parties. The Act derived its popular name from its objectionable 
provisions and the method in which those provisions were obtained. Republican 
Representative Benjamin F. Butler had added the measure as a late amendment to a general 
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appropriations bill, which had been delayed by several months, and contained vital provisions 
for the payment of the armed forces.
154
 The amendment doubled the compensation due to the 
president and the Supreme Court justices, but it also increased the pay of congressmen by 
fifty per cent, which would be made retroactive to the beginning of the congressional 
session.
155
 Butler thus provided congressmen with a five thousand dollar gift in back pay.
156
 
Due to the needs of the army (a government shutdown would have occurred otherwise) and 
most likely out of concern for the volatile situation in Louisiana, Grant signed the bill into 
law, but recommended the creation of a one-line veto to remove the back-pay clause.
157
  
Disgusted with Grant, most commentators claimed the President should have vetoed the bill 
rather than recommend the removal of the clause; otherwise departing congressmen could 
claim their back pay and would have no reason to compel them to return it. Grant’s 
suggestion of a line-item veto, as it usually known, would not be awarded until Bill Clinton’s 
administration in 1996, though even then it was shortly declared unconstitutional.
158
 
However, its first appearance in a national government in North America was as a legislative 
grant to the Confederate States’ chief executive, which made Grant the first president to ask 
for the power in the United States.
159
 After the Civil War, both Georgia and Texas gave the 
power to their governors in 1868, but not until January 1876 would a congressman propose 
such an amendment to the Constitution.
160
 Evidently, Congress was not amenable to 
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allocating more power to the President. For those concerned about the abuse of presidential 
power, the President’s refusal to veto the Act without more power constituted evidence that 
corruption reigned supreme in the United States. 
Grant’s intervention in Louisiana and the Salary Grab provided proof for many Americans 
that Grant could not be trusted to resist a third term. Those worried about the potential demise 
of the republic held these actions up as evidence that Grant had become corrupted – drunk on 
power rather than whiskey – and, if presented with the opportunity, would accept a third term 
and violate Washington’s two term precedent. The Salary Grab, in particular, allowed new 
arguments about greed, selfishness and monetary gain to enter into denunciations of Grant’s 
power: a precursor to the corruption scandals that would engulf the last years of his 
administration. One Democratic South Carolinian newspaper charged that ‘General Grant 
loves power as well as money’.
161
 Another Democratic editor argued that ‘Grant desired to 
have his salary doubled’ but ‘could not secure the increase without bribing members of 
Congress by increasing their salaries, also.’
162
 His third term bid, they suggested, would be 
funded by those who, ‘through his appointing power’ had ‘access to the treasury of this 
gloriously corrupt government’.
163
 After all Grant, an independent charged, had ‘again 
exhibited’ his self-indulgence ‘in connection with the salary steal.’
164
 If Grant could not resist 
the country’s finances, then how could he be expected to resist its honours? 
The abuse of the country’s finances allowed Democratic and independent newspapers to 
suggest that partisan politics had entered Grant’s presidency. One newspaper alleged that 
‘wire pullers are quietly at work with a view to nominate Grant for the third term’: a novel 
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argument in Democratic denunciations of Grant.
165
 The President, they now alleged, was ‘a 
party man.’
166
 An independent Wisconsin newspaper, which supported Grant in 1872, 
declared ‘[i]f there is anything in it we cannot too soon array ourselves against a plan that 
could only have been devised by public enemies, and sordid, selfish, corrupt, and utterly 
unscrupulous politicians, who would calmly sacrifice the people to keep their hold on place 
and power.’
167
 Grant, it seemed, had become a politician. 
Yet, the Democrats did not merely suggest the President had become a partisan, they also 
began attacking Grant’s antipartisanship as a source of corruption in government. Previously 
the Democrats had used aspects of republicanism, in particular the importance of self-
restraint, to illustrate that Grant was incapable of governing the country. Usually they 
accused Grant of drunkenness and tyrannical tendencies in an effort to undermine Republican 
attempts to present him as a model republican. But they had not directly attacked the self-
sacrifice and antipartyism that the Republicans had claimed for him. However, the Salary 
Grab allowed them to now assail Grant in this manner. ‘We merely deceive ourselves’, the 
Louisiana Daily Picayune warned, ‘if we indulge in the delusion of no-partyism.’
168
 The 
people, the paper alerted its readers, must be vigilant if power were not to be abused as no 
such thing as an antiparty man existed.
169
 Another paper, in Alabama, struck at the suggestion 
of Grant’s self-sacrifice when they retorted that if, as the Republican Hartford Post claimed, 
‘the masses of the republican party are animated by a self-sacrificing spirit’ then why had 
they not ‘‘sacrificed’ their back pay.’
170
 Lastly, the Herald entered the fray when it ran a 
story in August which questioned whether Grant was simply a slave to party. It quoted Grant 
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as supposedly declaring to a friend that ‘[i]f the newspapers want to know whether I will be 
renominated why don’t they quiz the party that elected me?’
171
 Grant’s commitment to the 
public duty, then, could turn the country into a dictatorship by his refusal to resist the laurels 
which the Republican Party, would in theory, repeatedly present to him. In this respect 
Grant’s republicanism could ultimately endanger, rather than enrich, the country. 
Particularly troubling for those afraid of Caesarism was the refusal of Grant to state his 
intentions, but in lieu of any clear statement on the President’s designs, the Herald sought out 
his close friends who denied he entertained any desire for a third term while giving him their 
future support. While George W. Childs, of the antipartisan but pro-Grant Philadelphia 
Public Ledger, wisely remained silent, some of Grant’s other friends were not so 
circumspect. Both Morton McMichael, of the Republican North American and United States 
Gazette – a conservative journal often supportive in principle of antiparty movements – and 
John W. Forney, of the Philadelphia Press, declared their belief that Grant had no interest in 
another term.
172
 However, McMichael also explained that he did not regard the prospect as 
dangerous if the President decided to run especially as he thought Grant ‘would prove true to 
his trust.’
173
 He also suggested that, if nominated, he foresaw the re-election of Grant but he 
believed this situation would only occur if ‘the party was in danger of being disrupted, and it 
became necessary to run for a third term a man whose prestige would save it.’
174
 Again, the 
party would appeal to the republican who, McMichael asserted, would rush to the Republican 
Party’s side to save it from disaster; it was a prospect the Herald had already suggested could 
lead to a perpetual presidency in the United States through, not despite, Grant’s 
republicanism. McMichael’s opinion proved worrying for those disposed to think that Grant 
coveted a third term. 
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Though Forney, too, claimed Grant had more ‘sense’ than to seriously consider running for a 
third term, he also pressed the importance of denouncing the prospect. Forney’s words were 
not helped by the Herald’s misstatement that he still owned the Washington Chronicle, which 
had pledged itself to Grant’s re-election in 1876.
175
 His call for ‘the republican press to place 
the seal of condemnation upon this third term movement at once’ implied that the idea had 
genuine support throughout the country.
176
 Moreover, he stated that Grant was ‘surrounded 
by flatterers’ (a tendency good republicans saw in monarchies),who would ‘come to him and 
say that the democratic party is utterly demoralized, and that anything recommended by the 
republican leaders will be approved by the republican party and made good at the election’.
177
 
However, Forney claimed that he did not perceive that there existed ‘any serious intention in 
any quarter in regard to this third term’, yet his urgency in denouncing it suggests he saw it at 
least as a political threat.
178
  
Whether or not the Caesarism scare began as a hoax, it was clear from the response of 
individuals and the press that genuine anxieties over the substantial extension of presidential 
power existed, especially after a few influential Republicans supported the idea of the third 
term. Not only did plenty of Democrats and Liberal Republicans believe in the possibility of 
Grant’s re-election, but many Republicans feared the situation, too. The Caesarism scare, 
which initially represented concerns over Grant’s use of patronage, came to encompass 
numerous grievances over the use of power by all federal representatives. It came to represent 
broken election promises, the monopoly of railroad companies on public land and finances, 
corruption among representatives, and the centralisation of power in the federal government. 
The threat of a third term rallied those who wanted a restoration of republican values to the 
federal government. But more importantly the serious discussions in the press of the third 
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term highlighted the fears of many Americans that the President’s power threatened to 
disintegrate their virtuous republic. 
Republicanism versus Democracy 
The discussion over Caesarism was often a conversation between major publications, of both 
national and regional reach, who used their influence to mediate debate in smaller journals. 
When papers with regional importance, like the Sacramento Daily Union, conceded that 
Caesarism had genuine roots they helped to transform a debate marked by ridicule and 
republican platitudes into a serious discussion about executive power. But these journals 
could only do so after several Republican newspapers seriously raised the prospect of a third 
term. After Harper’s Weekly (and other third term supporters) set the tone of the discussion 
by declaring their support for Grant, the Herald began responding to its claims. In particular, 
the Herald took great interest in Harper’s article that asserted the country would be better off 
with fewer liberties than it would be under an incompetent president.
179
 The Herald 
responded that the United States’ system of government made the country susceptible to 
tyranny. Its riposte was widely reprinted even in papers that had hitherto refuted charges of 
executive usurpation against Grant. Critiquing the American system of government, the 
Herald highlighted the enormous power yet lack of accountability of the cabinet, which 
seemingly made Caesarism possible.
180
  
The president, the Herald argued, controlled the cabinet, which in turn dispensed a large 
amount of patronage and gave Grant substantial unchecked power.
181
 Moreover, the article 
implied that the president, in collusion with the Attorney General, could make every law of 
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Congress amenable to his will.
182
 Thus, through patronage, Grant had accumulated immense 
power at his fingertips allowing him to direct ‘the machinery of the government of the United 
States’.
183
 In a telling hint of the linkage between political and corporate corruption it stated 
that the president had more control than a great entrepreneur did over his company.
184
 The 
life appointments system of the Supreme Court also aided the president as it allowed him, in 
the Herald’s eyes, to control the Supreme Court.
185
 This enabled the president to become 
dictator in all but name, as through the Attorney General and the Supreme Court, the 
president could interpret laws passed by Congress as he pleased.
186
 Furthermore, as 
committees and the Senate controlled Congress, a great deal of power remained 
unaccountable, which left congressional power open to abuse too.
187
 The paper also drew 
attention to the Congressional Directory (published annually) which listed the top officials in 
each government department, highlighting the astounding growth of the federal government 
and how these officials were ‘practically the friends of imperial purple’, especially as civil 
service reform had removed them somewhat from public censure and practically created life 
jobs for them.
188
 The Herald’s message was clear and consistent: the founders had accorded 
the president too much power and only a constitutional amendment which capped his terms 
would remedy the problem. 
The Herald therefore set itself up against ‘too much concentration of power in a few 
hands’.
189
 The great desire among some Americans for ‘centralization and a strong 
government’ to entrench the gains of Reconstruction had led to danger as ‘the power already 
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exists, and only the throne is wanting.’
190
 According to the Herald, the republic was not safe 




The response to the Caesarism editorials peaked in August and September as newspapers 
responded to the battle between the Herald and supporters of the third term, but by October, 
as the country reeled from financial crisis, the atmosphere created by Caesarism had calmed 
down. The Panic of 1873, explored in the next chapter, which hit on 18 September 1873, 
contributed a great deal to this change.
192
 But despite the pandemonium caused by the panic, 
it did not supersede Caesarism. The volume of articles on the scare remained high during 
September, and continued into October, but started to peter out towards the end of the month. 
Only a trickle of articles appeared in November. It is a testament to the strength of the scare 
that the Panic of 1873 did not decimate it. 
It is possible that the return of Harper’s Weekly’s premier cartoonist, from ordered rest due to 
fatigue, played a salient role in the demise of the scare in late October 1873.
193
 Thomas 
Nast’s influence was renowned: Lincoln credited Nast as the Union’s ‘best recruiting 
sergeant’ during the Civil War due to his moving illustrations which emphasised the moral 
and patriotic merits of the North’s cause.
194
 Though he returned too late to rectify the damage 
done by journalists – including those at his own journal – it is possible that his October 
cartoons helped to defuse many of the fears the scare had raised. Nast treated the editorials 
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with the only response he deemed suitable: ridicule.
 195
 His first cartoon entitled ‘A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream’, published on 4 October 1873, mocked the owner of the Herald 
by depicting Bennett Junior talking to the Ghost of Caesarism in his office, and dreaming up 
the idea in the dull news season. Nast drew Bennett throwing away ‘common sense’ in the 
waste basket and conversing with the ghost, saying ‘I think it is the dullness of the times 
which shapes this monstrous apparition. Art thou anything? What do I see?’
196
 The Ghost of 
Caesarism replied ‘[w]hat do you see? You see an ass-head of your own; do you?’
197
 Nast’s 
meaning was clear: Caesarism was nothing but the fiction of Bennett’s own imagination. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream’. 
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Source: Thomas Nast, ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream’, Harper’s Weekly, 4 October 1873. 
 
Congratulating himself and others who had ridiculed the Herald (slightly prematurely as it 
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appeared in the same issue), Nast’s second cartoon showed Bennett’s ‘hot air’ had burst.
198
 
However, his third cartoon, published on 11 October 1873, mocked both Bennett and those 
newspapers fooled by the editorials. In this cartoon, Nast tackled the suggestion that Grant 
could procure himself a third term. Nast used the story of the Anglo-Danish King Cnut and 
the tide to illustrate that Grant too knew full well the limits of his power.
199
 The story 
originated from a tale in Henry of Huntingdon’s Chronicle of the History of England which 
attested to the King’s humility.
200
 It claimed that after courtiers flattered him by suggesting 
he had the ability to command the sea, Cnut asked for his throne to be placed on the shore, 
and told the water to not touch him.
201
 However, the tide rose and soaked the King, who used 
it as proof to show the existence of an almightier force greater than any monarch.
202
 In Nast’s 
cartoon, Grant as a noble lion, sits on Cnut’s throne while pointing towards the ocean and 
declaring ‘I can no more proclaim myself Caesar than I can compel the Atlantic Ocean to 
recede, and you know it.’
203
 Those around him reading the New York Herald are portrayed as 
fools – partly through their depiction as animals but also by their look of embarrassment. The 
sea here stood in for the nation’s robust republican institutions: a widespread suffrage and a 
balanced government. Nast implied that Grant was more aware than his critics that these 
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 Thomas Nast, ‘Our Modern Canute at Long Branch’, Harper’s Weekly, 11 October 1873. 
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Figure 3.2 ‘Our Modern Canute at Long Branch’ 
 
Source: Thomas Nast, ‘Our Modern Canute at Long Branch’, Harper’s Weekly, 11 October 
1873. 
However, this did not diminish the fears over presidential power in this era. Nast was not 
alone in ridiculing the scare. The humorist Eli Perkins’ (a man most likely involved in the 
earlier Imperialist scare of 1869) wrote a widely distributed satirical article on Grant’s 
penchant for summary executions, human sacrifice and cannibalism in the New York Daily 
Graphic, and this too may have extinguished some fears over a third term for Grant.
204
 But 
the satire came too late to fully remedy the damage already done. Indeed the comical 
conclusion to the scare makes it too easy to miss just how seriously many Americans – not 
just Southern whites and partisan Democrats – took the prospect of a third term. Caesarism as 
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an idea, after all, would soon resurface in anti-Grant newspapers during the response to 
Grant’s veto of the 1874 inflation bill – the subject of the next chapter – where it was stirred 
up by congressmen, who were possibly the greatest casualty in the drama as they sought to 
rein in Grant’s power through bills which reduced the size of the military. It is probable that a 
House Resolution passed in 1876 which recommended against Grant’s re-nomination at the 
1876 Republican convention may have been derived from fears over the reach of his power 




The Caesarism editorials highlighted and fuelled ongoing fears over presidential power in an 
era where the boundaries of power in the federal government remained undefined. The Civil 
War and Reconstruction had required unprecedented mobilisation of presidential power in an 
attempt to ensure long lasting change within the nation. As a result, many Americans were 
left feeling insecure about the stability of the republic. Republican anxieties over patronage, 
the use of the military in peacetime, and the centralisation of power in the federal government 
were old concerns for citizens, but the period of instability exacerbated anxieties about the 
longevity of self-government. In giving form to these fears through his Caesarism editorials, 
though, Young made a small contribution to the downfall of Reconstruction. 
The anxieties which the Caesarism scare embodied would only serve to alarm Americans and 
keep them on high alert over potential infractions by the President. By raising concerns over 
Grant’s independence in distributing patronage and the power that could be derived from this 
privilege, Young simply built on existing fears over presidential powers already stoked by 
events in Louisiana. These in turn helped to bring numerous grievances over the use of 
federal power to the forefront of politics, which gave credence to the possibility that Grant 
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would violate Washington’s two term precedent. Efforts to defend Grant on a republican 
basis fell on deaf ears as his desire to use executive power to enforce Reconstruction saw him 
enact measures even many in his own party saw as questionable such as the Salary Grab in an 
effort to defend the gains African Americans had made in the South. The President’s 
dedication to Reconstruction ultimately resulted in depictions of him as a corrupt, power-
hungry politician, which would undermine his ability to enforce the rights of the former 
slaves over the final years of his second term when his vigorous use of power would be 
conflated with the actions of a tyrant. Warnings over presidential power, like the Caesarism 
editorials, imperilled the future of Reconstruction. 
The response to the Caesarism articles also raised questions over the safety of the republic 
and whether the electorate could be trusted to use the suffrage wisely. Talk of a third term 
was shaped by the concerns of Liberal Republicans and some businessmen who were 
suspicious of the abilities of the lower classes to vote in capable, incorruptible men to 
political office. Caesarism seemed to illustrate the potential of the electorate to elect a 
demagogue, who would use his popularity to abuse power with a supine electorate looking 
on, much as William Tweed had done with his Tammany machine on a smaller scale in New 
York. In particular, statements from Grant’s supporters that recommended the retention of a 
trusted, capable executive further reinforced these anxieties, and lent support to critics of a 
wide suffrage.  It brought into question whether democracy was compatible with republican 
government: if the public desired a Caesar could it legitimately elect one or did checks and 
balance place restraints on majority rule? Caesarism alerted the nation to questions of 
extreme importance for the future shape of the nation.  
Caesarism, then, was much more than simply an exploitation of exaggerated fears of 
presidential power. It raised serious questions about both the nature of presidential power and 
democracy in the United States. And it showed how the spectre of Andrew Johnson’s 
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presidency still hung over politics. Grant’s use of patronage was misunderstood by many who 
saw his reluctance to reward his party as an attempt to build a loyal power base. Grant’s 
independence from party trammels, as in his first term, raised fears that the President had 
dictatorial ambitions. Many level-headed Republican supporters also voiced worries over the 
inability of their representatives to adhere to their election pledges as they denounced the 
influence of railroads and the support they received from the federal government. In a 
political milieu shaped by concern over the corruption of republican virtue, many of Grant’s 
supporters too came to fear the possible extension of his power in the form of an 
unprecedented third term. Caesarism – as a Republican newspaper editor highlighted – 
became a byword for numerous grievances with the power of the federal government.
206
 
‘Caesarism’, as the Herald itself stated in response to its critics, ‘could not be made a 
newspaper sensation if it were the phantom they pretend it is.’
207
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‘The most important event of the administration’:  
 
The President vetoes the 1874 inflation bill 
 
 
As the nation continued to reel from the Caesarism scare and the uncertainty over whether 
President Ulysses S. Grant sought an unprecedented third term, financial catastrophe struck, 
shifting attention from fears over power to fears over economic security. In September 1873 
with the press still consumed with Caesarism, and the New York Herald chasing down public 
figures for their opinions on the issue, the financier of the Union Civil War effort – Jay 
Cooke and Company – suspended interest payments, effectively admitting bankruptcy.
1
 The 
company’s actions resulted in the Panic of 1873 as thousands of U.S. companies collapsed.
 2
 
In the pandemonium, many Americans looked to the federal government for relief. Grant, 
though wary of inflation, agreed to a small reissue of retired dollars, known as greenbacks, 
which partially eased the cash shortage in the East. However, the financial situation still 
remained critical in most of the country – especially the West and South, where credit had 
been scarce since the Civil War – and this prompted Congress to legislate on the issue. The 
resulting measure provided for an increase of the currency by a third of its existing amount, 
but, unexpectedly, Grant vetoed the bill on 22 April 1874. The President had acted of his own 
accord, but in doing so, had renewed the anxieties of executive tyranny that had filled the 
newspaper pages over the preceding summer.  
Historians have often portrayed Grant as either an incompetent chief executive or a puppet of 
the Republican Party, yet his veto of the 1874 inflation bill suggests he was neither.
3
 Most 
Americans did not expect Grant to veto the bill, and his action caught both congressmen and 
political commentators by surprise when the news arrived. Indeed it marked one of the 
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greatest shocks since his cabinet picks in 1869, to which it bore a striking similarity. Senators 
were stunned into silence when they received Grant’s veto in the chamber.
4
 Washington 
correspondents, considered the most knowledgeable on federal government news, had been 
confident that Grant would sign the bill into law, especially as congressmen deemed use of 
the veto unjustifiable unless the president believed a bill was unconstitutional.
5
 Grant’s 
predecessor, Andrew Johnson, narrowly missed conviction in the Senate after the House of 
Representatives impeached him for (albeit indirectly) his veto use, and many congressmen 
had threatened Grant with impeachment if he vetoed the bill.
6
 Congress did not act on their 
threat but in the President’s action they saw a dangerous precedent: an attempt by the 
executive to direct legislative policy. As a result, they sought to rectify the issue by devising a 
new bill which would provide double the amount of greenbacks than the original bill.
7
 Grant, 
they alleged in language that echoed the scare of the previous year, was acting dictatorially.  
Grant’s veto of the inflation bill proved extremely divisive. Opponents of Grant’s actions, 
illustrating the effect of the previous year’s Caesarism scare on the American public, accused 
Grant of plotting a third term, and read his actions as merely a device to gain powerful 
backers for his plans. Collusion with Wall Street, they warned, would enable the President to 
impose a permanent despotism throughout the nation. Grant’s veto was thus a symbol of his 
corruption and path to perpetual power. These critics presented Grant as a tyrannical ruler. 
Building on the critique of executive usurpation, framed in battles with Johnson then 
developed over the course of Grant’s presidency, some Americans perceived the veto as an 
illegitimate appropriation of a legislative role rightfully reserved to elective congressional 
representatives, who they argued represented the will of the people. Representations of Grant 
                                                 
4
 ‘Inflation Exploded’, Daily Alta California, 23 April 1874. 
5
 Smith, Grant p. 579, and Dubuque Herald (Dubuque, Iowa), 24 April 1874. A nearly identical article was also 
printed in the Chicago Tribune, 22 April 1874, and Michigan Tribune, 30 April 1874. 
6
 New York Times, 22 April 1874. 
7
 New York Tribune, 19 May 1874. 
222 
 
by both his opponents and supporters highlighted how issues of political economy often 
became intertwined with political culture. It mattered less whether inflation would improve 
the nation’s dire financial straits, and more, seemingly, on whether Grant was right to use 
power in such a manner. In this respect, the debate over the use of the veto became a question 
over the kind of democracy Americans desired in the United States. 
When Grant ascended to the presidential office in March 1869 he did so upon the promise of 
adherence to the will of the people. Though a slippery notion, Grant understood this to mean 
acting in the best interests of the United States, even if this risked putting him at odds with 
other claimants to democratic legitimacy: principally Congress. While the veto caused 
outrage in some sections of the country, the majority of responses to Grant’s veto 
commended his actions. These commendations illustrated that the reaction to Grant’s veto did 
not simply reflect an East versus West issue as many newspapers and historians have 
portrayed the incident. Applause could be heard in Chicago and Detroit, while condemnation 
extended to ‘hard money’ cities like Philadelphia. The issue of finance ran deeper than a 
simple sectional divide. Though geography was important – most of the denunciations after 
all came from credit hungry Western and Southern areas which stood to benefit the most 
from currency expansion – it mattered less than scholars have suggested.
8
 Newspapers from 
all regions of the country praised what they saw as an honourable antipartisan stance in 
vetoing a bill urged on him by many members of the Republican Party. Heralding the model 
republican, they compared Grant’s actions to his Civil War service. As President, they 
claimed, Grant bestowed on the people a victory as momentous to the United States as he 
effected at Appomattox Court House when he received the surrender of Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee. In their ‘exuberant’ gratitude some papers alleged that various cities had ‘fired 
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a hundred guns over the event’.
9
 It was evident that many citizens believed Grant had 
fulfilled his duty to the public by vetoing the controversial bill. 
In justifying the President’s use of the veto they reminded the public that the veto had roots in 
a political tradition dating back to the Revolution. Supporters insisted that Grant had saved 
the republic from financial ruin, and that the imperative of defending the national interest 
from partisan plots justified him overriding the wishes of Congress. They claimed that in 
vetoing a bill believed to be harmful to the still struggling American economy, Grant had 
acted for the public good. The President, they argued, had served his country rather than his 
party, and epitomised the republican ideal of the disinterested public servant. The editor of 
influential journal Harper’s Weekly, George William Curtis, even labelled Grant’s veto ‘the 
most important event of his administration.’
10
 But more surprisingly, Grant also received a 
great deal of support from former enemies for his action. Newspaper editors all over the 
United States described the veto as the defining moment of Grant’s presidency. In an era 
typically portrayed as dominated by scandals, corruption, and interest group horse-trading, 
Grant’s action was upheld by his defenders as embodying a different form of politics: an 
antipartyism that harked back to the rhetoric of the early republic rather than the Gilded Age.  
Grant’s supporters also portrayed him as an honourable man protecting the nation from a 
humiliating and degrading fate. Honour, historians have argued, formed a cultural system 
which revolved around the public reputation of an individual, family or group; the opposite of 
honour constituted ‘public humiliation’ or ‘shame’.
11
 Based on a public system of 
acknowledged reputation, a person’s honour had to be accepted by the whole of society rather 
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than simply relying upon the perception of their own ‘self-worth’.
12
 However, Amy S. 
Greenberg has identified that this culture diverged in the antebellum era into two 
manifestations: martial manhood and restrained manhood.
13
 Martial manhood was 
characterised by ‘strength, aggression, and even violence,’ and was symbolised most vividly 
by the penchant for duelling; in the Civil War era, it was strongest in the South.
14
 On the 
other hand, restrained manhood required ‘being morally upright, reliable, and brave’, and 
enjoyed its broadest support in middle-class Northern culture.
15
 Restrained men valued 
domesticity and often supported reform movements, especially temperance.
16
 When Grant 
was praised for his honour, it was the latter of the two forms which his supporters believed he 
signified. Where a former incumbent of the White House who stirred fears of tyranny, 
Andrew Jackson, was firmly situated by both champions and opponents in the tradition of 
martial honour, Grant embodied (at least his backers insisted) the qualities of manly self-
restraint. Rather than presenting a drunken and tyrannical threat to a chaste republic, as his 
critics so frequently charged, he had the self-control necessary to protect Columbia from 
those who preyed on her virtue: imagery, as I will show, that commentators explicitly evoked 
in defending the President’s veto. 
Through an examination of the reaction to this veto through newspaper articles, editorials, 
cartoons, and personal papers, this chapter demonstrates that debates over the presidential 
veto, like battles over other aspects of executive power in the era, took place in a political 
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culture still defined by republicanism. Though responses to the veto were often shaped by 
partisan (and sometimes sectional) imperatives, they were often couched in political rather 
than political economic terms. The reaction, indeed, suggests that fears about tyranny, 
celebrations of antipartyism, and the valorisation of honour – each usually seen as features of 
pre-Civil War politics – remained potent tools of mobilisation in Reconstruction politics. 
Opponents of the veto used the same republican language to illustrate that Grant, in the name 
of saving the nation, was building the foundations of an enduring despotism. It illustrated that 
a duality existed in the political culture of this era: while the President’s republicanism, 
especially his antipartisan stance, allowed supporters to portray him as a model executive in 
the Washington mould, that very independence could lend weight to fears that he was a 
tyrant. 
But as well as looking at the debate itself I also consider the impact of the veto in shaping the 
White House’s authority to implement its wider agenda. Previously, critics had challenged 
Grant’s ability to direct foreign affairs, his right to run for multiple terms, and most 
importantly his patronage appointments; now Americans disputed the legitimacy of his use of 
the veto power. In each case, the substance of what Grant was doing seemed to matter less to 
some, at least, than the fact that he had the power to do it. This of course varied. Conservative 
Southern whites opposed presidential power when Grant used it to prosecute the Ku Klux 
Klan but had supported Johnson in his battles with Congress. Charles Sumner’s bid for a one 
term amendment came in part out of his hostility to Grant’s foreign policy. Yet the hostile 
response to Grant’s veto of a measure that had little to do with the civil rights of African 
Americans suggests that the weakness of executive power after 1872 needs to be explained 
by more than declining political support in the North for a biracial democracy. 
Therefore, the chapter argues, while issues of racism and free labour ideology undoubtedly 
influenced the retreat from Reconstruction, the prominence of wider anxieties over executive 
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power in the period indicate we must explore this area too, in order to fully understand why 




The inflation bill 
The circumstances leading to the Panic of 1873 have been described in great detail by Mark 
W. Summers who has explored how the behaviour of railroad companies and their associated 
bankers enabled the financial crisis.
18
 Unprofitable railroad lines and false promises on the 
profitability of lines led to overseas investments at inflated interest rates which could not be 
met.
19
 As European economies faltered, these overseas investments dried up, which produced 
financial shortfalls for American railroads.
20
 American bankers had speculated on lines and 
sold bonds without the proper amount of backing capital, which meant when lines proved 
unprofitable, the companies went into deficit.
21
 This resulted in the failure of many railroads 
and their banking houses, which produced the Panic. 
The rights and wrongs of inflation as a response to the crisis greatly divided the country. 
Easterners, especially middle and upper-class lenders, supported a hard money policy which 
advocated returning to the gold standard by redeeming existing greenbacks for coin, known 
as specie. The cash-poor West and South, in contrast, campaigned for an increase of the 
greenbacks in circulation in order to alleviate the financial strain on debtors. Congressmen 
tended to divide along partisan lines and often supported or opposed inflation according to 
the needs of their constituents. Exceptions to the rule were rare, but they did exist, Senator 
Carl Schurz of Missouri, for example, served a constituency which desired an increase of 
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greenbacks, but he opposed the increase.
22
 Senator John Sherman, who represented the mid-
western state of Ohio, supported specie resumption, whilst House member Benjamin F. 
Butler, who represented a Massachusetts constituency, backed inflation, in line with the 
wishes of cotton factory owners in his district.
23
 An Ohio journal summed up congressmen’s 
positions best when it stated that ‘the commendations or censures are not governed by 
political lines, but come wholly from a financial stand-point.’
24
 Such a standpoint tends to 
support the view that material interests shaped Gilded Age politics, but economic position 
was not always decisive, and in defining their positions to the public congressmen drew on 
republican terminology to define their actions and that of the President, rather than attacking 
Grant in political economic terms.
25
  
The passage of the inflation bill had been complicated: Congress’s first attempt to solve the 
economic situation of the country originated with Senator John Sherman who proposed a 
Specie Resumption bill with the resumption date of 1 January 1874. However, a coalition of 
Westerners and Easterners defeated the bill, with the former disliking the resumption of 
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specie and the latter disliking the preference of national banks over state banks.
26
 The 
compromise bill, proposed by a group of Western congressmen, allowed for the issuing of 62 
million dollars of greenbacks as well as 38 million dollars of specie.
27
 The bill originated 
with four Republican Senators: Matthew H. Carpenter (Wisconsin), Thomas W. Ferry 
(Michigan), John A. Logan (Illinois), and Oliver P. Morton (Indiana).
28
 These men piloted 
the bill through the Senate whilst Republican Benjamin F. Butler (Massachusetts) 
championed it in the House. On 6 April 1874, the bill passed in the Senate by 29 to 24 votes, 
while it passed by 140 to 102 votes in the House (with 48 abstaining) on 14 April 1874.
29
  
The men who engineered the passage of the bill were ambitious politicians, some of whom, 
such as Morton and Logan, were also personally in debt.
 30
 Morton, as Governor of Indiana 
during the Civil War, had run the state single-handedly rather than allow the Democratic 
legislature to deprive him control of the state’s forces; however, as a Radical Republican he 
also consistently supported African-American suffrage.
31
 Logan, on the other hand, earned 
the status of ‘one of the last great state patronage bosses’ of Illinois, as he relied upon 
patronage to sustain his political career, and thus opposed Civil Service reform on this 
basis.
32
 Both men desired the presidency, and Logan – as a former Union General – had 
attempted to procure the 1868 Republican presidential nomination.
33
 In the aftermath of the 
veto, both men were suggested for the 1876 Republican presidential nomination by their 
supporters.
34
 However, Butler, by far, had the worst reputation having faced accusations of 
helping the Confederate war effort by engaging in the cotton trade – and thus abetting the 
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enemy – during his wartime administration of New Orleans.
35
 Described by critics as ‘the 
epitome of depravity’, Butler gained a reputation during the war for corruption and 
disreputable behaviour which he never lost.
36
 All these men had personal interests in the 
passage of bill and were unwilling to compromise on the inflation issue. 
Despite receiving a warning from Grant that he would not sign into law any proposal which 
did not include a clause for specie resumption, Congress sent the currency bill, without a 
redemption clause, to the White House on 14 April 1874.
37
 Yet the receipt of Grant’s veto on 
22 April 1874, and its welcome reception in sections of the press, did nothing to qualm 
senators’ desire for inflation. Sherman reintroduced the currency bill on 13 May 1874 which 
now mandated a small reissue of greenbacks and a clause for specie resumption.
38
 However, 
on 14 May 1874 the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 25 to 19, but with provision for 
doubling the amount of greenbacks contained in the vetoed measure.
39
 Though the bill did 
permit specie resumption, the terms provided allowed for the currency to stay inflated at a 
considerable level for several years.
40
 Through passing what became known as the ‘wild 
inflation bill’ it was evident that the Senate desired to assert its independence.
41
 On a 
previous occasion when the president – in this case Abraham Lincoln – had sought to direct 
legislative proceedings he had faced accusations of tyranny from senators.
42
 No doubt 
senators believed Grant’s intervention constituted executive usurpation of congressional 
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powers and sought to challenge his power in an attempt to assert their authority. Fortunately, 
for the President, the bill proceeded no further. 
The veto power has proved controversial in the nation’s history, yet no rules exist to govern 
its use beyond formalities.
43
 However, the founders present at the drafting of the Constitution 
envisioned the veto in very broad terms.
44
 Conceived as a ‘legislative power’, the veto 
sought, in the main, to prevent ‘legislative usurpation’.
45
 However, it was also envisioned as a 
means for the ‘protection of the rights of the people, prevention of laws ‘unwise in their 
principle’ as well as laws ‘in correct [sic] in their form’ and to ‘prevent popular or factious 
injustice’’.
46
 Yet despite this extensive interpretation of the power which gave the President a 
wide variety of reasons for vetoing legislation, the early presidents used the veto very 
conservatively.
47
 This encouraged a narrow interpretation of the power by legislators, and it 
was not until Jackson became president that Congress begun challenging the legality of the 
veto power.
48
 Regardless of the supposedly broad basis of the veto, Jackson’s use of the 
power to oppose congressional policies like internal improvements and the re-chartering of 
the Second Bank led to uproar in Congress.
49
 Lincoln’s use of the power also provoked 
congressional outrage which illustrated that during the Civil War and Reconstruction era 
Congress often interpreted the president’s ability to use the power narrowly, especially on 
issues of national importance.
50
 By Reconstruction, then, executive and legislative branches 
of government had still not fully resolved the proper use of the veto right. Indeed in 1873 
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Grant himself had requested a line-item veto, but was rebuffed by a reluctant Congress.
51
 
When Grant informed his cabinet of his decision to veto the inflation bill, Secretary of the 
Interior Columbus Delano alerted the President ‘that the use of the veto power [was] not 
popular except when exercised on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a bill’.
52
 The 
perceived scope of the veto power had narrowed greatly since its creation in this sense but as 
no constitutional limits existed, the president was still free to veto legislation as he saw fit. 
Grant himself insisted the veto constituted a matter of national and personal honour. In his 
veto message, the President described the bill as signalling ‘a departure from true principles 
of finance, national interest, [and] national obligations to creditors.’
53
 He reminded Congress 
that the provisions of the bill went against previous ‘Congressional promises, [and] party 
pledges (on the part of both political parties),’ as well as the ‘personal views and promises 
made by me in every annual message sent to Congress and in each inaugural address’ since 
becoming President.
54
 Portraying himself, not without reason, as a man of honour, Grant 
claimed he could not bring himself to break those trusts. The President cited an Act – the 
Public Credit Act of 1869 – that passed into law on 18 March 1869 which stated that the 
United States had committed herself ‘to make provision at the earliest practicable period for 
the redemption of the United States notes in coin.’
55
 He recalled several pledges by Congress 
to return the United States to a specie-based currency as soon as business prospects 
allowed.
56
 The language in Grant’s message extolled the importance of duty, fulfilling 
promises, and repaying debts at their full value. Grant did not wish to cause debtors to pay 
artificially high prices but nor did he believe it fair to pay creditors, who stood by the Union 
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in its hour of need, with devalued paper money.
57
 Grant believed the nation had a duty to its 
creditors as in the nation’s time of need these lenders had provided the funds to finance the 
Union war effort and to pay them in devalued currency would be dishonourable. 
The relationship between credit and honour, upon which Grant defended his actions, has a 
long history in the United States. The two concepts have been connected ever since 
colonisation.
58
 To retain his reputation or honour, many Americans believed, a man must 
maintain ‘his ‘credit’’.
59
 By the end of the eighteenth century, obligations to repay debts 
rested upon a man’s honour rather than any ‘religious underpinnings’ which had previously 
governed repayments.
60
 As one historian has affirmed, ‘credit and reputation were 
inseparable’; a man’s standing in the community – his honour – ‘had been among the 
nonfinancial definitions of ‘credit’ for two hundred years.’
61
 This understanding of credit still 
held sway during Reconstruction, and animated discussions regarding repayment of the war 
debt.
62
 Honour was implicit in republicanism with its notions of duty and sacrifice to the 
country. As a good republican, then, Grant linked the nation’s credit with his own honour and 
vetoed the inflation bill in part on this basis. 
Historians have not understood the reasons for Grant’s veto: most cover the incident briefly, 
while those who have explored the affair such as McFeely claim that Grant did not 
understand financial affairs and vetoed the bill to maintain his friendship with wealthy 
Easterners.
63
 He argued that Grant feared signing the bill would cost him his new social status 
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and leave him as ‘dispossessed’ as those he wanted to help.
64
 Even a historian writing twenty 
years later could not reconcile Grant’s former poverty with his veto: Jean Edward Smith 
argued that Grant’s ‘heart’ sympathised with those in poverty but ‘as president he felt his 
responsibility was to the nation’s future.’
65
 The most recent historian to comment on the 
issue, H. W. Brands, explains that Grant believed the veto would serve the long term interests 
of the United States, a point the President felt politicians had failed to consider.
66
 Brands, 
however, does not seek to locate where Grant’s beliefs originated.
67
 For many historians, the 
veto remains just another of the paradoxes of Grant the man and Grant the President.
 68
 
Yet there is evidence to suggest that Grant’s veto came from his own experience of poverty 
and his education in republicanism. In 1858, four years after Grant left the army, he heard 
that James Longstreet – an army friend to whom he owed five dollars – had come to St Louis, 
Missouri, where Grant resided.
69
 Having left the army still in debt to Longstreet, Grant 
hastened to repay him.
70
 Grant pushed a five dollar coin into Longstreet’s hand to repay ‘a 
debt of honor over 15 years old’, insisting that he could not live with any money in his 
possession which was not his own.
71
 As a man of honour, Grant felt unable to keep money 
owed to another beyond the term of the debt, even if that man had more means than him.
72
 
Though Grant had suffered in the Panic of 1857, he believed that an inflationary currency 
would not alleviate the poverty he had experienced. Two days before Christmas in 1857 he 
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sold his gold watch for 22 dollars in order to buy presents for his family.
73
 An inflated 
currency would still have provided Grant with the value of his watch in greenbacks, but 
traders, he reasoned, would have increased the price of their goods to take account of 
fluctuations in gold. With commodities priced above their real value, Grant assumed he 
would have received fewer goods for his gold. In all likelihood, it was partly due to – rather 
than in spite of – his previous poverty and his republican education that Grant refused to issue 
more greenbacks. 
There is evidence to suggest Grant gave the message considerable thought but ultimately did 
not believe in the arguments for inflation and did not feel he could commit the country to 
such a course.
74
 When he presented the issue to his cabinet, a majority disagreed with his 
decision, but, regardless, he decided to send in his veto.
75
 The rules of honour culture meant 
the President could not allow Congress to depreciate the currency which would lead creditors 
to receive devalued payments of the original debt. Despite Grant’s reminder of their previous 
pledges to return the country to specie payments, congressmen were outraged at Grant’s veto.  
Grant faced a vast backlash within his party as a result of his action, and for just about the 
first time, stood accused of executive despotism by loyal Republicans. As the Caesarism 
scare of the previous year illustrated, genuine fears of executive power abounded throughout 
the country. Many Americans, especially congressmen, viewed Grant’s use of the veto as an 
unacceptable attempt to direct legislative policy to the detriment of the independence of 
Congress. His action, in many quarters, was interpreted as the tyranny of the executive. 
The Press Reaction 
The reaction to the veto throughout the country cut through sectional lines and caused 
division in nearly every portion of the United States. Predictably Northerners – with notable 
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exceptions like Butler – tended to support the veto, especially in states such as New York and 
Vermont. States with booming economies in the South like California also usually expressed 
satisfaction with Grant’s veto. In comparison, states in the West and South were much more 
divided on the subject.
76
 Many of their newspapers claimed that the regions as a whole 
opposed the veto, which is what we might expect given that inflationary policies would have 
helped their indebted citizens Yet evidence exists which suggests that many Western states 
actually supported Grant’s action. The Chicago Tribune researched the issue in the aftermath 
of the veto and from nine Western states found the following results: 
Table 4.1 Western responses to the veto. 
 Sustain the veto Oppose the veto On the fence. 
Illinois 129 117 9 
Indiana 47 77 n/a 
Michigan 82 25 n/a 
Wisconsin 79 26 1 
Minnesota 42 7 n/a 
Iowa 80 64 n/a 
Missouri 26 58 n/a 
Kansas 20 26 n/a 
Nebraska 9 8 1 
Totals 514 408 11 
 
Source: ‘Voice of the West’, Chicago Tribune, 13 May 1874. 
The results highlight that the states of Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota strongly 
supported the veto, whilst Illinois, Nebraska and Iowa supported the veto by slim majorities. 
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In contrast, the states nearer to the South – Missouri and Kansas – opposed the veto. The only 
Western state to strongly oppose the veto was Indiana. Overall, though, a majority of 
newspapers supported the President’s action. These figures, of course, do not serve as a proxy 
for public opinion, but they hint at least at the depth of division the issue engendered. 
Interestingly, the Chicago Tribune also compiled a survey of Democratic newspapers in the 
West as well.  
Table 4.2 Western Democratic responses to the veto. 
 Sustain the veto Oppose the veto 
Illinois 25 27 
Indiana 18 28 
Michigan 10 7 
Wisconsin 30 5 
Minnesota 10 0 
Iowa 23 14 
Missouri 8 29 
Kansas 2 1 
Nebraska 2 1 
Totals 128 112 
 
Source: ‘Voice of the West’, Chicago Tribune, 13 May 1874. 
These showed that a large majority of Democrats in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa 
supported Grant, while those in Michigan, Kansas, and Nebraska also supported the veto but 
by slight majorities.
77
 Those opposed to the veto included Democrats in Illinois, Indiana and 
Missouri, which illustrated how even political parties in the West did not divide neatly into 
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 The veto divided parties as well as sections into inflationists and 
anti-inflationists as neither Republicans nor Democrats were united on the currency issue.
79
 
The only party which wholeheartedly supported one side – in this case the veto – remained 
the Liberal Republican Party, whose supporters now found themselves in the odd position of 




The Fallout: Presidential Tyranny Revived and Sectional Animosity 
Despite the Chicago Tribune’s assessment of overall support from a majority of Western 
states the veto engendered great opposition from Western and Southern congressmen, who 
debated its constitutionality. As a result, the President gained new enemies. Opponents of 
Grant’s veto renewed arguments over the legality of Grant’s use of executive power. These 
men debated whether the president had the authority to veto a bill of national importance, just 
as they had contested former President Andrew Johnson’s right to direct Reconstruction. 
They disputed whether the executive had a role in the legislative process or whether it had 
usurped the legislature by vetoing the bill. Grant’s critics believed Congress represented the 
nation and the President did not have the ability to check Congress’s power. As such, they 
cautioned the nation that Grant had behaved tyrannically as he courted Wall Street in search 
of his third term. For many Americans, the warning calls of Caesarism from the previous year 
appeared validated in light of the President’s actions. 
One of the foremost reasons why these congressmen were enraged over the President’s 
actions was due to their belief that, on national issues at least, Grant had no right to interfere 
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with the decisions of the country’s national representatives. Congress, they believed, 
superseded the president as the voice of the people. As a result, Grant, in vetoing the inflation 
bill had vetoed the will of the people. Though these men undoubtedly had their re-election 
prospects in sight, they also felt that the President had usurped power and denied the nation a 
much needed infusion of currency. Indiana Senator Morton summarised the situation for 
many Americans when he exclaimed how Grant was ‘mistaken if he thinks the mouth of the 
Mississippi can be dammed with straw’.
81
 They outlined the extent of their outrage by 
likening Grant to his predecessor Johnson and threatening Grant with impeachment. Even 
before the President vetoed the bill, in fact, Butler had warned that Grant ‘would deserve 
impeachment’ if he issued a veto, and when the President did indeed issue a veto the 
suggestion found sympathy in many quarters.
82
 Like the hated Johnson, Grant seemed to be 
showing alarming independence from Congress.  
Yet in contrast to Johnson who could never be considered a Radical, or even a moderate 
Republican, Grant, although an antipartisan, had mostly supported congressional legislation 
on important matters. As one Southern newspaper noted, Grant was ‘not much of a veto 
President’.
83
 Furthermore these Stalwart congressmen – Morton, Logan, Carpenter, Ferry and 
Butler – that Grant had now alienated with his veto had all previously supported the 
President. Logan, despite entertaining his own presidential ambitions, had nominated Grant 
for President at the 1868 Republican convention in Chicago, and campaigned for him in 
several states during the 1872 presidential election.
84
 Similarly, despite originally opposing 
Grant’s nomination in 1868 due to a personal grievance, Butler soon became an ardent 
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supporter of the President.
85
 He led the second attempt in Congress to repeal the Tenure of 
Office Act, which the House passed, though it faltered in the Senate.
86
 Both Butler and 
Morton became especially friendly with Grant after his initial efforts to annex Santo 
Domingo were thwarted.
87
 It was thanks to the efforts of Morton, after all, that a resolution, 
which attempted to salvage the annexation treaty, passed in the Senate, authorizing a 
commission to explore Santo Domingo despite Sumner’s attempts to sabotage Grant’s 
project.
88
 Yet it was these former supporters who now turned against Grant and rallied around 
the familiar cry of despotism. 
Grant’s veto reopened the ongoing battle between Congress and the White House over which 
branch had the authority to direct policy on national issues. Congress assumed the debate had 
been settled during Johnson’s presidency when it overrode his vetoes on Reconstruction 
legislation, yet Grant’s action seemed to indicate he was willing to contest its claim to 
legislative supremacy. Advocates of Congress concluded that as their branch represented the 
whole country, they had the authority to direct policy on issues of national importance. An 
anti-veto Senator vocalised this opinion when he alleged that ‘a President has no right to 
disapprove except on the ground that the particular measure is unconstitutional’.
89
 In the 
fallout from the veto, many newspapers reported the desire of pro-inflation Senators ‘to 
institute a rebellion in Congress against [Grant] similar to that of Andrew Johnson.’
90
 
Newspapers commented that the veto ‘promises to divide the Republican party.’
91
 Even as 
late as November 1874, the New York Tribune – an anti-Grant, Liberal Republican newspaper 
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which had nevertheless called Grant’s veto ‘the most creditable act of his administration’ – 
warned the President ‘to look well to his steps, or he will be impeached.’
92
 Grant’s action had 
reignited a battle some thought Thomas Nast’s cartoons had laid to rest a year earlier.  
In the aftermath of the veto, a storm raged over who had authority to speak for the people, 
which was reminiscent of the debate over Grant’s first cabinet selections; Congress had 
believed then, too, that the members of the legislative branch should be consulted and 
awarded a place in the White House due to their national voice. An anti-veto Ohio newspaper 
alleged that Congress had acted ‘in obedience to the demands of the people’ and implied the 
President’s action violated those wishes.
93
 One of the engineers of the bill, Senator Carpenter, 
predicted that the veto ‘will result in disaster’ before asserting that ‘[i]t throws the whole 
question back upon congress’ rather than the President.
94
 Another Ohio newspaper, the 
Cincinnati Enquirer, hinted at the influences Grant represented when it praised Butler, 
claiming the latter ‘has not been a tool of the moneyed lords of Wall and State streets, but has 
voted and spoken for the great mass of manufacturing operatives and other mechanical 
industries which largely exist in his district’.
95
 A Kansas newspaper, meanwhile, reported that 
farms and businessmen were appalled at the veto and would now only ‘vote for ‘one who has 
no policy aside from the wishes of Congress and the people.’’
96
 Clearly many Westerners and 
Southerners, who desired an inflated currency for their indebted constituents, felt the 
President had ceased to represent them by vetoing the bill.  
Outrage over Grant’s use of the veto power did lead to significant sectional animosity 
between the West and South against the East. The Western proponents of the bill – namely 
Morton, Logan, Carpenter and Ferry – proposed to repudiate Grant’s action, and if necessary 
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create a new party committed to inflation. Newspapers in their Western localities, reprinting 
an article which originally appeared in the Chicago Tribune, reported that ‘[t]hese gentlemen 
tell us of a new party to be organized within forty-eight hours, the foundation for which will 
be opposition to Grant and New England supremacy.’
97
 Groups of congressmen were seen 
talking about the veto in tight groups in hotel lobbies, where one group of Western and 
Southern Senators remained in Morton’s quarters past midnight.
98
 The press suggested 
conspiratorial plots were being hatched.
99
 The New York Herald – which despite the 
Caesarism scare backed the veto – quoted inflationists as saying that ‘[a]ll other means 
failing, they will begin the work of a revolution in the elections for the next Congress’.
100
 
Those elections, Grant’s critics believed would ensure the next incumbent of the White 
House was ‘a President who will not defy the will of the people’.
101
 The Herald expanded on 
the inflation Senators’ predictions, exclaiming ‘Caesar is killed in the Senate and a 
triumvirate is coming. The Republican party for the East, a new party for the West and South, 
and the Democratic party against both of them.’
102
 The President’s independence had yet 
again provoked elements of his party into rebellion, but the Herald’s owner – Bennett Junior 
– suggested the consequences would be Grant’s dethronement and the fragmentation of the 
U.S. into sectional and partisan blocs.
103
 
As at other points in his presidency, here, Grant’s military background proved a double-
edged sword. By reminding readers of Grant’s martial spirit, his opponents suggested how 
the President could, and in their opinion had, transformed the presidency into a dictatorship. 
As a military leader, they asserted, Grant demanded obedience and his critics claimed he had 
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carried that habit of command into civil office. They described Senator Roscoe Conkling, a 
Grant loyalist, ‘as the new leader of the administration party in the Senate’, and noted ‘his 
usual somewhat dictatorial tone’ in responding to the veto.
104
 Similarly those who claimed 
they had always supported a veto were portrayed as ‘prompted by the spirit of loyalty which 
the military character of the present Administration has instilled in all its subordinates.’
105
 
Their Caesar had all the necessary prerequisites to abolish the republic.  
By invoking military language, critics of the veto sought to impress on the American public 
that Grant’s actions were akin to that of an armed tyrant. Their intent was to show that the 
President’s policies represented the wishes of a minority, especially those ‘men who 
presented him with the cottage’ – a reference to the Eastern businessmen who had bought 
him a house at Long Branch in Pennsylvania.
106
 An unrepentant Confederate Tennessee 
newspaper played on longstanding republican fears of a centralised and distant government 
by invoking the image of a tyrannical president who disregarded the wishes of a 
representative majority. The paper raged that ‘[t]here must be shocking errors and falsehoods 
somewhere, when it is commendable in a Republican President to crush with his executive 
foot a measure conceived and matured by Republican Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives.’
107
 It suggested that Grant’s action amounted to corruption and would lead 
to a ‘disturbance in Washington’.
108
 ‘[T]he Radical party’, it alleged, ‘has plunged headlong 
into the mire of un-American despotism that will prove not less disastrous to its friends than 
to its opponents.’
109
 ‘If Grant, like Caesar,’ it continued, ‘is ambitious and a tyrant at heart, 
his tyranny will be more national than sectional, as time must prove.’
110
 Feeding exaggerated 
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fears of executive despotism, it insisted that the President had become so powerful that even 
the majority in Congress who supported the bill refused ‘to attack him openly’, thus 
‘confess[ing] their weakness and fear.’
111
  
Indeed Western and Southern newspapers spoke derogatively of the influences which had 
come to bear on the President, presenting here a double-edged attack: on the one hand Caesar 
had risen to dictate policy to Congress, whilst on the other they claimed that the corrupt 
President had been unduly influenced by Wall Street. Taking higher ground, they claimed he 
had failed to represent the public good and begun asserting just what – or rather who – had 
led Grant astray. The President here was presented not as an incorruptible antiparty man, as 
his supporters liked to have it, but rather the anointed representative of shadowy interests. 
One news article reprinted in Western newspapers stated ‘INSINUATIONS OF A VERY 
UGLY NATURE are freely made by the inflationists in their blind wrath, as to the influence 
to which the President has yielded.’
112
 Others, such as a Texan paper, alleged that the ‘veto 
was made in the interest of the money kings and monopolists of the East and North,’ as ‘no 
well informed business man will deny.’
113
 The language used by proponents of the bill 
indicated their belief that Grant represented a minority group which had bribed him into 
vetoing the bill; the President did not represent the wishes of the people.
114
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Rumours swirled of conspiracies and plots against the Western states as hostilities flared. 
Mid-western critics of Grant, for instance, charged that New Yorkers knew about Grant’s 
veto before Illinois received notice of it.
115
 Such claims hinted at concerns about the enduring 
instability that had followed the Civil War and laid bare real fears that the precarious unity 
would soon give way to ‘national strife’.
116
 Western newspapers spoke of treason: a 
conspiracy led by the East and supported by the White House to undermine the fortunes of 
the West, and sectional conflict. Several newspapers reprinted an article claiming that 
‘TERRIBLE THREATS AND PROPHECIES’ were being ‘magniloquently uttered as to the 
uprising of the great West and Northwest against New England and the wealthy East.’
117
 The 
piece concluded that ‘the sectional struggle between the East and the West, long anticipated, 
has finally opened in earnest.’
118
 Grant here emerged as the greatest traitor: a new incarnation 
of Vice President John C. Breckinridge (1857-1861) who had fought against the United 
States government in the Civil War and served as the Confederate Secretary of State in 1865. 
‘He is again discovered to be ‘a Breckinridge, anyhow’’, several Western papers wrote of 
Grant.
119
 The Western man had betrayed his section, the article insinuated, and become an 
Eastern apostate. 
Perhaps most saliently, Grant, through his independence and antipartisanship, had succeeded 
in alienating not only the Democrats but much of his own Republican Party, through the use 
of different facets of executive power. The Democrats had first raised anxieties over Grant’s 
potential to convert the republic into a dictatorship during the 1868 presidential election. Yet 
it was a claim which gained a ring of authenticity when the President independently chose his 
cabinet and excluded many of the most prominent party members from the White House. His 
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refusal to consult congressmen on patronage appointments alienated many Radical and 
moderate Republicans who, suspecting patronage had enabled his attempt to annex Santo 
Domingo, split from the Republican Party. These men formed a new party which then 
competed against Grant during the 1872 presidential election. However, after Grant’s use of 
the veto power on legislation of national importance, anxieties over his use of power 
estranged his most loyal supporters – the Stalwarts – who similarly became agitated over the 
President’s independence in his use of executive power. Grant’s desire to remain above party 
had encouraged suspicions over his use of executive power which helped to lose him 
supporters. His republicanism had become his undoing.  
Allegations of the unconstitutional use of power and executive usurpation, in addition to talk 
of creating a third party, illustrated once more the persistence of a republican political culture 
in Reconstruction.
120
 Warnings of conspiracies in Western and Southern newspapers 
demonstrated that fears of tyranny and sectional conflict were not simply rhetorical devices to 
mobilise the electorate, though they fulfilled that purpose too. Genuine fears of executive 
power existed throughout the country and rose in times of crisis. The economic situation 
greatly concerned many Americans who interpreted Grant’s veto as a desertion of his duty to 
the public good in favour of newly befriended but powerful allies. The President’s military 
background remained particularly troubling to opponents of his veto, who saw in his action a 
disregard for the Constitution and Congress, and alleged that it reflected the unravelling of 
the republic by Grant’s capable hand. It suggests that the paranoid politics which undermined 
Johnson’s presidency continued into Grant’s presidency, with warnings of presidential 
tyranny and disputes with Congress over the boundaries of power eroding the valuable 
political capital he had to enforce Reconstruction. 
Defending the Veto: The Model Republican 
                                                 
120
 Voss-Hubbard, Beyond Party, pp. 4, 10.  
246 
 
In stark contrast to his opponents, who saw executive usurpation in the President’s actions, 
his supporters, returning to the script they had used since 1868, presented Grant as the 
epitome of pure republicanism. Yet their message had been honed for the circumstances. In 
addition to exalting the President’s antipartisanship, patriotism, and sacrifice, they added the 
preservation of the nation’s honour. Grant’s veto, they claimed, upheld the sacrifices of 
thousands of men who had died for their country on the battlefields of the Civil War by 
preventing efforts to pay the war debt in devalued currency. In this respect, they regarded 
payment with devalued greenbacks as devaluing the sacrifice of the war dead. Grant, then, 
saved not only the honour and credit of the nation but upheld the value of the lives of those 
men who died to reunite the nation. As a result his victory, they claimed in rather hyperbolic 
terms, was as great as any of his Civil War battles.  
Commendations of Grant’s actions were geographically far-reaching. The President received 
praise from all over the country for his veto; he took ‘receipt of congratulatory letters and 
telegrams from all parts of the country east and west’.
121
 Though such vindication might be 
anticipated in the hard money East, Grant also received endorsements from Western areas 
and some Southern newspapers too.
122
 In particular, Grant won praise from Southern 
newspapers in Tennessee, Georgia, and even Louisiana. Much support also came from 
farmers: a group usually assumed to have been the strongest supporters of inflation.
123
 
Perhaps most saliently even former enemies commended Grant’s actions, with the Liberal 
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Republicans especially backing a man they had endeavoured to unseat two years before. Even 
those who were on the Liberal Republican Executive Committee, despite their long-standing 
opposition to Grant’s policies, cried ‘[h]urrah for Grant’.
124
 They were now ‘full of glee’ not 
only due to ‘the veto’ but also because the President’s ‘language’ had a ‘fatal effect’ on the 
Republican inflationists in Congress.
125
 Many Democrats too delighted in Grant’s veto, 
illustrating that the issue cut across party lines.
126
 Even Grant’s predecessor, Johnson, 
grudgingly bestowed a compliment on Grant when he admitted that ‘somehow or other, 
accidently, perhaps, he had gotten hold of a right good idea, and he stumbled upon what 
seemed to him a very sensible plan when he withheld his signature from that inflation bill. 
But then accidents would happen.’
127
 Grant’s veto garnered a diverse coalition of support but 
what held it together was not so much a common understanding of political economy but an 
attempt to explain the President’s actions in republican terminology.  
The defence of Grant’s action centred around three main points: the role of the President in 
the legislative process, the virtues of his military background, and his honourable conduct in 
preserving the nation’s credit. Newspapers across the country expressed their gratitude in 
exaltations of Grant’s duty to the public good, his civic virtue, courage, honour, and 
antipartisanship in politics. With corruption a preoccupation in an age of rings, Grant’s 
supporters implied that their President remained untrammelled by corrupt impulses, and 
instead acted out of higher ideals than the wishes of his party. Republican tropes, rather than 
financial explanations, dominated their responses to the veto, demonstrating how credit and 
debt had a cultural as well as an economic history in Reconstruction. 
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Grant’s supporters sought to deflate the arguments of those who opposed the veto by 
highlighting the importance of the president’s role in the legislative process. These 
newspapers stressed the constitutional role of the presidential veto, emphasising that it 
offered a vital opportunity to reconsider the wisdom of legislation of national importance, in 
their efforts to defend the President against allegations he had usurped congressional 
power.
128
 An Eastern newspaper explained how the veto represented ‘a conservative power’, 
and signified its necessity in government by stressing how amongst all ‘the checks and 
balances of the constitutional provisions, it is among the most important’.
129
 The paper 
further elaborated that ‘[t]he executive, responsible to his constitutional oath and to the 
people, has the power to check mad legislation–and there are times when the country is in 
great danger from the combinations and corruptions of Congress.’130 The paper not only 
endeavoured to justify Grant’s veto but to situate the role of veto power within the 
constitutionally-approved legislative process. The president, they argued, had a duty, under 
his constitutional oath, to prevent the passage of bills which threatened the sanctity of the 
republic. Within this framework, partisan interests became irrelevant as the President had an 
obligation to sacrifice his own interests to that of the nation. The paper concluded succinctly 
that, in this respect, ‘[t]he veto of President Grant is an excellent illustration of the nature and 
value of the veto power.’
131
  
The benefits of the veto power, other defenders claimed, could be found in the restoration of 
the Republican Party’s platform to its original pledges. One Western paper rebuked 
supporters of inflation by scolding them for forgetting their pledges to constituents.
132
 ‘The 
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President’, it reminded them, had simply tried ‘to keep covenant with the people who put 
their trust in that platform, and him in the Executive chair.’
133
 Another paper claimed that the 
veto power provided an opportunity to stem the plans of ‘reckless plotters and speculators’.
134
 
While ‘the flood of financial heresies rose to such a height as to sweep from their moorings 
both Houses of Congress,—the popular House by a large majority,—the President stood 
firm’.
135
 Such coverage stressed how the president’s veto was vital to protect the nation when 
their representatives ‘swerved from’ their duties to the nation.
136
 As the New York Tribune 
affirmed, the veto represented ‘a piece’ of vital ‘prevention’ for the nation’s interests.
137
 The 
president’s veto, they claimed, constituted a necessary obstacle in the legislative process. 
Perhaps the most important defence of the fundamental role of the veto power in the passage 
of legislation emanated from a Harper’s Weekly artist. A. Fredericks produced the first 
cartoon – ‘The Nation’s Tribute’ (Figure 4.3) – to congratulate Grant on his veto. It 
celebrated the duty Grant had performed by quoting New York Governor Dix who, on 
hearing of the veto, had exclaimed how ‘[t]his veto is not for the North, nor the East, but for 
the entire nation’.
138
 The use of this particular caption was a reminder that the veto power 
played a crucial role in crafting the laws of the United States. Similar to many cartoons from 
this era, Fredericks’ drawing drew on classical symbolism, which educated Americans would 
recognise immediately.
139
 His drawing of Columbia – who represented the nation – holding a 
garland above the head of a bust of Grant referenced Republican Rome. Garlands, or corollæ 
as they were known in ancient Rome, could be awarded for a number of reasons including 
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‘military valour’ and ‘to crown the victors’ in sacred contests.
140
 In this respect Fredericks’ 
depiction sought to link Grant to the military heroes of the Roman republic by heralding 
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Figure 4.3 ‘The Nation’s Tribute’. 
 
Source: A. Fredericks, ‘The Nation’s tribute’, Harper’s Weekly, 9 May 1874. 
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It was an argument also pursued in the editorial response from Harper’s Weekly which 
stressed the vital role of the executive in the legislative process.
141
 The veto power, it pressed, 
formed an integral check on congressional power which, similar to the other branches, had 
the ability to endanger the country with unwise legislation.
 142 
In this respect, executive power 
provided a necessary corrective for Congress’s failure to legislate for the interests of the 
whole nation. Harper’s argued that ‘experience shows that the most vitally important laws 
may be heedlessly passed’ as a result of ‘passion, ignorance, [and] party spirit’ which made 
the application of the veto power crucial.
143
 While opponents of the veto argued that in 
exercising the power Grant had acted tyrannically, Harper’s countered that Grant’s veto had 
been used ‘not to thwart the will of the people, but to defeat what he does not believe to be 
their will.’
144
 The founders had provided the presidency with the veto, Harper’s asserted, 
‘because when people are intelligent enough to govern themselves wisely they know that they 
not only sometimes need to be defended from themselves, but that their representatives may 
not truly represent them.’
145
 Congressional representatives, Harper’s implied, had let their 
personal interests on the issue guide their votes, and had allowed a piece of legislation that 
stood in opposition to the national interest to pass. As a result, the people had to rely upon the 
President for ‘the sober second thought.’
146
 The tyranny lay with Congress. 
This idea of congressional tyranny was taken up with vigour by Harper’s Weekly’s leading 
artist, Thomas Nast, who depicted Grant’s veto as preventing tyrannical congressmen from 
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endangering the nation. Having previously portrayed Butler as an evil genie let out of his 
bottle, Nast now characterised the veto as restoring the Senator to his rightful place.
147
 
Figure 4.4 ‘The Cradle of Liberty out of Danger’. 
 
Source: Thomas Nast, ‘The Cradle of Liberty Out of Danger’, Harper’s Weekly, 16 May 
1874. 
                                                 
147
 For Nast’s first cartoon see ‘The Cradle of Liberty in Danger’, Harper’s Weekly, 11 April 1874. For his 
second, see ‘The Cradle of Liberty out of Danger’, Harper’s Weekly, 16 May 1874. 
254 
 
Grant's veto, Nast contended, had bottled Butler which allowed the Puritan child in the 
Cradle of Liberty to grow up unhindered. Nast implied that the veto power had corked both 
corruption and the tyranny of selfish party politicians. The nation, Nast demonstrated, could 
now prosper unhindered by corrupt politicians, as the President remained above dishonesty 
and selfish pursuits. Nast placed the tyranny that Grant’s opponents alleged he had committed 
with the veto firmly in the proponent’s camp. 
While Grant’s opponents, by invoking military language and imagery, charged that his 
military background made him particularly susceptible to governing the country tyrannically, 
his supporters alleged that Grant’s military service brought virtuous republican ideals into the 
government. The republican ideals of duty and sacrifice which were implicit in stories of his 
military service alerted Americans to the benefits of electing a military man to the 
presidency. In their celebrations they compared the value of his veto to the repute of his Civil 
War victories. The veto, they implied, had saved the future of the nation just as his victories 
at Vicksburg and Appomattox Court House had reunited the nation.
148
  
The virtues which had led him to victory on the battlefield, they suggested, had endowed him 
with the necessary qualities to lead the republic to success too. The personal sacrifice 
necessary to serve with distinction in the military had served Grant well in civil affairs.
 149
 
The President, inspired by his ‘sense of duty’ to the republic, had sacrificed his selfish 
political interests by pursuing an action which was adverse to ‘the majority of his friends in 
Congress’.
150
 This led to some exaggerated claims. An Eastern independent newspaper, for 
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instance, argued that Grant had ‘gained a greater victory than ever marked his brilliant 
military career.’
151
 ‘Nobly’, they continued, ‘has he redeemed the sacred pledge which the 
republican [sic] party made in its national platform and vindicated the wisdom of the people 
in reelecting him to the highest office in their gift.’
152
 Few newspapers ventured as far in 
claiming that the veto superseded Grant’s Civil War victories. But many Americans, both 
privately and publicly, concurred with a statement from the Republican Albany Evening 
Journal, which claimed that Grant’s veto came ‘scarcely second to his illustrious work on the 
battle field’.
153
 Military service, his supporters argued, enabled him to put the interests of the 
nation first. As a result, Grant had saved the nation yet again. 
References to Grant’s Civil War victories also indicated the gravity of the threat that the 
President had removed through his veto. One Eastern Republican newspaper’s claim that 
‘[i]n time an intelligent and appreciative people will recognize that the peaceful victory of 
April 22, 1874, is as vital to the future glory of the nation as that of April 9, 1865’ highlighted 
such sentiments.
154
 But the newspaper proceeded further, claiming that ‘history will record of 
U.S. Grant that, by his veto as the chief magistrate, he secured the fullest fruits of his 
victories as a soldier. To have shrunk from the former would be to throw away the latter.’
155
 
The entwining of Civil War battles and economic policy indicated the extent to which 
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economic policy was enmeshed and influenced by the wider context of the wartime 
patriotism. 
The selfless sacrifice of the President for the interests of the nation was counter-posed to the 
reaction of Republican congressmen. It was clear from the outrage of these men, Grant’s 
supporters suggested, that the President had acted from his ideal of antipartisanship. Just as 
Grant had outraged some of the defectors to the Liberal Republican camp by allocating 
patronage in an antipartisan fashion, Grant now alienated the Stalwart wing of the party 
through his independence in governance. Supportive newspapers emphasised that the 
President’s military background had endowed him with virtuous republican qualities which 
led him to put the safety of the nation above his own career. 
Antipartisanship, which had informed Grant’s attitude to the presidency, featured extensively 
in sympathetic coverage of the veto. ‘[T]hough plied by Butlerites and prominent officials in 
Washington’, a New York journal wrote, and ‘though beset by brokers and politicians day 
and night till to all appearances he must yield to the strong personal influence brought to bear 
upon him’, Grant had broken free and ‘showed again the old firmness of the hero of the 
Wilderness’.
156
 Another newspaper, the Boston Traveller, argued that ‘[t]he unexpected veto 
of the currency bill by President Grant affords new evidence that he is a man that keeps his 
own counsel and acts on his own judgement.’
157
 ‘By this act’, an independent Eastern 
newspaper claimed, ‘he has shown he is the tool of no man or clique and has not forgotten 
how to fight for the right.’
158
 Grant’s military characteristics, though assailed by his 
opponents as resulting in the militarism of the presidential office, actually enabled the 
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President to act in a principled manner in the civilian world of politics. Caesar, his defenders 
charged, existed only in the imagination of the inflationists. 
Whilst Grant’s supporters championed his antipartisanship, opposition newspapers rued his 
independence and the inability of his party to control him. These newspapers bitterly 
complained about the President’s obstinacy and his refusal to approve a bill crafted by his 
own party. A Georgian newspaper lamented the President’s antiparty stance, commenting 
that ‘Gen. Grant never regarded himself beholden to the Republican party at all.’
159
 Another 
Southern newspaper, an independent in Tennessee, described the prevailing opinion of the 
President: ‘[i]t has been generally understood for several years that President Grant has a will 
and way of his own.’
160
 The paper argued moreover that the veto reinforced the ‘vindication 
of his character as the ‘stubbornest man in America’ save one’; though it did not elaborate on 
who had managed to supersede Grant in this respect.
161
 Saliently, these denunciations of the 
President from Southern inflationist newspapers actually gave credence to the antiparty 
image of Grant sustained in the anti-inflation press. It is easy to consider the platitudes 
received from Northern newspapers as simply rhetorical justifications for a President vetoing 
an unfavourable measure, but the readiness of his opponents to recognise his antipartisan 
outlook suggests there was substance behind the rhetoric. Grant’s own words on the matter 
thus appear genuine. He commented ‘I must say if personal influence could have any weight 
with me I should have signed the bill.’
162
 
In celebrating Grant’s service to the public good, newspapers from all over the country 
praised the President’s strength, courage and commitment to the nation. By vetoing a bill 
matured by his own party, the President, they claimed, had validated his standing as an 
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honourable gentleman. Though unfavourable with the Stalwart faction of his party, his action, 
his supporters claimed, was in the interest of the nation. An Ohio newspaper demonstrated 
this when it congratulated Grant for having ‘the firmness and moral courage to do what he 
believed to be right’, thus upholding ‘the true honor and welfare’ of the republic.
163
 The 
language of national honour, indeed, proved especially important. An independent 
Connecticut newspaper illustrated this when it stated ‘President Grant deserves and will 
receive the gratitude of every man in the land, whose judgement has not been perverted by 
the delusions of an inflated currency, and whose regard for the nations’ faith is still sound.’
164
  
Honour, as a defence, proved a powerful tool with which to appeal to the republican 
sensibilities of the American public. It suggested the morality of the President’s stance and 
demonstrated that he could be relied upon to act in the best interests of the nation.
165
 By 
vetoing the inflation bill, the President indicated that he had the ability to act in a restrained 
manner by reining in the passions of his party.
166
 In this respect, the veto relied upon the 
character of the President, and signified that, as a man of honour, he could be trusted to pay 
his debts. Both the honour of the President, and his honesty, regularly featured in defences of 
the veto from supportive newspapers suggesting that his action possessed a gallantry his 
opponents failed to understand. ‘All honor to the President’, an Eastern newspaper 
exclaimed, ‘and his noble stand in favor of national honesty.’
167
 A Western journal stated that 
the President had saved the country from ‘depart[ing] from the true principles of finance, 
[and] the national obligation to creditors.’
168
 The bill, it claimed, ‘was the first step on a 
downhill course, at the bottom of which lies bankruptcy, national dishonour and possible 
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 The paper here referred to the cultural relationship between debt and honour. 
The payments of debts and the awarding of credit in the nineteenth century rested upon the 
honour of an individual.
170
 Similarly, paying debts at the level they were contracted was 
considered a matter of honour. In this respect, by keeping the promise of the nation to pay its 
debts at a non-inflated level, Grant had preserved the honour of the nation. 
Liberal Republicans, who just two years earlier had denigrated Grant’s reputation, expressed 
their gratitude by heralding the President as a creditable man. The New York Tribune 
announced that ‘Grant has once more deserved well of the country, and merits the thanks of 
Congress no less than years ago when he defended the country against a more dangerous 
enemy.’
171
 Similarly, the Cincinnati Commercial celebrated how ‘President Grant has 
hitherto done few things so well calculated to give him honorable distinction as his veto’.
172
 
‘The world’, it claimed, ‘has now assurance of our National honor’ and ‘honesty stands a 
chance of just appreciation.’
173
 Less enthusiastic but no less satisfied was the Chicago 
Tribune, which stated that for ‘the credit of the country the President’s acting has been 
beneficial’, especially as the veto showed ‘that the people of the United States do not intend 
openly or covertly to repudiate their debt.’
174
 Rather more pleased was the New York Evening 
Post, which wrote that ‘to the President himself, we owe our escape from this shame and 
dishonour which Congress would have inflicted on us.’ Congress’s attempt to shy away from 
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Hostile Democratic newspapers also occasionally honoured the President, who, they believed 
had saved the nation from ruin. Editors, such as Charles A. Dana of the Democratic New York 
Sun, who had spent a considerable amount of time during Grant’s first administration trying 
to uncover Republican corruption, labelled Grant’s veto ‘the smartest thing that he has ever 
done since he was elected President.’
176
 The publishers of the Western Madison Democrat 
stated that they were happy to ‘commend the veto because we believe it is dictated by every 
consideration of national honor and sound common sense.’
177
 The New York World claimed 
‘he deserves well of all who love the honor of the United States.’
178
  Yet again showcasing its 
ability as an independent to represent both sides of a partisan debate, the New York Herald 
explained how Grant’s ‘veto will save our brethren of the west and south from the 
demagogues who would lead them into ruin and call it statesmanship’.
179
 It continued to 
claim ‘the time will come when they remember it to the honor of the President as an 
achievement more glorious than Vicksburg and Appomattox. Then he saved the sovereignty 
of the Union; now he has saved its honor.’
180
 The tendency once more to unite Grant’s veto 
with his Civil War victories indicated that many considered repaying the war debt in specie a 
matter of honour which reflected the nation’s republican heritage. 
Perhaps the most striking defence of Grant’s restrained honour took a pictorial form. The 
Harper’s Weekly artist, Charles S. Reinhart, provoked outrage with his significant but 
controversial cartoon ‘Stand Back!’
181
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Figure 4.5 ‘Stand Back!’ 
 
Source: Charles S. Reinhart, ‘Stand Back!’, Harper’s Weekly, 9 May 1874. 
Reinhart’s powerful cartoon encompassed many of the themes which the written commentary 
on the veto celebrated. Grant is portrayed as the honourable defender of the republic, while 
his opponents, who accused him of corruption, are symbolised as base partisan politicians. 
The artist emphasised honour, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice in order to illustrate the duty 
which Grant had performed for the nation. He used military uniforms to signify Grant’s self-
sacrifice and duty to the nation, while depicting the inflationists as dishonourable and 
barbarous. The depiction of the Senators as villains caused particular outrage from Western 
states but their portrayal none-too-subtly insinuated that those supporting inflation were the 
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tyrants whose lack of political virtue threatened liberty and endangered the future of the 
republic. Reinhart’s claim found sympathy in many quarters. 
The artist used military and republican imagery to depict both honour and dishonour thus 
conveying Grant’s role as the protector of the nation. The central figure in the cartoon is 
President Grant – in military dress as denoted by the four stars on his shoulder which 
signified his rank during the Civil War – who stood between the group of rogue congressmen 
and the three women that represent Columbia, who symbolised liberty and virtue. Grant stood 
with one foot on the inflation bill, preventing the men from menacing and dishonouring 
Columbia. It is a strong image, as it suggests the riotous, unrestrained men threatened to 
violate the feminised republic, with only Grant’s chivalrous stance protecting the women 
from the avaricious and lustful politicians. Columbia’s vulnerability to men in pursuit of 
power was often used by artists to attack political corruption. Of particular significance was 
Thomas Nast’s depiction of a virtuous woman being mauled to death in his 1871 cartoon 
‘The Tammany Tiger Loose’, which attacked the frauds of Boss William Tweed’s Tammany 
Hall machine. But whereas corruption killed Columbia before a baying crowd in Nast’s 
image of New York as a Roman amphitheatre, in Reinhart’s portrayal, Columbia was saved 
by Grant’s gallantry. Tellingly, though, Grant did not hold back these men with his sword, 
which lay by his side, but with his outstretched hand, which commanded them to stop.
182
 
Saliently Grant was portrayed with the comportment and dignified bearing of a gentleman, 
which as Matthew J. Grow has attested in his study of Northern honour culture was more 
about ‘behaviour and attitude’ than any monopoly of force.
183
 Grant exudes authority in the 
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image as a military man, but it is not a raw display of power. Such tropes answered charges 
of tyranny against a figure whose army roots, some alleged, offered a path to despotism.  
Grant’s positioning between the Columbian embodiments of republican virtue and the 
lascivious congressmen depicted him as a chivalrous gentleman. Chivalry constituted an 
important component of honour culture, as men’s status as the ostensible protectors of 
women rationalised gender inequality.
184
 Grow describes chivalry as being characterised by 
‘magnanimity, self-restraint, and the cultivation of the ‘finer feelings of human nature.’’
185
 
None of Grant’s opponents were illustrated with any of these qualities as each man had 
publicly shown a corrupt, selfish, and unforgiving nature. The depiction of these men in 
various guises of over-indulgence signified their unrepublican qualities and thus their 
unsuitability to govern the nation.  
Foremost in the cartoon is Indiana Senator Morton drawn in a criminal’s prison uniform, 
which referenced his undemocratic actions as the Governor of Indiana during the Civil 
War.
186
 At the back holding a torch inscribed with the word ‘speculation’ and his hand rolled 
in a fist is the Pennsylvanian Senator Cameron whose corruption and dishonesty in politics 
was well known.
187
 Wisconsin Senator Ferry held the flag with the words: ‘Down With 
National Honor’; ‘Death to Honest Trade’; ‘We Forgive Our Creditors!’ and ‘Inflation!’ 
While Illinois Senator Logan, a former Union General, lacked any sign of his former rank on 
his shoulder, in stark contrast to the portrayal of the President. But even he did not suffer as 
harsh a fate at Reinhart’s hands as Butler, who, stood nearest Grant, was drawn in 
Confederate regalia to signal his treasonous past in Civil War Louisiana where he had traded 
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cotton with the enemy.
188
 The portrayal of these men highlighted the widely held belief that 
the threat to the republic came not from an aspiring Caesar, but a corrupted Congress. 
Reinhart successfully turned the argument that Grant had exceeded his constitutional powers 
around to suggest that the opponents of the veto constituted the real threat to the republic. 
The artist combined corruption with morality to suggest that these men could neither be 
trusted with a women’s honour nor the country’s. He showed that with a calm and 
gentlemanly demeanour, the President’s chivalry had saved the nation’s honour from harm. 
Reinhart could rely on the President’s previous laurels to illustrate that Grant, unlike his 
opponents, had an impeccable record in performing his duty to the nation. The President had 
portrayed a willingness to defend the nation against all threats during his Civil War service, 
despite his dislike of military service, and Reinhart, like many others, equated Grant’s veto to 
his military career. In using Grant’s military service, the artist made a powerful point, 
suggesting that Grant’s veto was no different to the fight against an enemy on a battlefield, 
and as such represented a legitimate method to restore liberty and peace. 
The portrayal of Grant as the honourable restrained gentlemen who, through his sense of 
morality and duty to the nation, had led the country to victory can also be found in private 
commendations of the veto. Lawyer George Templeton Strong wrote in his diary ‘Vivat 
Grant! He has vetoed the inflation bill! This veto will rank in his record with Vicksburg and 
Appomattox.’
189
 Senator James Garfield wrote to a friend that ‘[f]or twenty years no 
President has had an opportunity to do the country so much service by a veto message as 
Grant has, and he has met the issue manfully’.
190
 The President also received over a hundred 
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letters thanking him for his veto which attest to the sincerity of the public celebrations. A 
resident of Illinois provided a good illustration of this when he wrote to Grant claiming: 
As a working man, I tacke the liberty of thanking your Exclency for your veto 
message ... If your Exclency will hold on, the cours you have taeken as well as 
being honorabl & just will very lickely lead to a further residence of four years in 
the Executive Mansion of the nation. [sic]
191
 
Such sentiments were not uncommon. But few commentators explained their gratitude more 
succinctly than Smith D. Atkins of Freeport, Illinois. Neither a politician, nor a financier, he 
had been asked in 1868 to speak at a political meeting, probably a Democratic gathering, to 
gain support for Pendleton’s Plan – a Democratic scheme defeated at the 1868 presidential 
election – which entailed paying back the war bonds with devalued greenbacks.
192
 Atkins, 
however, opposed the plan and explained his position with plain but impassioned words, 
which he recalled for the President. 
Adkins explained the connection between the honour of debt and the Civil War. After 
describing why people bought war bonds – their belief that the government would defeat the 
rebellion and respect public credit – he explained why repaying the debt honestly remained of 
the utmost importance. He stated: ‘it is a sacred debt, both greenbacks and bonds—it 
represents a part of the price this nation paid for Liberty—and this nation must be honest, 
must keep its plighted faith, and pay every greenback and every Bond, dollar for dollar, in 
gold coin.’
193
 His message received a rapturous applause signalling the support the notion 
garnered from the Democratic audience. This was no ordinary debt which the response to the 
veto demonstrated. Adkins continued to claim that some ‘of that great debt has been already 
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paid in crimson currency, the best blood of the nation. Fathers and mothers did not 
complain—for Liberty and national Union and honor they turned a nation into mourning and 
covered the land with graves.’
194
 To save the nation, Union citizens had sacrificed a great 
deal justified only by a victory funded by war bonds; to then pay a devalued amount would 
devalue the loss of life. The debt and the dead were inseparable. 
For many, the issue of inflation was not an issue of finance, but rather a matter of honouring 
the dead. The price paid by the nation for victory in the war was high but it represented the 
level of sacrifice that Americans had made to secure success. Thus if the nation devalued the 
debt it accrued in winning the war, it effectively devalued the sacrifice of life too. The United 
States did not simply have a financial debt: it had a debt of lost lives. In this respect, 
dishonouring the debt would also dishonour the sacrifice made by hundreds of thousands of 
Americans for the prosperity of the nation. As Adkins proclaimed, ‘Greenbacks and Bonds 
are sacred side by side with the Union Graves.’
195
 The debt was a reflection upon the nation’s 
honour and its republican heritage and to sacrifice it would sacrifice the country too. These 
beliefs led Democrats like Adkins to claim that though ‘I am told that it is hard times, that 
you are complaining of your taxes—I do not believe it—taxes have been and may continue 
high’, nevertheless, he believed: 
[T]he people, the common, working, labouring people, farmers and mechanics, 
they who paid most of the crimson currency and bore most of the sorrows of war, 
rather than have this nation dishonoured by repudiating a single pledge the nation 
made in that contest, would cheerfully submit to having their taxes doubled 







instead of reduced. And, Mr. President, the audience received that sentiment with 
the heartiest applause. I believe that as the people then felt, so they feel now.
196
 
The commendations that emanated from some Western Democrats suggest that the 
relationship Adkins’ drew between the war debt and the debt of life incurred in that conflict 
still held sway with many Americans. The celebration that greeted the veto, while often no 
doubt borne out of self-interested economic motives, showed that emotional connection in 
action. 
It was evident from the basis upon which supporters of the veto sought to defend the 
President that the opposition to inflation rested upon more than mere economics. Their 
defence indicated that the economics of inflation were entwined with the political culture of 
Reconstruction America. In commending Grant’s action they sought to validate his executive 
power by arguing that the veto power played a crucial, and just, role in the legislative process 
which had saved the country from ruin in this instance. They also highlighted the benefits 
derived from his military background for the United States, arguing that he brought the vital 
qualities of antipartisanship, patriotism and self-sacrifice to the presidency which ensured the 
nation adhered to principle rather than party politics. But most importantly, the President had 
retained the honour of the nation by refusing to allow legislation which sought to devalue the 
debt into law. Not only did Grant illustrate his restrained manhood in vetoing the bill but he 
demonstrated that he stood as an honourable gentleman in society who could be trusted as 




The response to the veto from both Grant’s supporters and his opponents provided substantial 
evidence that in 1870s America the ideas of political economy and political culture had 
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become enmeshed. Ideas of finance were informed by republicanism as well as economics. 
Both sides fought for the high ground of a republican common good while trying to accuse 
the other side of slavishly representing self-interested economic actors. Grant’s opponents 
accused the President of acting tyrannically in vetoing a measure cultivated by a Republican 
Congress whilst his supporters claimed the President had shown his restrained manhood – his 
honourable capabilities as executive – by stymieing a bill which sought to dishonour the 
nation and devalue its sacrifices. By doing so, they reinforced the salience of ideas of 
tyranny, antipartyism and honour in politics during Reconstruction by illustrating the power 
of republicanism to define and influence political decision-making in this era. 
The response of Grant’s opponents to the veto demonstrated that genuine concerns over 
executive power existed in this era as even an issue loosely related to Reconstruction 
provoked accusations of executive usurpation and tyrannical conduct on the part of the 
President. The outrage over Grant’s use of the veto power indicated that the concerns which 
arose over his use of presidential power to enforce Reconstruction policies were not simply a 
cover for other grievances with Reconstruction such as racism, support for free labour 
ideologies, and white Northern discontent with the ongoing Southern issues. This is further 
illustrated by the division the veto caused in both parties which showed that anxieties over 
executive power crossed both party and sectional lines. The fears of power existed in a broad 
cross-section of the population. The reaction to the veto illustrated that suspicions of power 
penetrated the era and influenced political observers’ interpretations of events which in turn 
impacted upon the President’s ability to use executive power. Issues over power had the 
ability to influence and hinder Reconstruction. 
This was demonstrated by some members of the Liberal Republican press who, despite their 
personal support for the veto, highlighted these concerns over power when, in the aftermath 
of the veto, they suggested that the decision might procure a third term for Grant. The value 
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of the President’s act, Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier-Journal suggested, had 
divided the Republican Party so much,  and had led to such popular support for Grant that he 
would be re-elected and ‘never be got out of the White House except upon a stretcher.’
198
 
Horace White, of the Chicago Tribune, concurred stating that ‘[t]he only issue which could 
make a Third Term for Grant possible would be that of currency-inflation.’
199
 Grant, the 
editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal claimed, had ‘played with parties before he became 
President’ and had ‘played with the politicians since’; in power, Grant had demonstrated ‘a 
singular method in his operations, both political and military’ which indicated his ability to 
become a Caesar or Napoleon.
200
 Now, with the parties in disarray and no potential 
challenger – Grant having ‘killed Morton as dead as a door-nail’ and ‘set Logan back a 
thousand years’ with his veto – the President had a clear shot at re-election as he was ‘the 
central figure.’
201
 Despite alienating both the Democratic Party and the majority of the 
Republican Party, Grant, political commentators argued, remained a strong executive who 




Possibly in response to the fears that emanated from Liberal Republican newspapers, a 
rumoured response from Grant regarding his potential third term circulated widely 
throughout the press which indicated his disapproval of both the third term and inflation. 
Though the quotation most likely did not originate with Grant, it nonetheless caused much 
excitement in press circles. It referred to a meeting between the wife of a member of 
Congress and the President, where a discussion of a large portrait of Grant led to a 
conversation over whether it would adorn his future place of residence. ‘But,’ the 
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congressman’s wife countered, ‘you will be elected for a third term, and this house will hold 
the picture four years longer.’
203
 The President responded, ‘No. I shall veto that. It would be 
inflating my term of office, and I will always veto inflation.’
204
  
Though historians have often contended corruption scandals lost the President a significant 
amount of political capital and distracted attention from Reconstruction, the veto of the 
inflation bill indicated the powerful grasp which the battles over executive power could exert 
over the implementation of Reconstruction. In particular, the reduction of the size of the army 
– always considered a threat to republican America – resulted in more difficulties enforcing 
the voting rights of African Americans. Moreover, the loss of the House of Representatives in 
the ensuing midterms would have profound consequences for the enforcement of African-
American civil rights. The division evident amongst the Republicans in the inflation bill 
fallout was prominent during the 1874 elections and caused many of their supporters to stay 
at home; many Republicans felt – for numerous reasons but most prominently economic ones 
– that the party had ceased to represent them.
205
 Upset at congressmen’s inability to legislate 
on an economic settlement and appalled at the failure of Southern governments to pay state 
debts and railroad bonds at the value in which they were engaged, many simply did not 
vote.
206
 Few historians have explored the interplay and impact of non-Reconstruction issues 
of national importance on Reconstruction legislation, preferring to focus solely on 
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Reconstruction without the wider context in which it was embedded.
207
 In doing so, 
historians miss an opportunity to understand how the federal government failed to place 
Reconstruction on a firm footing, often blaming the failure of Reconstruction on the long-
term corruption exposed in the 1870s. In doing so, historians have not recognised that even 
the exposés of corruption were often an offshoot of a greater struggle over executive power. 
The battle that raged between Congress and the President so fiercely in the inflation bill 
threatened to irrevocably injure the President’s ability to enforce Reconstruction.
                                                 
207
 One historian to explore this is Michael O’Malley who looked at the interplay of race and money issues, 
arguing that the issues intersected and were debated in the same terminology. Republican inflationists tended to 
be more sympathetic to legislating for racial equality, he suggests, while hard money interests saw race, like 
currency, as having a fixed value. Grant – as a supporter of African-American civil rights but an anti-inflationist 
– presents a notable exception to O’Malley’s observation. See Michael O’Malley, ‘Specie and Species: Race 
and the Money Question in Nineteenth Century America’, American Historical Review 99.2 (1994), pp. 369-
395. Another is Mark W. Summers in Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity who 
























The Third Term Movement:  
‘the unwritten law of the republic’ and the necessity of a ‘strong man’ 
 
Figure 5.1 ‘The Third-Term Panic’ 
 
Source: Thomas Nast, ‘The Third-Term Panic’, Harper’s Weekly, 7 November 1874. 
Thomas Nast succinctly summarised the effect of Caesarism and – among other incidents –
Grant’s controversial veto of the inflation bill on the congressional elections of 1874 when he 
drew ‘The Third-Term Panic’ that November.
1
 Nast’s cartoon made an enduring contribution 
to the iconography of U.S. politics by depicting the Republicans and Democrats as elephants 
and mules respectively. The depiction of the Democratic donkey masquerading as a lion to 
scare voters with its warning of a third term suggested, in Nast’s view, one of the main 
reasons for the Republicans’ loss of the House of Representatives. Nast implied that Grant’s 
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strength and Republican fears of presidential power, which had been fed by Democratic scare 
tactics, cost the party vital support in 1874. Yet it was not long before Grant’s vigorous use of 
executive power – this time in the case of employing the military to implement 
Reconstruction policies – caused controversy again among party loyalists. Grant’s 
interference in Louisiana in January 1875 would provoke a mix of fury and fear not only 
among Democrats, but also many Republicans. Grant, his critics suggested, had acted 
dictatorially in using the military to remove members of the Legislature. That a subversion of 
democracy – in the form of a coup d’état – had taken place to ensure the Democrats gained 
the disputed seats seemed to matter little. Many Republicans now set out to rein in 
presidential power where it was needed most: the South. 
Given that the fears Democrats had about Grant’s despotic ambitions had by 1874 migrated 
to plenty of supporters of the Republican Party, it is ironic that the current historiography on 
the President depicts him as a weak executive, who through a mix of naivety and 
incompetence undermined his own administration.
2
 This view of Grant’s presidency ignores 
the complexities of the Reconstruction era. By alleging that scandals and corruption 
perpetuated by the President’s friends greatly enfeebled the executive branch, historians 
ignore the reasons why and how this corruption was uncovered. The impetus for the 
investigations that unearthed corruption in Grant’s presidency lay in what he understood to be 
his republican use of power to defend citizenship rights. His tenacious defence of African-
American civil rights through the use of military power, his enemies warned, threatened to 
provide the President with a third term. However, the ‘strong man’ image of Grant proved 
counter-productive to efforts by Republican politicians to nominate him for a third term in 
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1876. Grant’s strength as a president actually proved his weakness if his purported ambitions 
to break George Washington’s precedent had any merit. 
This chapter charts how white Republicans – even former Radicals – deplored Grant’s use of 
the military to overturn fraudulent activity in the Louisiana state legislature.
3
 The fear of the 
executive’s Reconstruction military powers and the possible tyranny such powers could 
inflict upon the United States led Northern Republicans to oppose ‘the strong man’ as much 
as Northern Democrats. Yet a successful post-presidential world tour in which the strong man 
became a statesman, and the actions of the Democratic Party, in control of Congress between 
1879 and 1880, led to the revival of support for Grant’s presidential style. Ironically, the 
President’s willingness to use executive power – especially his military powers – as 
peacetime weapons to enforce the civil rights of all citizens led many Republicans in 1880 to 
rejuvenate the oft-debated third term. Ultimately, though, the republican belief in ‘the 
unwritten law of the republic’ – the two-term presidency – overpowered the desire for ‘the 
strong man’ of politics. The survival of the republic triumphed over the civil rights of the 
most vulnerable in society. By showing how fears of dictatorship hampered Grant’s room to 
manoeuvre, the chapter adds to our understanding of the retreat from civil rights in the 1870s.  
Historians have tended to explain the downfall of Reconstruction by emphasising, to varying 
degrees, the intransigence of Southern whites, the racism of the Northern white electorate, 
and the economic tensions that came out of the Panic of 1873 and the fragmentation of ‘free 
labour’ ideology. Most scholars writing on the subject, however, use each of these factors to 
explain why, in contrast to the 1866-1871 period, the federal government no longer 
committed its forces to defending African-American voters from violent campaigns of 
intimidation. Grant’s 1875 intervention in Louisiana therefore marks an end of an era. But to 
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understand why subsequent struggles on the part of white supremacists to ‘redeem’ the Deep 
South from Republican rule proved successful we also need to look to political culture. Many 
voters – including plenty with strong commitments to civil rights – did not respond passively 
to the downfall of Reconstruction due to innate racism or fear that class conflict was 
spreading to the North. They were genuinely concerned that the aggregation of presidential 
power required to reconstruct the South presented a greater danger to the republic than the 
cost to citizenship rights through standing by.
4
 
‘An insolent soldiery’: The Demise of the Third Term Movement in 1876 
Let us enter upon the second century of our existence as a republic, in the spirit 
that animated the men of Concord and Lexington in 1775, and there will be no 
more forcible and fradulent [sic] attempts to put the states under bayonet rule, or 
to invade the fair temple of Liberty with an insolent soldiery proposing to treat 
the people as ‘banditti,’ or to ride a president into power on the strength of a 
third-term military force bill.
5
 
The celebration of the United States’ centennial in July 1876 elevated the significance of the 
upcoming presidential election for many Americans. If newspapers are anything to go by, the 
danger of tyranny remained almost as prominent in citizens’ minds in 1876 as it had been in 
1776. Both Republicans and Democrats feared the usurpations of power by President Grant in 
the South, especially in Louisiana, signalled the end of the republic. Although the above 
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extract came from a Connecticut Democratic newspaper, strong denunciations of the White 
House’s Southern policy came from former Republican supporters as well. Both parties saw 
unrepublican threats in Grant’s interventions on behalf of African Americans in the South. 
Though hyperbolic fears could be found more easily in Democratic and Liberal Republican 
newspapers, the Republicans – fearing the electoral consequences of staying silent –
reprimanded Grant just as severely. Republicans questioned Grant’s commitment to a 
republican form of government whilst the Democrats (and Liberal Republicans) warned of 
the fall of the republic and the dawn of empire. The presence of troops in peacetime and the 
approaching centennial therefore provoked heightened concerns over the future of the 
republic. 
The seating of the new Louisiana legislators in January 1875 proved a turning point in 
Reconstruction policy. The situation in post-emancipation Louisiana had always been 
strained, with frequent outbursts of violence and lawlessness.
6
 The Democratic attempt to win 
control of the state government in 1872 had resulted in such a high level of fraud that the real 
victor could only be surmised.
7
 This controversy had resulted in the President adjudicating 
the results after the Colfax Massacre in April 1873.
8
 Yet the situation the federal government 
encountered in January 1875 remained unprecedented and required novel actions to restore 
order.
9
 The Democrats had come close to victory, after an election characterised by White 
League paramilitary outrages and rampant fraud, despite a black voting majority.
10
 When the 
legislature assembled on 4 January 1875, five seats in the House remained unallocated by the 
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Returning Board – a body established to adjudicate on contested election results in the state.
11
 
The Republicans had 52 members, while the Democrats obtained 50 seats, leaving the result 
in the balance.
12
 As the clerk called the roll of elected members, the Democrats took control 
of the chamber, nominating and electing their preferred speaker – Louis Wiltz – and ousting 
the clerk.
13
 Promptly, Wiltz was sworn in, and proceeded to elect a permanent speaker and 
‘dozens of sergeants-at-arms.’
14
 With the coup d’état complete, the contested seats were 
declared Democratic thus providing them with a majority in the House.
15
 Then, in an effort to 
pass favourable measures, the sergeants forcibly blocked the exits to maintain the quorum; 
though successful in retaining a sufficient number of Republicans, they were unable to 
prevent some members from escaping.
16
 Informed of events in the legislature, the Republican 
Governor appealed to the troops stationed outside.
17
 Colonel de Trobriand and his force, 
armed with ‘bayoneted rifles’, entered the legislature and removed the Democrats who had 
not been sanctioned by the Returning Board.
18
 The federal troops succeeded in defeating the 
Democratic coup d’état. 
Yet the reversal of the coup d’état brought more condemnation upon the Republican Party 
than the coup itself. Despite the unconstitutional actions of the Democrats, the behaviour of 
Colonel de Trobriand, his superior General Phillip Sheridan, and the President were more 
severely rebuked. Many Republicans viewed this forceful action by the President in state 
jurisdiction as unrepublican, and a threat to the foundations of the republic. Numerous 
Republican commentators considered the underhand antics of the Democratic House 
members as legitimate and the President’s role in correcting this behaviour – through the 
                                                 
11
 Dawson III, Army Generals and Reconstruction, p. 201. 
12
 Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
13
 Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877, p. 305. 
14






 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
18
 Ibid., pp. 205-206. 
279 
 
federal military – as unconstitutional. Military intervention in civil affairs – a species of 
Caesarism – undermined sound government: the President, not the Democrats, threatened 
democracy. This perception of the incident would have severe consequences for 
Reconstruction and the civil rights of African Americans. 
In response to a query regarding his involvement in recent events in Louisiana, Grant sent a 
message to the Senate justifying the constitutional basis of all actions in Louisiana since his 
presidency begun. In contextualising his actions, Grant sought to remind the Senate of the 
continuing violence in the state. Initially troops were sent to Louisiana prior to the election, 
due to an outbreak of violence, under both ‘the act of 1795’ – which allowed the President to 
use federal troops to subdue disturbances in the states – and ‘section 4, article 4 of the 
Constitution, to aid in suppressing domestic violence.’
19
 To prevent violence at the election 
polls, troops were also sent to protect voters under ‘section 8’ of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 
1871.
20
 Troops remained stationed in the state ‘to prevent domestic violence and aid in the 
enforcement of the State laws’, but they did not have orders from the President to interfere in 
the legislature.
21
 Though Grant had ordered General Sheridan to the state to guard against 
hesitancy in the execution of future commands – a problem with less decisive officers – he 
did not anticipate their use in the legislature.
22
 The President was careful to stress the violent 
nature of past incidents in Louisiana which had required the presence of federal troops in the 
state, but he also emphasised the unprecedented nature of the latest incident, which had led to 
an exceptional solution. 
After outlining why federal troops were stationed in Louisiana, Grant proceeded to justify 
their actions. Grant suggested that given their orders to maintain the peace, they ‘may well 
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have supposed that it was their duty to act when called upon by the governor for that 
purpose.’
23
 Despite the ambiguity surrounding their involvement, the President explained that 
the nature of ‘circumstances connected with the late legislative imbroglio in Louisiana’ did 
‘seem to exempt the military from any intentional wrong in that matter.’
24
 Furthermore, he 
defended the Governor’s request for the troops’ assistance by suggesting that ‘most 
extraordinary circumstances’ had guided his actions and resulted in his ‘duty ... to call upon 
the constabulary, or, if necessary, the military force of the State’.
25
 However, he recalled that 
previous events involving such forces resulted in ‘a bloody conflict’, which necessitated ‘the 
presence of the United States troops’.
26
 Validating their use, Grant explained how ‘[b]oth 
parties appear to have relied upon them as conservators of the public peace.’
27
 Events 
therefore justified the use of the army to ‘suppress the disturbance’.
28
 The President was 
careful to portray the legitimate basis of action taken by federal troops in Louisiana. Federal 
power was unfortunate but necessary given the volatile situation. 
Thus though Grant conceded that the democratic basis upon which the Governor acted was 
‘perhaps a debatable question’, he stressed that the lack of order and the prevalence of 
violence in Louisiana had led to extraordinary circumstances.
29
 Grant also pointed out the 
support which the Governor received from ‘the majority of the members returned as elected 
to the house, to use such means as were in his power to defeat these lawless and revolutionary 
proceedings’.
30
 The President also sought to remind Congress of its own failure to take 
charge of conditions in Louisiana through its inaction on issues highlighted as requiring 
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urgent attention by the President.
31
 Federal troops intervened, Grant claimed, because 
Congress had not performed its duty in resolving hostilities in the state.
32
 Grant, as a result, 
took control lest Louisiana should descend further into anarchy.
33
 Grant was clear that the 
legitimacy of federal force rested upon the need to quell the anarchic behaviour of those 
causing the disturbances in the absence of any other enforcement mechanism. 
Despite this explanation, the intervention was opposed by both Democrats and many 
Republicans, who saw it as the latest in a long line of executive usurpations. For the 
Democrats, especially the coincidence of military intervention with the upcoming centennial, 
it allowed them to plot Grant’s actions into a longer story of the republic’s descent into a 
monarchy. One paper used the anniversary to highlight the correlation between Grant’s 
actions and those of the British, playing upon fears over the fragility of the nation to forewarn 
that ‘[t]he acts of violence and aggression, sought to be enforced against the people of the 
South by the Grant administration, are essentially antagonistic in principle to the government 
founded by our fathers’.
34
 The journal, in pointing to the many similarities it saw between the 
two governments, declared  that Grant’s actions ‘leave the peoples of the states at the end of 
the first hundred years of fruitless experiment, with no other end actually gained than that of 
a change in imperial masters.’
35
 Grant’s tyranny was denounced throughout the Democratic 
press in warnings that reminded Americans of the necessity to oppose the President’s 
despotism and his imminent empire.
36
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Expanding upon fears of executive power, especially military powers, many Democrats 
warned their supporters that Grant’s actions in Louisiana represented an attempt to gain a 
third term by force.
37
 In contrast to the Republican press, Democratic newspapers generally 
connected Grant’s actions in the South with the President’s potential third term. They warned 
not only of despotism, but of the coming empire. The Boston Post – the leading Democratic 
newspaper in New England – exclaimed that ‘[i]f the Federal soldiery may thus put down and 
set up a State Legislature by force, the example may embolden by its success to a similar 
experiment in the National Legislature also.’
38
 The New York Sun, too, proclaimed how ‘[t]he 
precedent is full of peril’ before it elaborated on the consequences of Grant’s actions.
39
  
If the prime author of this outrage is allowed to go unpunished, will he not repeat 
it two years hence, in his own individual case, on a scale as broad as the Union? 
Suppose he carries out his intention and runs for a third term? What matters it 
[sic] that he does not get a majority of the electoral votes? Can he not be counted 
in by fraud and inaugurated by the edge of the sword?
40
 
Though Democratic rhetoric often sought to stoke fears of executive tyranny for partisan ends 
– the Sun’s editor, Charles A. Dana, attempted to rouse support for the President’s 
‘impeachment’ – it nevertheless commented on a phenomenon which caused genuine fear 
especially in states, such as Louisiana, where fraud and stolen elections frequently occurred.
41
 
Gregory P. Downs has explored this situation with relation to the 1876 presidential election 
providing evidence to show how the ‘line between violence and politics’ had become blurred 
during Reconstruction especially in the repeated instances of the inauguration of ‘[t]wo 
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governors’, and the apparent readiness to turn to force to sustain rival claims to office.
42
 
Many Democratic newspapers also recalled the words of Frank Blair Junior in 1868, who had 
warned that Grant would never leave office, as evidence that sound reasons existed to 
question Grant’s use of executive military powers.
43
 Though these newspapers had partisan 
ends in sight, their readers often genuinely feared the use of federal troops in state affairs.  
Leading Democratic newspapers connected Grant’s protection of civil rights in the South 
with a military dictatorship. The New York Herald, this time firmly in the Democratic camp 
on the debate, warned its readers that ‘[t]he President commands the government and the 
party just as he commanded the army. There is no will but that of the silent, inscrutable 
master in the White House.’
44
 The Weekly Democratic Statesman claimed ‘at last we have the 
Federal despot not only controlling Legislatures by force of arms but absolutely controlling 
the action and organization of the courts. In what is the despotic authority of Grant 
restricted?’
45
 The Texas newspaper also raised the spectre of a monarchy when it stated 
‘surely Grant will lead the divine effulgence of his imperial presence and in his own person 
assuage the griefs of a great Northern commonwealth.’
46
 The newspaper described the state 
of affairs – especially in Louisiana – as ‘government based on fear and force’.
47
 Democratic 
newspapers, by playing upon republican fears of executive power, denied the President the 
authority to enforce civil rights by describing his actions as despotic. Their accusations were 
commonplace in Democratic circles where they had circulated for years, but the President’s 
actions in Louisiana had demonstrated how far Grant would go to protect African-American 
civil rights.  
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The Democrats demonstrated the extent to which they felt threatened by Grant’s action 
through their use of language. Many Democratic editors – not content with their connection 
of the executive office and the military – assured readers of Grant’s absolute control over the 
federal government through metaphors tied to slavery. By referring to Grant as ‘master’, they 
conflated his supposed tyranny with the absolute power of slaveholders.
48
 In doing so, 
perhaps, they were attempting to reignite exaggerated Southern antebellum suspicions over 
Northern ambitions to force white Southerners into slavery, while continuing to hold the 
Reconstruction era conservative line that black suffrage was a mask for subjugating whites.
49
 
Such language abounded in Democratic coverage of the intervention.
50
 The New York 
Herald, reversing its position on the inflation bill, stated that within the Republican Party 
there existed only ‘[o]ne or two independent men [who] venture to assert that they are the 
peers and not the slaves of the President.’
51
 The Plain Dealer in Cleveland explained that 
Democrats in Louisiana were working ‘to lift the state out of the bondage to which Radical 
carpet-bagism has subjected it.’
52
 The Pennsylvanian Washington Review and Examiner also 
printed an article on Grant which they entitled ‘Cracking the Lash’, again comparing the 
President’s action with that of a slaveholder, whilst the Weekly Democratic Statesman in 
Texas asked its readers ‘[a]re we not slaves?’
53
 Much as in 1776, the use of slavery analogies 
proved a potent means to critique absolute power, and mobilise supporters to fight tyranny. 
Conflating ‘strong government’ with tyranny, they claimed Grant’s use of executive power 
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meant ‘no fuss; no argument; no parliamentary quibblings’; Caesar, they suggested, had 
ascended and must be deposed.
54
 
Democrats also warned the electorate of the continuation of corruption and the abuse of 
patronage if Grant were re-nominated and elected. The Indianapolis Sentinel even claimed 
that Grant would try to control the Republican convention of 1876 ‘through the powerful 
enginery of the offices within his gift’.
55
 The Cairo Bulletin alleged that Grant was unlikely 
to give up a third term as it would ‘disaffect a powerful element; to depose office holders, 
high and low, would be to alienate an equally powerful element’.
56
 These newspapers spoke 
of ‘notorious thieves’ in positions of power supported by the imposition of Grant’s ‘martial 
law’ and legislatures ‘regulated by United States troops’.
57
 The Cincinnati Enquirer simply 
stated that Grant would achieve a third term ‘by stuffed ballot boxes and forged returns.’
58
 
Patronage and corruption – the abuse of executive power both parties had warned of since 
Grant picked his cabinet – would ensure a third term for the President. 
Whilst some Democrats viewed Grant’s corruption and unconstitutional actions as the root 
cause of his undemocratic actions, the independent New York Herald considered Grant’s 
antipartisanship and republicanism as the real source of the country’s problem. Grant’s lack 
of loyalty to party made him not only undemocratic but unrepublican: an argument honed by 
opponents of Grant’s veto of the inflation bill in April 1874. The newspaper denounced Grant 
as ‘[o]bstinate, able, independent, self-willed, amenable to no influences except those which 
appeal to his pride and his vanity, believing that he is more necessary to the party than the 
party ever had been to him, and regarding the Presidency as a personal possession’; the 
implication here was that parties were more capable of defending the republic than an 
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 The antipartisanship of the President – initially considered a positive 
quality in politics, even by the Herald who had wanted him as the Democratic presidential 
candidate in 1868 – was now deemed an undemocratic force which would endanger the 
republic. Always a popular argument with opponents of Grant who believed his antipartyism 
was a cover for the beginning of despotism in the United States, the argument gained 
credence after Grant’s use of the veto power in 1874 and his military powers in 1875 as his 
actions illustrated his willingness to act without reference to his party, or Congress. 
Increasingly, newspapers of all parties interpreted republicanism as loyalty to party and the 
independent President as a threat to the existence of the republic. The warnings of the 
tyrannical potential of executive power expressed by the Liberal Republicans in 1872 and 
John Russell Young in 1873 seemed to be ringing true. A republican president could become 
an unrepublican despot.  
Denouncing Grant’s use of executive power as the ‘arbitrary … will of the President’, the 
Democrats insinuated that Grant had ceased to act for the public good.
60
 Grant, they charged, 
represented ‘an uncontrolled dictator’ and argued that ‘[i]mpeachment should follow this 
usurpation’.
61
 The New York World denounced Grant as ‘the traitor who sits in the 
President’s chair’ for his defence of the freedmen’s rights.
62
 In Pennsylvania, the 
Philadelphia Commonwealth warned that ‘Grant intends to be Dictator, if riot, anarchy, or 
any other means will accomplish his purpose. This is the first effort. White men, prepare for 
what is to come.’
63
 Grant’s support of the newly enfranchised African Americans was 
increasingly seen as undemocratic as it not only denied Southern white conservatives places 
of power but it threatened the very existence of the republic by using the military for civil 
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purposes. The New York Herald critiqued the ‘war spirit which comes muttering to us from 
Washington as they would deal with a crime against the integrity of the Republic.’
64
 Invoking 
the Caesarism scare of 1873, they scolded those who ‘sneered at our prophecies of 
Caesarism, yet came to accept them when they could no longer be denied.’
65
 The President, 
they claimed, endangered the republic as he showed a willingness to use the military to 
implement laws and constitutional amendments regardless of his opponents’ concerns.  
Yet despite the hyperbole and warnings over the threat of Grant’s power which emanated 
from the Democratic press, the Liberal Republican press bore much of the responsibility for 
undermining the political capital of the President through their comparisons of the President’s 
actions. In particular, the articles from three Liberal Republican newspapers – the New York 
Evening Press, the New York Tribune, and the Springfield Republican – were reprinted 
throughout the Democratic press which highlighted the power and depth of the allegations. 
Liberal Republican newspapers likened Grant’s actions to Napoleon, Charles Stuart and 
Cromwell. ‘What is the difference between the condition of the citizens of Louisiana under 
Kellogg,’ the Evening Post asked, ‘and the people of France under Louis Napoleon?’
66
 
Monarchical comparisons featured regularly in their articles as they connected Grant’s 
removal of legislators from the Louisiana state legislature to those of the King of England 
and Cromwell.
67
 The Springfield Republican stated that on ‘April 20, 1653, Oliver Cromwell 
drove the representatives of the English people out of their chamber at the point of the 
bayonet. January 4 1875, Ulysses S. Grant repeats the experiment—upon a smaller scale, to 
be sure—by sending a file of soldiers into the State House of an American commonwealth on 
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a like illegal, revolutionary, treasonable errand. We shall see what comes of it.’
68
 The Liberal 
Republicans used European – especially monarchical – analogies in the same way the 
Democrats used slavery metaphors: to warn the electorate of the necessity to oppose tyranny 
and the formidable power of the federal government. 
Building on the fears they had espoused in 1872 over Grant’s patronage and military powers, 
the Liberal Republican newspapers did not consider the President’s actions to have any 
legitimacy, preferring to see them as tyrannical. Yet republican fears over the role of the 
federal military in state affairs, and by extension of the power of the federal government, 
proved a formidable obstacle to the implementation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments which these former Radical Republicans had helped inaugurate. Liberal 
Republicans had been hostile to the president’s use of the military in civil affairs since the 
passage of the 1871 Force Act, which not only authorised the use of the military in curtailing 
Klan violence, but also allowed the federal government to extend the remit of the 
constitutional amendments to individuals as well as states.
69
 Though, inevitably, some 
Democrats used these fears as effective electioneering rhetoric – especially men like Dana of 
the New York Sun who had worked ferociously to uncover corruption in Grant’s 
administration for many years – but for others they signalled real concerns about threats to 
the balance of powers in a fragile and war-torn Union. In Grant’s protection of civil rights 
they saw a dangerous move towards the unconstitutional infringement of ‘self-government’ 
in the States.
70
 At the end of a century of republican government, both Democrats and 
Liberals Republicans saw the beginning of despotism in the United States.  
Liberal Republican newspapers couched their warnings of tyranny in constitutional language. 
They explained what the Constitution allowed and what it did not, which allowed them to 
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appeal to the republican sensitivities of voters. It was in this area that the Liberal Republicans 
– with Democratic support – made their most persuasive critiques of the Republican 
President to voters. The New York Evening Post condemned Grant’s actions as ‘absolutely 
unjustifiable’ before it explained that ‘the Constitution of the United States does not provide 
for the employment of the army in civil affairs of a State in any other way than by a formal 
demand from the executive officer of the State made upon the President of the United 
States.’
71
 The newspaper asserted that the Governor of Louisiana ‘made no specific request to 
the government for military aid’.
72
 The article further claimed that ‘[t]he fact stands forth, 
clear and unmistakeable that the acting Governor of Louisiana yesterday used the army of the 
United States to interfere with the organization of the Legislature of that State, without 
justification in fact or warrant of law.’
73
 The paper concluded its attack on presidential power 
by asserting that ‘depriving the citizens of any State of this Union of the right of self-
government will be fatal to the existence of any political party.’
74
 The Liberal Republican 
paper had acquiesced to the Democratic mantra of states’ rights, which denied the President 
the authority to enforce laws that Congress had written. It was an argument presented 
throughout the Liberal Republican press denouncing Grant’s use ‘of Federal bayonets’ to 
keep the Republicans in power in Louisiana.
75
 The use of federal power to enforce federal 
law was seen as the usurpation of states’ rights, democracy and ‘self-government’.
76
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The Liberal Republicans presented a powerful force in many Northern states where they held 
meetings denouncing the President’s actions in Louisiana.
77
 In particular, the meeting in 
Boston at Faneuil Hall garnered much attention from the press. Prominent Liberal 
Republicans, and some Democrats, scolded Grant’s actions; they claimed that if Grant could 
interfere in Louisiana then he could also interfere in their own state.
78
 Attendees claimed that 
for parallels they needed to look at ‘the arbitrary tyranny of the Stuarts of England’ or, 
turning to a parallel liberally used elsewhere, ‘the iron despotism of Oliver Cromwell’.
79
 
Only in such actions – which counted the unseating of members of parliament on a ruler’s 
command – could equivalents be found for the ‘outrage committed in Louisiana’.
80
 At the 
end of the meeting, the attendees passed a resolution stating their desire ‘that the sword may 
be the supporter and not the destroyer of civil liberty’.
81
 
Although the Liberal Republicans conceded that ‘the five [Democratic] members had been 
seated by a surprise and voted in haste’ they still questioned ‘[w]hat right had the United 
States soldiers to pass upon the election, qualifications and the returns of a State?’
82
 They did 
not see constitutional prerogatives in Grant’s actions but rather lamented the unwarranted 
interference of the federal government in state government. Even the former Republican 
turned Democrat John Quincy Adams II – whose grandfather and great-grandfather had each 
been accused of monarchical ambitions – urged ‘that the hand of the federal government 
should be kept off the liberties of the State’, and that through the actions in Louisiana the 
country had ‘passed the first milestone on [its] way to empire.’
83
 These men ‘held the 
President and his general to a strict responsibility for trampling upon the very principles upon 
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which are [sic] free institutions are founded’ and accused Grant of ‘a flagrant usurpation of 
power.’
84
 Referring to the Constitution to condemn the President, opponents cited the same 
Act of Congress from 1795 that Grant had used in building the legal basis for intervention, 
which decreed that the President could only send the federal military to a state on the request 
of the Executive (or Legislature if convened) and only in response to an insurrection.
85
 Here, 
the struggle revolved around whether Louisiana was still insurrectionary; for Grant it was, but 
his critics rejected this reasoning. 
During John Quincy Adams II’s speech, Wendell Phillips was spotted among the crowd 
listening avidly.
86
 The crowd began to interrupt the speakers with calls for Phillips – the 
former abolitionist and women’s suffrage advocate – who had not been invited to speak at the 
event.
87
 Eventually the President of the meeting acceded to the demands and Phillips took the 
platform.
88
 Phillips began his speech by appealing to the crowd on the subject of justice, 
asking whether or not every citizen had the right to appeal to the federal government for 
protection, whether that protection could be granted in a strict constructionist interpretation or 
not.
89
 He stated: 
When the negro in the Southern States hauled from his house and about to be 
shot; when a white Republican caught in some county in Alabama and about to be 
assassinated—[heckler]—looks around on the State government about him and 
sees no protection,—none whatever, for white or black,—has he not a full right, 
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an emphatic right, to say to the National Government at Washington, ‘Find or 
make a way to protect me, for I am a citizen of the United States?’
90
 
Phillips gained applause for this statement despite the interruptions from hecklers which were 
a constant presence throughout his speech. He had outlined basic rights for United States’ 
citizens, hoping to appeal to the republican sensibilities of the audience. He described the 
situation in Louisiana and the inability of Congress to fulfil its duties to the state, which, he 
argued, had compelled Grant to act. Continuing, he stated how the federal government in 
1872 had supported Kellogg, the Republican, in the disputed November elections as, 
according to Phillips, ‘[t]he President of the United States had no alternative. … Congress 
would do nothing; neither the Senate nor the House would act; your Congress was dumb; it 
would not take a step in any direction. [heckle] There stood the President of the United 
States, what was he to do?’
91
 Phillips declared that only the strong man had stood up to 
defend the republic: 
I have just brought it to your attention that the citizen of the United States has a 
right to look up to him and say: ‘By your oath of office, protect me.’ ... Now 
Congress would do nothing. There was the State of Louisiana going to pieces; 
Grant recognized Kellogg as governor, as he must recognize someone. ... If he 
usurped power, or made a mistake, remember, gentlemen, for two long years 
Congress has never rebuked him, nor corrected his errors. They have tried again 
and again to come to some conclusion on the Louisiana question, but they could 
not, and there stood the Executive; he must act; there was no choice; he had got to 
act; the law must be executed.
92
  









Phillips used Lincoln’s expansive interpretation of the war powers to justify Grant’s actions 
but he also cast the President as a model republican. When the war broke out in 1861 Lincoln 
had assumed powers – which he claimed through his presidential oath to defend the 
Constitution to conduct the war. Lincoln had not summoned Congress – which was in recess 
– to a special session and instead acted alone. Events in Louisiana had also illustrated the 
inability of Congress to act decisively in moments of crisis, and Phillips explained that once 
more it fell to the President to fulfil his promise to the nation to uphold the laws of the 
country in the face of congressional incapacity. 
Phillips, who had fought Grant’s nomination in 1868 by accusing him of being an 
unrepublican drunkard, now defended the President as the man most likely to stand up for 
black civil rights.
93
 By 1872, indeed, Phillips had admitted his pleasant surprise at the 
President’s actions in defence of former slaves’ civil rights and supported him over Horace 
Greeley, the Liberal Republican nominee, in the election.
94
 Rather than trying to act 
tyrannically, Phillips now claimed in Boston, that Grant was merely performing his required 
role.  
He did what he was compelled to do. Driven to that position—shut up to it—give 
him your sympathy. When the assembled wisdom of the nation confessed that it 
could see no satisfactory step to take, then have fair consideration for the man 
who was obliged by his oath of office to walk forward and meet his 
responsibilities. At least, when he has again and again, and again, besought 
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Phillips then pointed out that Grant’s personal interests as a politician lay in the exact course 
of action the Liberal Republicans were demanding. He proclaimed:  
President Grant’s message affirms that ‘lawlessness, turbulence, and bloodshed’ 
cover the whole history of reconstructed Louisiana. If he is a selfish politician, it 
would be more profitable for him to paint it all peace, and so gain the support of 
the now triumphant white race. If he loves fame, to claim that he has really 
pacified the South would be the cap sheaf of his glory. He has no temptation to 
exaggerate on the side of Louisiana disorder.
96
 
The President, Phillips affirmed, cared nothing for the fruits of victory but rather sought to 
fulfil his duty, as a republican, to protect all the citizens of the United States. By intervening 
in Louisiana, the President simply sought to protect the nation from chaos and uphold law 
and order. Phillips appealed to the audience on a republican basis, perhaps realising the 
necessity of defending the President, and equal rights, on the prerogative of the White House 
to exercise republicanism in politics.  
Yet the reaction of Grant’s supporters was not as warm as the one he received from former 
opponent Phillips. Republicans around the country were greatly divided over Grant’s actions. 
Some Republicans – especially Radicals and black voters – applauded his defence of the 
newly enfranchised African Americans. The New York Times reported for instance that two 
out of three letters it received from readers supported the President’s policy.
97
 Many 
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previously supportive newspapers, however, condemned his actions.
98
 These Republican 
newspapers included both Radical Republicans, such as the hitherto loyal Harper’s Weekly, 
and moderates, such as the New York Times. The reaction of former staunch supporters of 
Grant provides the best indication of the opposition to his Southern Reconstruction policy. 
Even George William Curtis, a strong supporter of black suffrage, saw a dangerous trend 
towards military despotism in the intrusion of the military in civil affairs.
99
 The opposition 
from these formerly strident supporters was worrying. The President, they contended, had 
engaged in dictatorial acts which menaced the republic. Rather than contextualize the 
incident in the violence of Reconstruction politics, they saw it as symptomatic of a wider 
danger for their states. It was the end of ‘self-government’ and the centralisation of power in 
the White House, they warned.
100
 Their perception of events led them to resume (or in some 
cases begin) agitating against a third term for Grant. 
In many respects, the New York Times summarised the fears of plenty of Americans when it 
described how it struggled to understand the rationale behind Grant’s actions. The paper 
argued:  
For ourselves, we must say that the use which was made of the United States 
troops seems to have been an extreme exercise of power, and one which the 
President, who is primarily responsible for it, must find it very difficult to show 
adequate authority. The United States guarantee to each State a republican form 
of government, and, on requisition, protection against domestic violence. In this 
case there was no recent requisition, and there was no actual violence. The 
Governor called in troops in anticipation of his own helplessness, and engaged 
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their commander in acts which have never yet been performed by a United States 
Army officer. The troops did not aid the States forces. They replaced them. We 
do not believe the country will regard such a procedure with approval.
101
 
The New York Times – amongst other newspapers – created an entirely different picture of 
the situation in Louisiana by removing all references to electoral violence and 
unconstitutional actions in Louisiana on the part of members of the legislature. This allowed 
the Republican press as well as its Democratic counterparts to skew events in the state in a 
manner that made Grant look like the usurper. The portrait of an unconstitutional president 
they produced, in turn, limited the legitimate scope of presidential power. Phillips here was 
fighting a losing battle in trying to defend what the White House was obliged to do. Whether 
consciously, or unconsciously, these newspapers removed the constitutional basis of Grant’s 
power denying him crucial political capital to deal with state emergencies and enforce civil 
rights for all American citizens. Furthermore, their refusal to acknowledge the constitutional 
basis of Grant’s actions would have severe consequences for the ability of future presidents to 
intervene in the South to protect citizens’ civil rights. The opposition of such influential 
publications as the New York Times and Harper’s Weekly was extremely damaging to the 
future of civil rights in the South.  
As a moderate Republican newspaper, the opposition of the New York Times could have been 
anticipated, but that of the Radical Republican Harper’s Weekly was unprecedented: the 
journal had been a ferocious supporter of the President. In other scares over executive power, 
whether over his allocation of patronage, his use of foreign powers or with regard to the 
military, the journal had vigorously defended the President. It also claimed during the 
Caesarism scare of 1873 that it saw no objection to a third term for Grant. As a result its 
turnaround, documented in their editorials, hurt the President’s political capital immensely. 
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Although the journal did not deny that the situation in Louisiana remained intolerable – it was 
under no illusion that white Democrats wished to hold African Americans in a position of 
subjugation – it denied Grant had the power to intervene to remedy the situation with United 
States troops.
102
 In doing so, they rejected the constitutional role of the federal government to 
guarantee the civil rights of all citizens.  
The journal effectively validated the unconstitutional actions of the Democrats by repudiating 
the President’s role in enforcing republican rule on state governments. Harper’s Weekly set a 
dangerous precedent when they charged ‘that the result of a constant and familiar forcible 
supervision of the [state] government by the [federal] is the destruction of that self-reliance 
and spirit of independence which are indispensable to successful popular republican 
government.’
103
 Their dismissal of the activities engaged in by the Louisiana legislature 
signalled a disregard for undemocratic activity conducted by state governments. Harper’s 
Weekly remained more concerned with the process to rectify undemocratic activities. This, 
they claimed, did not reside with the federal military or the president. Completely ignoring 
the bloody history of legal and extra-legal attempts to resolve power struggles within 
Louisiana, the journal claimed that ‘[o]ur problem is not how to protect a negro or a white 
man in his rights, but how free institutions, which are the guarantee of all rights, are best to 
be maintained.’
104
 Highlighting republican concerns over the use of the army, the journal 
wrote that ‘military force is to be employed only in strict subservience to the letter and spirit 
of the Constitution’.
105
 Harper’s Weekly’s claims were a damning indictment of the use of the 
military to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments; its editorials implied that the president 
had no right to interfere in the Southern states to enforce the laws of the United States 
regardless of undemocratic activity on the part of the states.  
                                                 
102






 ‘Republican Duty’, Harper’s Weekly, 15 May 1875. 
298 
 
Where Phillips saw Grant’s actions as republicanism in action, Harper’s Weekly – and other 
Republican newspapers – saw the seeds of despotism. Curtis’s journal claimed the President 
used ‘merely selfish control’ in government and was devoid of ‘the highest patriotism’, ‘the 
purest character and the best ability.’
106
 The Philadelphia Times denounced Grant ‘as insane’ 
and ‘selfish’.
107
 The Hartford Daily Courant, a Republican newspaper that celebrated Grant’s 
action in vetoing the inflation bill, reported ‘dissatisfaction’ with the President and stressed 
the necessity to correct unwise behaviour within the party.
108
 The inability of many former 
supporters to muster any kind words for the President illustrated the large increase in 
opposition to a strong executive. This loss of Republican support for the enforcement of the 
Reconstruction Acts would have profound long term consequences for the nation. 
Though the Senate supported Grant’s actions in Louisiana, the President stood accused of 
despotism in power by some members of Congress. Led by Democratic Senator Allen G. 
Thurman of Ohio, the Senate sent the President a resolution requesting information on the 
situation in Louisiana, which asked upon ‘what authority such military interference and 
intervention’ had occurred.
109
 Debate on the resolution continued for four days before a 
resolution of approbation passed. Most Republican members did defend the President, with a 
Vermont Senator claiming the debate marked: 
the first time ... in human history when any man has raised his voice to condemn 
what he calls despotism on the part of the Government, where, when you look to 
find what that despotism is, you find ... the Government exerting all the power 
that it is able to exert to protect human life and human liberty.
110
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The Vermont Republican was responding to Democratic allegations of despotism levelled at 
the President. In particular, a Democrat from Delaware suggested that Grant, in his action, 
had become ‘Caesar’, was trying ‘to wrap the purple about him’, and that ‘the American 
people [must] tear the robes from him.’
111
 The debate proceeded mostly along partisan lines, 
and even after the resolution passed, the Liberal Republican Senator Carl Schurz still sought 
to denounce the President’s actions.
112
 Schurz accused the President of violating 
constitutional government and using ‘arbitrary power’ to preserve peace, pronouncing that 
‘where the forms of constitutional government can be violated with impunity, there the spirit 
of constitutional government will soon be dead.’
113
 Schurz asserted that by usurping power to 
ensure peace and protect the rights of former slaves, there would soon be no republican 
government in existence for them to enjoy.
114
 Although the Senate eventually approved the 
President’s course, the allegations of usurpation by an influential Republican proved 
damaging especially as it echoed the stance of many Republicans around the country who 
disapproved the President’s course. The condemnations sent in from state legislatures across 
the nation refuted the idea that the ‘temporary despotism’ tolerated under Lincoln during the 
Civil War – and now extolled in republican garb by Phillips – would be allowed despite the 




Nowhere was this sentiment clearer than in the actions of the newly elected Democratic 
House members. These members replicated the course of the Liberal Republicans in the early 
1870s by commencing investigations into the conduct of Grant’s administrations in an effort 
to uncover corruption. However, historians who focus on the corruption discovered during 
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Grant’s presidency often do not situate it within its long-term context. The Liberal 
Republicans launched numerous investigations during Grant’s first administration in pursuit 
of corruption in order to restrict him to a single term. Corruption, in this sense, became an 
accusation that could diminish the President’s power. These congressmen even interrogated 
the Secretary of the Navy – George S. Robeson – on the basis of allegations made by the 
Democratic New York Sun’s editor Dana.
116
 One Senator denounced these activities claiming 
they had turned the Senate ‘into a political caucus’.
117
 Fearing the election of a Republican 
President in 1876, the Democrats too sought to unearth administrative malfeasance. A House 
committee tasked with investigating the administration discovered fraudulent dealings by 
Secretary of War William W. Belknap in March 1876.
118
 However, Democratic secretiveness 
meant that the President remained unaware of the crime before he was approached by 
Belknap who persuaded Grant to accept his resignation before impeachment proceedings 
commenced.
119
 The desire to injure Grant left the Republicans unaware, until too late, of the 
evidence against Belknap which allowed the Secretary to approach the President before he 
could be forewarned of Belknap’s criminal dealings.
120
 There is no doubt that corruption in 
the modern sense of the term was rampant in the 1870s, but as a political weapon, it was 
mobilised at particular points to challenge the White House. The aftermath of the Louisiana 
intervention marked a real opportunity to diminish the power of the President. 
The Democrats’ reluctance to inform Grant of their findings was indicative of the nature of 
the investigations. The decision of the committee to recommend impeachment only reached 
Republican ears early on the morning of Belknap’s resignation. Congressmen Lyman K. Bass 
informed the Secretary of the Treasury, Benjamin H. Bristow, a good friend of Belknap’s, 
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who relayed the information to the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, who was still in bed, 
before heading to the White House to brief the President on Fish’s recommendation.
121
 
However, the President was in a hurry to get to a portrait sitting which led Bristow to notify 
him of the House’s intentions without discussing the evidence against Belknap.
122
 Instead he 
advised Grant to converse with Bass, who the President sent for, but before he could leave the 
premises Belknap and his friends approached the President. Presenting their side of the story, 
they convinced the President to accept Belknap’s resignation before he received the full 
history of the situation.
123
 The resulting impeachment proceedings against Belknap were 
therefore ineffectual and served only to embarrass Grant’s administration. The failure of the 
Democrats to inform the President rested with their ultimate aim: to implicate the President in 
unrepublican activities which would destabilise his administration and harm the Republicans 
for the 1876 election. 
Frustrated by their inability to fell the President in their attempts to discover corruption in his 
administrations, the Democratic press begun discussing the possible impeachment of Grant 
himself.
124
 Disappointed by their inability to impeach Belknap and by Grant’s interference in 
the trial of Orville E. Babcock, his former private secretary, which supposedly prevented his 
conviction, the Democrats tried a new tactic.
125
 Babcock’s trial had resulted from 
investigations by Bristow, which had Grant’s support (the President stated ‘[l]et no guilty 
man escape if it can be avoided’).
126
 Bristow’s inquiries uncovered the Whiskey Ring in May 
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1875, a scam which involved the bribery of Treasury officials in exchange for non-payment 
of liquor taxes.
127
 Unfortunately, Grant’s insistence on Babcock’s innocence somewhat 
sullied both his reputation and the administration, though the evidence against Babcock was 
highly contestable.
128
 Unable to implicate the President, the Democrats accused him of 
dereliction of duty. A resolution passed by the Democratic House in April 1876 asked the 
President to confirm how many days he had been absent from the capital. Grant’s response 
scolded the Democrats for their impertinent enquiry and presented a list of absences for 
nearly every previous President.
129
 Congressional Democrats may have been trying to 
embarrass the White House by suggesting that Grant lived an idle, aristocratic life free from 
the cares of public life, but if they were trying to stop him from running for a third term, they 
need not have bothered: Republican opinion-makers had already determined that it was not a 
good idea. 
The President’s actions in Louisiana in January 1875 turned the tide of opinion on his 
presidency against him and led to a rise in Republican opposition to his use of executive 
power. The groundwork lain by influential political commentators and Senators, including 
Sumner and Schurz, had increased concerns over the possible misuse of power by the 
President, which only grew after the military’s intrusion on civilian affairs in Louisiana. 
Grant’s intervention represented the culmination of fears over executive power that had 
existed since the start of his first term in office. Concerns over patronage and military power 
– heightened by the growth of both during and after the Civil War as the federal government 
expanded – could no longer be adequately answered by defenders like Phillips. Fears of 
‘mexicanization’ explored by Downs, which, he asserts came to a head with the disputed 
1876 presidential election, were already present in the response to the Louisiana 
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 Fearing for the stability of their republic, even many Republicans committed 
to civil rights now began to see a strong man in the White House as a liability. For many 
Americans, Louisiana confirmed that the military man was unsuitable for civil affairs.  
The Revival of the Third Term Movement 1880 
The President’s use of military power to revoke a civil injustice in the Louisiana legislature in 
January 1875 led to the final demise of the third term movement for the 1876 presidential 
election. Republican conventions around the country passed resolutions against a third term 
for the President in light of his ‘usurpation’ of the democratic process in Louisiana. Grant 
took the opportunity provided by the Pennsylvania Republican Convention in May 1875 to 
renounce the suggestion of a third term in the White House. The letter, sent to the President 
of the Convention Harry White, explained Grant’s position. The President stated that he had 
‘never sought the office’ and had run for the presidency as he ‘was made to believe that the 
public good called [him] to make the sacrifice.’
131
 He continued:  
Now for the ‘third term’: I do not want it any more than I did the first. I would not 
write or utter a word to change the will of the people in expressing, and having 
their choice. The question of the number of terms allowed to any one Executive 
can only come up fairly in the shape of a proposition to amend the Constitution 
… Until such an amendment is adopted the people cannot be restricted in their 
choise [sic] by resolutions further than they are now restricted—as to age, 
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nativity, &c. … To recapitulate: I am not, nor have I been, a candidate for a re-
nomination. I would not accept a nomination if it were tendered unless it should 
come under such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty, circumstances 
not likely to arise.
132
 
The President’s letter refusing a third term was as republican in its sentiments as his letter 
accepting the first. Though he wished to make clear that he would not accept a third term, he 
was clear that the people’s will remained his compass. His subservience to their desires led 
him to concede that events might arise necessitating his retention, though he asserted that 
such an occasion seemed unlikely.
133
 The letter reaffirmed his commitment to the public good 
emphasising that his actions were directed by concerns for the republic not his own 
ambitions.
134
 This idea was apparent in a passage that stated ‘[i]t may happen in the future 
history of the country that to change an Executive because he has been eight years in office 
will prove unfortunate if not disastrous.’
135
 Grant did not believe a third term was inimical to 
the republic, but nor did he desire one. 
The Republican Party interpreted Grant’s message as his withdrawal from the Republican 
presidential race in 1876 which allowed Rutherford B. Hayes to receive the nomination. 
Grant himself supported Hayes wholeheartedly after his nomination, but remained silent 
during the convention though many suspected, without evidence, that he supported New York 
Senator Roscoe Conkling.
136
 He also did not campaign for Hayes due to his position as 
President. However, it is interesting to note that despite this the campaign was waged on the 
suggestion that Hayes’ election would merely constitute an extension of Grant’s presidency. 
Moreover, the impact of the struggle over term limits during the Grant years can be seen in 
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the campaign: Hayes announced before the election that he would not stand for a second 
term.
137
 But ironically, this opened the field for the 1880 presidential election, and the 
potential revival of the third term movement.
138
  
The 1876 election replayed the violent, disputed character of the 1874 canvass in Louisiana 
on a national scale.
139
 High levels of violence led many ‘Republican election boards’ to 
nullify ‘enough returns’ to pronounce Hayes the winner in some Southern states.
140
 In others, 
such as Louisiana and South Carolina, fraud led both parties to declare the states for their 
own candidates.
141
 This practice resulted in neither candidate winning a clear majority for 
their election.
142
 Eventually a compromise between the two parties gave Hayes the 
presidency in a ‘corrupt bargain’ which saw the Republican Party gain the executive office in 
exchange for economic aid to ‘Redeemer’ governments in the South and the end to the 
federal policing of the Reconstruction Amendments.
143
  
The situation in the Southern states changed radically with the withdrawal of the military 
from the region. Though the Republicans controlled the executive office, the removal of the 
military allowed for renewed, and unabated, violence by white Southern Democrats who 
intimidated African Americans away from the polls and led the Democratic Party to regain 
control of Congress in 1879.
144
 Once in a position of power the Democrats attempted to 
undercut the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
145
 Fortunately, the party only gained a 
slight majority in the Senate which denied them the control the Republicans had enjoyed over 
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President Andrew Johnson during Congressional Reconstruction.
146
 This meant they could 
not override President Hayes’s vetoes of their legislative attempts to undermine 
Reconstruction.
147
 However, these bills confirmed to Republican supporters how 
unreconstructed the Democrats remained. As a result many Republicans – especially in the 
South – desired a ‘strong man’ for the 1880 Republican presidential nomination who could 
rein in white supremacists.
148
 They turned once more to Grant. 
As the Democrats attempted to undo the work of Reconstruction, the former President sailed 
around the world. Soon after relinquishing the presidency, Grant had embarked on a round-
the-world trip as a private citizen touring Great Britain, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. 
Grant also visited areas of the United States he had never seen. Embraced by dignitaries 
across the world as a representative of the American nation, Grant found himself greeted as 
though he were still president or, at the very least, a highly ranked diplomat at liberty to 
speak for his nation. The New York Herald’s John Russell Young – the author of the 
Caesarism editorials of 1873 – accompanied Grant on his tour and submitted articles detailing 
his reception to the Herald for publication.
149
 Young, who had provoked the third term scare 
just four years before, emphasised the respect foreigners had for the former president, which 
stood in stark contrast to the abuse meted out to him by the American press. Young also 
recorded many frank conversations with Grant which, after consultation, he agreed to allow 
Young to publish in the Herald as well.
150
 The world trip established a completely different 
image for Grant than Americans had become accustomed: it showed a man of great intellect 
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and judgement treated as an equal by monarchs and emperors around the world. A Nebraska 
newspaper summarised the situation when it described the present given to Grant at an event 
welcoming him home. The gift had the following engraving ‘the whole country feels itself 
honored by the honor you have received from the great nations of the earth.’
151
 The tour 
helped transform Grant into the man above politics he had wanted to be. Rather than a 
conniving politician, he was now lauded as a statesman.  
The former president, Young and other reports declared, was treated with the highest regard 
by nations across the world. He received invitations from numerous dignitaries and was 
greeted by crowds wherever he travelled. In Germany, Bismarck treated Grant as a friend: 
welcoming him with outstretched hands and talking in a very open manner.
152
 As Grant 
departed, Bismarck affirmed that it had been his ‘pleasure’ and ‘honor’ to meet the former 
president.
153
 Whilst in England, Queen Victoria invited Grant to a reception at Windsor 
Castle.
154
 The King of Sweden ordered all his palaces to be opened for Grant to view in his 
leisure.
155
 The Imperial Highness of Austria provided a reception for Grant and the following 
day both families dined together.
156
 Wherever the former president went he was greeted by 
that country’s rulers, often dining and conversing with them for several hours, conferring 
respect and honour unto both Grant and the country he represented.
157
 
Though most newspapers did not endeavour to define their conception of a statesman, it was 
clear from their use of the term that it indicated a man who represented the best interests of 
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 Many newspapers now described Grant as ‘the patriot, soldier and 
statesman’.
159
 Describing him as ‘the peerless general and patriotic statesman’, these 
newspapers sought to re-instil the image of an antipartisan man to the electorate.
160
 Others 
used it in the same vicinity as ‘hero’ as did the National Republican which wrote that 
‘General Grant is a hero, a statesman, and a loyal citizen’.
161
 A statesman, in 1870s America, 
could only apply to an antipartisan figure who floated above the fray of warring factions.   
The world tour presented to Americans a much more complete picture of a man they had 
known without truly knowing. Whilst his services were engaged by the United States, 
whether as President or in the army, Grant had been guarded with his own personal opinions, 
never allowing anyone but his truest friends to know his real opinions, but as a civilian Grant 
was open and gave an enlightening insight into his thoughts on many political matters. 
Americans became acquainted with their former president now that he was a civilian. In 
particular, Grant’s refusal to meet with the Prince Imperial when in Denmark and his 
conversations on Napoleon were extremely enlightening as to his views on power and 
governance.
162
 Though he conceded that Napoleon I (to whom he had been so often – and 
malignantly – compared) ‘was a great genius’ he also acknowledged that he was ‘one of the 
most selfish and cruel men in history ... He abused France for his own ends, and brought 
incredible disasters upon his country to gratify his selfish ambition. I do not think any genius 
can excuse a crime like that.’
163
 As a result he also refused to visit his tomb.
164
 Grant 
continued to elaborate on the family stating how he believed Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte 
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(Napoleon III) ‘was worse than the first, the especial enemy of America and liberty. Think of 
the misery he brought upon France by a war which, under the circumstances, no one but a 
madman would have declared.’
165
 If anything illustrated Grant’s republicanism, it was his 
disdain for the Bonapartes. 
Grant’s new image led to a change in much of the U.S. press. During his presidency and the 
1876 presidential election, newspapers from all parties had freely denounced Grant’s 
presidency for its alleged scandals, corruption and abuse of power. Yet in the approach to the 
1880 Republican presidential convention this language was largely absent. The status 
accorded Grant outside the United States elevated him within the republic and led to a 
decrease in personal attacks upon him.
166
 Nevertheless, a minority of newspapers – mainly 
Democratic and formerly Liberal Republican papers like the New York Sun and the 
Harrisburg Patriot respectively – still recounted the old allegations of base corruption and 
imperial ambition.
167
 Yet a majority of newspapers refrained from such attacks, which 




Grant’s statesman-like reputation combined with the Democrats’ actions in power led some 
Republicans to revive the third term movement.
169
 Democratic attempts at ‘legislative 
coercion’ relied on the addition of riders to appropriation bills.
170
 A Georgia newspaper 
claimed that the Democrats’ actions represented an attempt ‘to renew the obsolete doctrine of 
State rights and to cripple the Government by withholding needed appropriations in order to 
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 Lacking a sufficient majority to overturn the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the House Democrats pursued this strategy (borrowed from the Republicans) in 
an attempt to pass legislation which would undermine the effectiveness of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.
172
 Their riders sought to forbid the placement of federal marshals at polling 
stations and to rescind the loyalty oaths necessary for jurors in the federal courts.
173
 Upon 
gaining a slight majority in the Senate in the 1878 congressional elections, Democrats were 
determined to pass their bills.
174
 But they could not override Hayes’ vetoes, and furthermore, 
their tactics united the Republican Party behind the President.
175
 Realising their mistake, the 
Democrats eventually passed the appropriation bills – albeit with a few items omitted – but 
without any riders except a clause stating that the army should not be ‘used as a police force 
at the polls’.
176
 Though their endeavours to undermine the Reconstruction Acts did not 
succeed as they hoped, the Democrats had illustrated how precarious the Reconstruction 
settlement remained, and reminded Republicans of the necessity of a strong executive to 
protect it. Democratic intransigence thus led to support for Grant’s third term. 
The attempts of the Democrats to privilege the state government over the federal government 
illustrated to many Republicans the necessity of a firm Southern policy. Hayes’ reconciliation 
policy had not succeeded in establishing a peaceful South based on equal suffrage; the 
Democrats refused to accept the Reconstruction Acts and showed their willingness to use 
underhand tactics to coerce the President to accept the superiority of the state over the federal 
government.
177
 Many Republicans looked to Grant, whose ‘strong man’ image, having 
extinguished support for a third term in 1876, now seemed appealing as 1880 approached. In 
particular, Southern Republicans desired an executive with the strength to control the 
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 Increasingly Republicans, especially Northern Republicans, recognised the 
necessity of the strong use of executive power to safeguard the gains of the Civil War and to 
ensure a fair ballot in the South. Their loss of power, coupled with Democratic attempts to 
undercut Reconstruction, led them to no longer depict Grant’s interventions in the South as 
acts of tyranny, but rather as a set of measures pursued to preserve public order and protect 
civil rights.
179
 Whilst in 1875 many Republicans endorsed Schurz’s claim which argued that 
civil rights could not be protected at the expense of the republic, in 1880, Republican state 
conventions declared their belief that the ‘Government must depend for stability upon honest 
elections; until a man is considered infamous who casts an illegal vote, our Government will 
not be safe, and whoever deprives a citizen of his right to vote, or of the legal effect of his 
vote, is a traitor’.
180
 For the Republicans, the protection of civil rights had become the 
bedrock of the republic. Many therefore pursued the re-nomination of Grant, whose actions, 
they realised, threatened the republic less than those of the Democrats.  
Though, undoubtedly, some Republicans saw Grant as a route back to power, others desired a 
firm hand in the South as they saw the nation itself under threat. Both African Americans and 
white Republicans faced murder, intimidation and disenfranchisement in the South.
181
 The 
third term support for Grant derived, as one paper put it, from the necessity of ‘a President 
who will ‘enforce practical obedience to constitutional provisions designed to secure the 
fruits of the war’; who will satisfy the South that he is ‘resolved upon doing so in a kind and 
just spirit toward them’; and who will dispose of sectional differences with a firm and steady 
hand.’
182
 One of the ‘Pennsylvania committeemen’ wrote to the New York Tribune explaining 
that his choice for the nominee ran as follows: ‘[f]irst choice, Grant; second choice, Grant; I 
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want the South to ‘tremble when I say hurrah for Grant.’’
183
 The Tribune argued that Grant’s 
supporters were ‘about equally divided in their sentiments toward the South’.
184
 One 
argument in favour of the former President’s election resided in the belief ‘that the South will 
be afraid to deprive colored men of their rights’ with Grant as President, whilst ‘the other half 
believe[d] that the South will welcome Grant as a just and kindly ruler, with an 
unimpeachable claim upon their allegiance.’
185
 The editor of the North American Review 
resided in this latter category of those whose belief in future prosperity lay in Grant’s 
republicanism and his reputation for fairness.
186
 Grant’s strength with these Republicans lay 
in both his ‘strong man’ image and his republican simplicity: a fusion of the old Democratic 
critique of Grant and the Republican defence of Grant. Even the formerly Liberal Republican 
Springfield Republican conceded that Grant’s ‘unlikeness to the average politician … [gave] 
Grant his best hold among the people.’
187
 Ironically, the qualities which led Republicans to 
oppose Grant for a third term in 1876 now built him support. 
Opponents of the third term also highlighted the reasons why many Republicans supported 
Grant’s re-election. The formerly Liberal Republican, but still anti-Grant, New York Tribune 
printed a letter from Thurlow Weed in April 1880, which claimed that ‘[s]ix months ago 
General Grant’s nomination was a ‘foregone conclusion.’’
188
 This resulted from ‘a general 
belief that the country needed him.’
189
 The basis for this desire, Weed argued, lay with the 
Copperhead element of the Democratic Party in Congress which in the fall of 1879 had 
‘become aggressive, defiant and revolutionary in methods and measures’.
190
 Weed stated that 
if this behaviour began again then ‘General Grant’s nomination would be demanded by a 
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sentiment which would secure his triumphant election.’
191
 An anti-Grant address ‘issued to 
the Massachusetts republicans’ stated that Grant’s ‘nomination is often pressed by applying 
to him the character of the ‘strong man’ who is specially needed at this time.’
192
 A 
Democratic newspaper explained that one ‘reason why Republican stalwarts want Grant is 
clearly expressed in the statement that a ‘strong man,’ a ‘great soldier,’ is wanted to fight the 
South and the Democratic party.’
193
 Where Grant’s image of a strong executive had 
previously led to warnings of oncoming tyranny among both Democrats and Republicans, 
now the trait had become a desirable quality to save the republic. Grant was no longer a 
tyrant but a ‘strong man’ capable of controlling treacherous unreconstructed Democrats.  
Grant’s supporters could now argue (much as Johnson’s had done) that the greater threat to 
republican liberty lay in the legislative rather than the executive branch. But where Johnson 
had tied this claim to an attack on civil rights, Republicans could honestly claim to be trying 
to protect black voters and their white allies in the South. Many Republicans had begun to 
view fair elections as central to the survival of the republic rather than an aspect which could 
be sacrificed to preserve the nation. The platform of the Pennsylvanian Republicans affirmed 
this sentiment.
194
 The Pennsylvanians claimed they believed in ‘the perfect security of free 
thought, free speech and a free press, and of equal rights and privileges to all men, 
everywhere, irrespective of nationality, color or religion’.
195
 They were also committed to ‘a 
free and pure ballot, thoroughly protected, so that every man entitled to cast a vote may do so 
just once at each election without fear of molestation, moral or physical, on account of his 
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political faith, nationality or the hue of his skin’.
196
 Fair representation was now necessary to 
save the republic from the threats within.  
The Pennsylvanian Convention then voted by a majority for Grant’s nomination at the 
Republican national convention in 1880 and consistently pledged 32 to 36 of Pennsylvania’s 
58 votes to Grant in the convention itself.
197
 The New York Tribune deduced that the desire 
for Grant’s election revolved around the belief that these ‘advocates of a ‘strong man’’ had 
promoted, which ‘inferred that Grant, if elected, will do something at the South, to enforce 
laws and protect human rights that no other President will desire and be able to do.’
198
 The 
Tribune acknowledged – even though it opposed a third term for Grant – that the ardour for 
Grant rested on the belief that he would ‘use the Army at the South and seat Republican 
Legislatures by United States troops, as when under his order General DeTrobriand and his 
soldiery organized the Louisiana Legislature, to be abandoned’.
199
 It signalled that a 
significant change had occurred over who imperilled the republic. Many Republicans no 
longer saw a strong executive as a threat to the republic but a necessary adhesive to 
republican government.   
One of Grant’s former attorney generals – Amos T. Akerman who had vigorously pursued 
Ku Klux Klan prosecutions – reinforced the notion that Grant would protect the South from 
unrepublican behaviour.
200
 In an interview with the Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Akerman stated 
that ‘three-fourths of the Southern Republicans would prefer Gen. Grant, and mainly for the 
reason that to him they owe the enactment and enforcement of the Ku-Klux law of 1871’.
201
 
Akerman re-affirmed the claim of the necessity of a ‘strong man’ from which Grant derived 
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much of his support – a fact which the New York Tribune begrudgingly admitted.
202
 The Ku 
Klux Klan Act, Akerman claimed, represented ‘a law which, in the words of the late Senator 
Morton, accomplished more good with less attendant evil than any other law ever passed in 
America.’
203
 It was a statement unlikely to have been uttered five years earlier after Grant’s 
interventions in Louisiana, and it illustrated how drastically the country had changed since 
the implementation of the agreement to remove troops from the South. The result of two 
years of Democratic control of Congress had led to praise for Grant’s Southern policy and a 
significant decrease in the accusations of tyranny and usurpation of power. Akerman 
continued to praise Grant, claiming that the Ku Klux Klan ‘law, as enforced by Gen. Grant, 
was a practical protection to Southern Republicans at a time when they needed protection 
against unprincipled and ferocious adversaries, and hence they gratefully remember the 
President by whom it was recommended and executed.’
204
 Five years previous this same 
newspaper, which now supported Grant’s potential third term and strong executive action in 
the South, had savaged Grant for his intervention in Louisiana in January 1875. 
The New York Tribune admitted that in ‘the southern and southern tier of western states [lay] 
Grant’s greatest popularity as a candidate.’
205
 However, despite the desire of Southern and 
Western Republicans – as well as some Northern Republicans – for Grant’s re-election, there 
were numerous Republicans who still feared the consequences of the violation of 
Washington’s two-term precedent. Several newspapers restated their belief in ‘the unwritten 
law of the Republic’, which disqualified Grant from re-election.
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Review ran a series of articles which discussed ‘the abstract question of the propriety of 
electing anybody for a third term than to the qualifications of General Grant.’
207
 The editor 
believed in ‘the indefinite reeligibility of a President, especially when he has once descended 
to his place as a private citizen and surrendered the control of the patronage’; an argument 
which found support in many quarters especially among those supportive of a third term for 
Grant.
208
 However, an article by a guest writer in the journal critiqued the desire for ‘Gen. 
Grant and Strong Government’ by asserting that it would undermine ‘a fundamental principle 
of our republican form of government’.
209
 Many Republicans supported this view and 
claimed that Washington ‘set an example which was imitated by all his successors, and has 
become a part of the unwritten law of the land as sacred as any article in the Constitution.’
210
  
The argument against Grant originated in enduring anxieties about the stability of the post-
war republic. The unstable nature of Reconstruction encouraged these anxieties which peaked 
in the aftermath of the disputed 1876 election.
211
 The recent memory of that event only 
exacerbated fears over violating one of the nation’s oldest principles. The New York Tribune 
even printed ‘a suggestion’ from ‘one of the most prominent Republicans now in 
[Philadelphia]’ in which the writer claimed to ‘favor a third term but insist[ed] that in his 
letter of acceptance General Grant must expressly decline a fourth term.’
212
 A letter to the 
Cincinnati Daily Gazette also revealed concerns over the possibility of a perpetual presidency 
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(and presumably a perpetual struggle against it).
213
 The Ohioan correspondent believed that 
the ‘time honored principle’ of the two-term precedent ensured stability in the country and 
feared its abolishment meant the establishment of ‘a permanent oligarchy or imperialism’.
214
 
The recent experiences of instability – not least in Democratic attempts to reverse the post-
war settlement – increased the reluctance of many Republicans to willingly concede what 
was regarded as a guiding principle in politics.  
Though Grant’s supporters tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade those Republicans fearful of 
violating Washington’s precedent that the republic would remain intact, they were unable to 
overcome republican concerns about another Grant administration. In their efforts to persuade 
the unconverted that a third term would not lead to monarchy, his supporters used a letter 
from Washington to the Marquis De Lafayette.
215
 In the letter Washington professed his 
opposition for the necessity to limit the number of presidential terms an incumbent could 
serve.
216
 ‘There cannot, in my judgement,’ he wrote, ‘be the least danger that the President 
will, by any practical intrigue, ever be able to continue himself one moment in office, much 
less perpetuate himself in it, but in the last stage of corrupted morals and political depravity’; 
however, Washington added that in this circumstance ‘there is as much danger that any other 
species of domination would prevail.’
217
 Here Grant’s supporters attempted to undermine one 
of the most powerful arguments against the third term by revealing the true views of the 
figurehead their opponents so often turned to undercut the third term movement. However, 
their clever ploy to appeal to ‘[e]very honest and intelligent citizen … [to] feel insulted when 
he is told there is danger to the country from a man being elected President the third time’ 
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backfired due to Washington’s own warning.
218
 Their use of his statement that the country 
would be ‘in ‘the last stage of corrupted morals and political depravity’’ inadvertently preyed 
upon republican fears that the country had already descended into this state of despotism.
219
 
Perhaps most disconcerting for the third term supporters, was the assembly of an anti-third 
term convention which took place in St Louis, Missouri. The convention not only protested 
the election of any man to a third term, but promised to hold a new meeting to oppose the 
selection of Grant if he were re-nominated.
220
 The body was assembled in ‘hostility to any 
movement tending in the least degree to the establishment of a monarchy’, indicating that 
many Republicans still equated a third term with absolutism.
221
 Their denunciation of Grant’s 
nomination did not rest solely on opposition to the third term, but also with Grant personally, 
as they wished for ‘the nomination of a candidate without a stain’.
222
 Grant, they believed, 
would once again bring ‘a dangerous tendency to personal government’ into the federal 
government, which would be detrimental to the ‘welfare and safety of the Republic.’
223
 
Though the attendees were resistant to the idea of a third term, they were clearly more 
resistant to the idea of Grant in particular, and they proposed limiting executive patronage to 
stop such a figure from rising again.
224
 Grant’s use of his patronage powers clearly still had 
the power to engender strong opposition to his potential election. 
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Such opposition put Grant supporters on the defensive at the 1880 Republican convention.
225
 
It did not help them that Grant made no attempt to actively campaign for the nomination or 
even express his desire for it. Much like the 1868 and 1872 conventions, he wished the 
nomination to come to him by the people’s choice irrespective of his desire for it. Grant had 
outlined as much in his letter rejecting the prospect of re-nomination in 1876.
226
 It was a 
statement reiterated by his friends who, as General William T. Sherman stated to Grant, 
‘contend that you have not and will not, by word or deed, indicate a wish to be the nominee 
unless the country call again for you with a uninimity [sic] which is overwhelming’.
227
 Grant 
maintained just over 300 votes throughout the 36 ballots it took to choose a candidate, and 
finished on 306 votes. The supporters of James G. Blaine and John Sherman eventually 
swung behind Garfield to thwart Grant’s supporters’ attempts to win their man a third term. 
While the reasons for this are not clear, the lingering fears of a permanent executive certainly 
played a significant role in denying Grant support. It is worth noting that when Washington’s 
precedent was finally violated during the Second World War by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
Congress quickly moved to codify the two-term precedent. After Roosevelt’s election for a 
record four terms, Congress passed the Twenty-Second Amendment which limited the 
President to two terms in 1947. As Grant had affirmed, only extraordinary circumstances 
would result in the retention of a President for an unprecedented third term. 
Though the republic survived the violation of Washington’s precedent the reaction of 
Congress indicated that even 67 years later, concerns remained about the potential of a 
widely-popular president to centralise power. It was clear that anxieties over executive 
aggrandisement still had the capacity to shape national politics. The destabilising effect of the 
Democratic challenge to the Reconstruction settlement and Grant’s successful world tour left 
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many Republicans grasping for the strong statesman in 1880. But while some Republicans 
desired further extensions of executive power to save the nation, others believed that such 
actions threatened the nation.  
Conclusion 
It was ironic that the very reason which formed the backbone of opposition to Grant’s third 
term in 1876 came to engender support for a third term for Grant in 1880. The irony was not 
lost on Grant.
228
 The silent man denounced as a tyrant and a usurper of power in the last two 
years of his presidency announced ‘surprise’ at the support he garnered in the run up to the 
1880 Republican national convention.
229
 States which had denounced the principle of a third 
term out of respect for the ‘unwritten law of the republic’ upended their 1876 resolutions and 
pledged delegates to the former President in 1880.
230
 Although many opponents of a third 
term still existed – some on principle, others due to the candidate – the attitude of the 
opposition had changed significantly. Former charges of usurpation and despotism were 
mostly abandoned which led a majority of the Republican opposition to focus on the principle 
of the third presidential term. Charges of tyranny and despotism still existed but they related, 
in the main, to the third term itself rather than Grant’s administrations in particular. Many of 
Grant’s erstwhile opponents now valued his republican simplicity.  
Yet this acceptance came too late. The accusations of tyranny by an influential majority of 
the Republican Party drastically reduced the political capital of President Grant during the 
last two years of his presidency.
231
 The opposition of the Republican Party to their 
President’s attempts to protect and enforce civil rights in the South contributed significantly 
to the downfall of Reconstruction. The condemnations of federal enforcement of the 
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Reconstruction Acts in Southern states – especially the reaction to federal intervention in the 
Louisiana state legislature in 1875 – amounted to the abandonment of the Republican South. 
The refusal of Republicans to acknowledge the violations of law in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Arkansas led them to interpret Grant’s actions in republican terms as the usurpation of 
power. It also led to a willingness to remove troops placed in the South in exchange for the 
presidency in 1876.
232
 This completed the acquiescence to the violation of the civil rights of 
Southern Republicans. Their denunciations had formed a powerful deterrent for future 
attempts to protect the civil rights of Southern Republicans. However, in the face of 
Democratic intransigence, many Republicans realised the necessity of federal intervention in 
the South to protect the gains of Reconstruction. 
The tendency of Reconstruction historians to overlook the continuing resonance of 
republicanism in this era has hampered our understanding of Reconstruction’s downfall. 
Republicanism played a crucial role in Republicans’ conceptions of the acceptable limits of 
power. Louisiana – and the subsequent opposition to a third term which flowed from it – 
forms a prime example of this tendency to view the more extreme attempts to protect and 
enforce African-American civil rights in terms of encroachment upon the rights of ‘self-
government’ in the states. Grant’s attempts to protect African-American civil rights began to 
appear tyrannical even to his supporters in the wake of the Louisiana incident in January 
1875. Even when Republicans accepted that the Democrats had effected a coup d’état, they 
still believed that the use of federal troops to reverse the coup went against the principles of 
the nation. Although they did not accept the Democratic doctrine of states’ rights in its 
strictest terms, these Republicans interpreted the use of the military to restore democracy in 
the Louisiana legislature as a threat to the existence of the republic. In this climate, Grant 
                                                 
232
 Holt, By One Vote, pp. 175-184. 
322 
 
faced an impossible task to protect and enforce the former slaves’ civil rights from 
unscrupulous Southern Democrats. 
Only after a new, more threatening, form of tyranny occurred in the shape of Democratic 
congressional coercion to reverse the gains of Reconstruction in 1879 did white Republicans 
clamour for the strong president whose dedication to the laws of the United States became so 
plain during the Louisiana crisis that one of the most ardent Radicals announced ‘give him 
your sympathy.’
233
 It took a flagrant attempt by the Democrats to reverse the settlement of 
Reconstruction before the Republicans realised the necessity of the force which Grant had 
used to enforce Reconstruction in the South in 1875. Until this point, the necessity of 
guarding the liberties of the republic led many Republicans to oppose Grant’s use of 
executive power. Fears of a phantom tyrant in the White House weakened the President’s 
ability to use military force against the very real tyranny of the White Leagues and other 
white Democratic militias in the South. Yet republicanism was malleable enough in 1879 to 
raise the prospect that the ‘strong man’ might return to office. The supposed tyrant became, 
to some at least, the saviour. Republican fears, however, remained over electing a president 
for a third term and led to substantial opposition to Grant’s re-nomination. The exaggerated 
fears evident in the opposition to the third term could not be overcome.
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Few Americans living in the nineteenth century could have anticipated the downfall of the 
reputation of Ulysses S. Grant in the twentieth century. Despite often being called the most 
popular nineteenth-century American, Grant’s presidency was largely portrayed as a failure.
1
 
To one set of twentieth-century historians he destroyed Reconstruction through his 
overzealous support for African-American civil rights, while a later generation claimed he 
was a weak president who abandoned the former slaves. But Grant’s historiography has made 
great strides since these assessments as many historians such as Brooks D. Simpson, John Y. 
Simon, and lawyer Frank J. Scaturro have sought to show that Grant did care for African-
Americans and their plight. Their work has attempted to restore both Grant’s humanity and 
his dedication to Reconstruction to the record by illustrating both his compassion and his 
political acumen both in the army and in political office. By presenting a man more 
committed to Reconstruction than has been previously acknowledged, they have elevated 
Grant’s image.  
Yet recent works on Reconstruction still persist in presenting Grant’s presidency in its old 
guises, which raises questions over the resilience of the older evaluations compared to newer 
assessments. Part of the reason for this is the lack of an in-depth scholarly analysis by a 
historian – excluding biographies – of Grant’s presidency which has allowed the influence of 
older works to dominate the historiography. But it also suggests that for all Grant’s good 
intentions there were other forces at work which have been overlooked by scholars of 
Reconstruction. As such work still remains to be done to understand more fully why 
Reconstruction failed and why Grant’s presidency is still held in such low repute. One 
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possible solution, this thesis suggests, is to look at the interactions between federal power and 
the dominant political culture of the era: republicanism.  
By looking at the language and culture through which Americans understood their politics, 
my research has shown that many Americans interpreted Grant’s actions through long-
standing fears such as the centralisation of power, the stability of the republic, and the 
dangers of a large standing army, which led them to judge interventionist efforts on the behalf 
of African-Americans’ civil rights more harshly. The republican political culture of the 
nineteenth century, which informed many Americans’ perceptions of power during the 
Reconstruction era, has often been ignored in studies of Grant’s presidency, even though 
historians have begun to acknowledge the presence of many republican fears and ideas during 
Reconstruction. This is understandable as it is difficult to discern whether Americans using 
this language believed in the ideals of republicanism or used it simply to gain political 
ground.  
Yet the longevity of the language of republicanism suggests it remained part of the political 
landscape and a powerful aid to obtaining power whether or not those using it intended to act 
for a singular public good. This was the language which many Americans chose to use to 
disseminate their politics in the nineteenth century which gives it value because it was how 
many Americans understood their politics. Whether or not the ideology was used as simply 
rhetoric becomes less important than the impact that rhetoric had upon power and the public’s 
perception of it. This was precisely the difficult line Grant walked in engaging with 
republicanism. Neither his supporters nor his opponents knew whether Grant was a true 
republican or a tyrant-in-waiting positioning himself to destroy the republic. It is a line that 
becomes discernible by looking at private papers to see whether public pronouncements 
match private statements. But many of Grant’s supporters and all of his opponents did not 
have this privileged access to Grant’s inner mind and thus allowed their own political 
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insecurities and anxieties – derived from their political language and culture – to define how 
they interpreted Grant’s actions both for themselves and for others. 
Republicanism, whether used as an ideology or a discourse, played a crucial role in defining 
the parameters of the possible during Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency, and thus what he could 
achieve for African-Americans during Reconstruction. When his supporters could draw on 
the positive elements of republicanism – antipartisanship, self-sacrifice, patriotism, and 
honour – and portray Grant as a model republican, they could provide him with enough 
political capital to employ extraordinary means to enforce African-American civil rights and 
the Reconstruction settlement. However, when his critics succeeded in drawing on the 
negative elements of republicanism – fears of centralised power, anxieties over a large 
standing army, and suspicions about the federal intervention in state politics – they could 
portray Grant as a tyrant-in-waiting who, given the chance, would destroy the republic in 
favour of his own partisan aims, such as African-American suffrage. When this image gained 
credence it gnawed away at Grant’s ability to enforce Reconstruction. These two sides of the 
republican political culture fought for control over Grant’s image, his political capital, and 
ultimately, Reconstruction. 
The first chapter explored how the 1868 presidential election, with its high political stakes, 
was fought upon a battlefield of republican tropes which focused, in large part, on the 
Republican candidate. It highlights how many Americans interpreted Reconstruction through 
a republican political culture which sought to stress the importance of republican qualities – 
antipartisanship, manly self-restraint, self-sacrifice, and honour – in politics alongside 
policies. It shows that evaluations of the election need to take into account the continuing use 
of republican ideas to both win elections and validate Reconstruction. The election, in many 
ways, set the terms which would define the rest of Grant’s presidency; the double-edged 
sword of republicanism was first showcased during this election. This chapter also suggests 
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that scholars need to consider Grant’s own political education for explanations of his own 
actions during both the election and his presidency. In this respect it builds upon work 
completed by Brooks D. Simpson in highlighting Grant’s distaste for partisanship in politics. 
It also builds on work by Adam I. P. Smith which shows how Americans during the Civil 
War used partisan antipartisanship to win elections by removing partisan issues and focusing 
on proving dedication and loyalty to the Union which a candidate like Grant could do ably. 
Though the election has justly been seen as a referendum on Reconstruction by most 
historians, it was also a referendum on Grant’s own character and how he would govern the 
nation. His refusal to express his political views resulted in a focus on his past deeds, in 
particular his military career, which led the campaign to focus heavily on his character. In 
this respect, the election represented Grant’s attempt to redefine the presidency by removing 
the discussion of partisan policies from the canvass and instead forcing both parties to focus 
on the republican purity of the candidates. While the Democratic Party charged that Grant 
lacked the requisite republican traits for power – especially manly self-restraint – and would 
inaugurate despotism in the United States, the Republicans countered that the General 
epitomised the model republican through his patriotic duty to the nation, his sacrifices, sense 
of justice to all, and his antipartisanship. The election showed that the mantra of partisan 
antipartisanship could still yield dividends in this unstable era; the party which espoused 
republican traits, hid their partisanship, and produced a convincing antipartisan candidate 
won the election. In this respect, the 1868 presidential election illustrated the continuing 
power of republicanism to shape the way politics was fought in the Reconstruction era. 
The second chapter explored the rise of the one term principle during Grant’s first 
administration, illustrating how the battles over power between the executive and legislative 
branches led to suspicions over Grant’s intentions which resulted in calls for civil service 
reform to restrict the executive’s independence. It builds upon assessments of Grant’s 
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reformist tendencies in office, especially with regard to his cabinet appointments, which have 
been acknowledged by historian John A. Carpenter and lawyer Frank J. Scaturro. As well as 
applying Grant’s antipartisanship, acknowledged by Simpson, to his actions in office. The 
chapter shows that Grant’s appointments stemmed from a calculated move at redefining the 
presidency rather than political naivety as most historians tend to claim. This attempt at 
moulding the presidency in his republican vision would have significant consequences for his 
legislative endeavours and later attempts to protect Reconstruction as it necessitated 
independence from the legislature which was interpreted as the aggrandisement of power in 
the executive office by many in his party. Republican fears of power, which persisted despite 
Andrew Johnson’s near-conviction on impeachment charges, therefore need to be taken into 
account when assessing battles over power during Grant’s first term. While many historians 
acknowledge Grant’s commitment to Reconstruction, they fail to acknowledge the 
continuation of the conflicts which derailed Johnson’s presidency. At a time when the limits 
of presidential power remained undefined, and the stability of the republic was still uncertain, 
the White House’s course fostered genuine republican fears over Grant’s intentions in power. 
This led many Republicans to concede that corruption had informed Grant’s patronage 
appointments, which explained his reluctance to consult congressmen, just as Johnson had 
attempted to use his patronage to create a party which would re-elect him in 1868. This led to 
attempts to curtail Grant’s power through civil service reform, which though ultimately 
unsuccessful, decreased his political capital and thus his ability to protect Reconstruction in 
the long-term. 
The third chapter, which focuses on a series of New York Herald editorials named 
‘Caesarism’ and published in July 1873, highlighted how widespread fears of the misuse of 
presidential power remained and in particular, suspicions over the ability of the President to 
use his patronage to achieve corrupt ends. It builds on fears over the fragility of the nation 
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explored by Gregory P. Downs, Andrew Heath, and Mark W. Summers, who have all looked 
at instances during Reconstruction where fears of power led many Americans to believe the 
nation was in danger of disintegrating. However, the only historian to explore this incident – 
Summers – concluded that it was a hoax intended to increase sales in the dry news season, yet 
the reaction of the press to the articles exposed deep-seated fears over presidential power, 
especially the centralisation of power which was necessary to enforce Reconstruction. From 
concerns over corruption, such as the Salary Grab Act, to anxieties over the President’s 
interference in state elections, such as in Louisiana, the articles shed light on how even 
supporters of Grant held grave concerns about the newly emboldened presidential office 
whose boundaries remained uncertain. The Herald suggested that the enormous power of the 
President – which it argued had always existed but under Reconstruction had been greatly 
expanded – would allow him to secure a third term, possibly through dishonourable means. 
The solution, the author suggested, was the one term principle Sumner had championed the 
previous year. The response to the editorials showed just how extensive anxieties regarding 
federal power during Reconstruction were and how Grant’s efforts to protect the settlement 
could rebound on him as proof of his corruption.  
It highlighted just how carefully the President had to tread when enforcing Reconstruction: 
excessive use of power could easily be interpreted as the actions of a tyrant. By focusing on 
areas of long concern in republics – patronage, a standing army, and a strong popular 
president – the editorials heightened fears of the potential of the President to abuse his power 
in the name of securing a third term, or even perpetual power. The articles resulted in myriad 
concerns over federal power coming to light which, like the one term principle, focused on 
the ills to the republic of a strong president. In particular, the support of a few influential 
Republican newspapers for Grant’s hypothetical third term led to increased fears that the 
Republican government had been corrupted. This resulted in increased scrutiny on the 
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President’s use of power for fear, that if left unchecked, he would use his power to impose 
despotism on the republic. The articles illustrated that great concerns remained over 
majoritarian government, a point which Harper’s Weekly highlighted, and that in the debate 
over democracy versus republicanism, the latter still held its own. In this respect, the articles, 
by heightening fears over Grant’s power, ensured influential opinion-makers would remain 
vigilant in watching for acts of supposed executive usurpation which would endanger 
Reconstruction. 
The fourth chapter examined the reaction to Grant’s veto of the 1874 inflation bill which 
sought to increase the number of greenbacks in circulation without allowing for specie 
resumption. The President’s veto of a party measure on a nationally significant bill illustrated 
how Grant was neither controlled by the Republican Party nor an inept decision-maker as it 
was heralded as one of the most politically adroit decisions of his administration. This 
contrasts sharply with most historians’ views that the veto was both politically and 
economically detrimental to the country, and showed Grant’s lack of fitness for office. While 
several historians have suggested Grant’s veto was driven by selfish interest, my research has 
shown that even Grant’s opponents felt it was motivated by his republicanism. Furthermore, 
my work has also shown that there was considerable support amongst both Southerners and 
Westerners to the veto which contrasts with existing scholarship which has tended to see both 
regions as strongly opposed to it. Grant’s veto of the inflation bill was far more popular than 
has been previously recognised.  
Celebrations of the veto highlighted how the republican values of antipartisanship, honour 
and the public good remained foremost in the minds of many Americans who believed the 
President had, once again, illustrated his republican simplicity by saving the nation’s credit 
from dishonour. To pay creditors in deflated currency, they charged, would be dishonourable 
and would detract from the sacrifices made by many Americans in fighting the Civil War, 
331 
 
especially those who lost their lives. In this respect, the chapter shows how important honour 
remained for many Americans even in politics. But the response also demonstrated how 
Grant’s actions – so often made independently of his party – could be seen as the 
aggrandisement of power. His opponents, who now included former loyal supporters angry 
over his veto, charged that his action represented tyranny. The response from both sides 
illustrated how political economy had become enmeshed with political culture, in this case 
republicanism. Much of the debate focused less on whether the bill would help the United 
States’ economy and more on whether the President held the prerogative to veto such a 
measure. His supporters held that his veto had saved the country from ruin and thus had 
enacted the public good regardless of party wishes whilst his critics charged that he had 
usurped congressional power. These debates over power – far removed from the racially-
charged arena of Reconstruction – indicated that many Americans still held serious concerns 
over the reach of executive power, which had been exacerbated by interventions in Southern 
states, accusations of ‘Caesarism’, and the supposed abuse of patronage powers. The bill also 
demonstrated how Grant’s use of executive power in the pursuit of the public good had the 
ability to undercut his power to enforce Reconstruction by giving his actions the appearance 
of tyranny and by losing him supporters who would defend his actions. 
The fifth chapter, by exploring the attempts to secure a third term for Grant in both the 1876 
and 1880 elections, illustrates how Grant’s vigorous attempts to protect the rights of African-
Americans led to accusations of presidential tyranny which worked in 1876 to deny Grant a 
third term but paradoxically drummed up support for it in the 1880 election. This situation 
highlights how evaluations of the retreat from Reconstruction need to consider the role of 
republicanism which adjudicated on the acceptable limits of power. Most studies on the 
downfall of Reconstruction tend to claim that economic issues and corruption distracted 
attention from the South which allowed the Democrats to reclaim power; others suggest that 
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the fault lay in Grant’s lack of commitment to protecting African-Americans and the absence 
of a coherent Southern policy. This chapter, however, builds on works by Andrew Slap and 
Downs. The former claims that republican beliefs regarding power – in this case the Liberal 
Republicans – led to the abandonment of Reconstruction for fear it would endanger the 
republic, while the latter highlights that longstanding anxieties over power, such as a large 
standing army and a large debt, which result in policy decisions which cripple the ability of 
the federal government to enforce Reconstruction policies. Both works highlight that fears 
and ideas – whether or not republican – undermined Reconstruction, which this chapter also 
claims by focusing on republicanism’s power to define the parameters of power.  
In this sense, republicanism could both detract from efforts to entrench Reconstruction, as in 
1876, and provide power for it, as it attempted in 1880. Fears of the centralisation of power – 
both real, as in the forcible removal of unelected members of the Louisiana legislature by 
federal troops in January 1875, and imagined, as in the Caesarism scare – forestalled attempts 
both to protect the gains of Reconstruction and to provide Grant with a third term in 1876. 
Many Republicans began to fear that Grant’s actions to protect universal male suffrage would 
endanger the stability of the republic for all by enabling the rise of a tyrant. As such they 
began to oppose strong executive action on behalf of civil rights as they feared it would 
endanger their own liberties. However, their belief that they were saving the republic by 
opposing a strong executive would be burst by the actions of the Democrats when they won a 
majority in the House of Representatives and proceeded to coerce the President to undermine 
Reconstruction. These underhand methods, combined with the elevation of Grant’s stature 
from his world tour, led to renewed support for a strong executive, which Republicans began 
to see as the saviour of the republic rather than its destroyer. Yet the potency of 
republicanism to define the parameters of the possible in politics would be shown in the 
failure of Republicans to nominate Grant for a third term. The republican fears of power that 
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contributed to the downfall of Reconstruction would be the undoing of the attempts to 
nominate Grant for an unprecedented third term too. 
My thesis contends that republicanism continued to play a vital role in American politics 
during Reconstruction as many Americans interpreted political events through its lens. 
Though the position of republicanism in late nineteenth-century historiography is still fiercely 
debated, there have been an increasing number of works which suggest it had relevance in 
both culture and language in influencing politics in this era. Longstanding fears over the 
centralisation of power, a large standing army, a large debt, and federal interventions in state 
politics, which republican ideas of power fostered worked to undermine Reconstruction. The 
instability of the Reconstruction period created great anxiety over the security of the republic 
which made vigorous executive action seem tyrannical at times. As the President lost 
supporters his actions became less defensible in republican terms which increased fears he 
would pursue unrepublican actions which in turn reduced his political capital and undermined 
his ability to protect Reconstruction. My research suggests that the relationship between 
republicanism and executive power during Reconstruction is crucial to understanding why 
President Grant was unable to pursue more vigorous actions to protect Reconstruction’s 
longevity.  
* 
As my thesis has shown, by exploring Grant’s presidency primarily through the lens of the 
press a very different image emerges of his administration and the demise of Reconstruction. 
The press exposes an era enmeshed in republicanism; one where actions to defend civil rights 
are defined by perceptions of executive power, not just racism and economic ideologies. It 
illuminated widespread and entrenched fears of power which, when confronted by 
unprecedented governmental actions, could stymie reform. Caesarism, in particular, was an 
334 
 
example of how journals highlighted extensive fears that existed over patronage and the 
power of the president which later impeded efforts to enforce Reconstruction by cultivating 
fears over the safety of the republic. Furthermore, newspapers helped to illustrate the 
continuing resonance of many aspects of republicanism, such as antipartisanship, honour, and 
fears over the instability of the nation which have often been overlooked in this era. 
Newspapers illustrated the desire for antipartisanship in politics when they showed that 
Grant’s cabinet choices were commended by the public, but condemned by many party 
politicians; the salience of honour can be seen in how Grant’s veto of the inflation bill was 
considered the greatest achievement of his presidency rather than the unwise, selfish action 
portrayed by scholars; and his vigorous efforts to protect the civil rights of the former slaves 
provoked allegations of tyranny from his own party which denied Grant crucial political 
capital to enforce Reconstruction. The press has shown a far more politically astute and 
committed President than the personal papers of Grant’s political opponents have revealed. 
Though as a source it must be used with caution, the press can be invaluable in giving a 
window into popular perceptions held at the time on contemporary events.
2
  
Republicanism helped shape many Americans’ perceptions of the acceptable use of 
government power in the nineteenth century. The ideology played a central role in crafting 
Grant’s image throughout his career in the public arena. The idea itself was malleable – the 
pursuit of the public good is difficult to define – and could also be contradictory as seen with 
the way it produced two images of Grant from the same actions. But despite its fluidity, many 
Americans clung to its ideals as a guiding principle especially when the nation’s stability was 
threatened. It also developed throughout Grant’s presidency as a result of his actions. For 
example, during his presidency the strong use of executive power was seen as a violation of 
the public good, yet by 1880 it was seen as a necessary corrective to other forces which 
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threatened the stability of the republic. Grant too came to concede that the common good 
required engaging in somewhat unrepublican practises such as using patronage to build 
coalitions of friendly supporters who would help direct his legislative endeavours through 
Congress. But despite his clashes with Congress over his republican conception of power, 
republicanism remained a guiding force both in Grant’s decisions and the way those 
decisions were interpreted throughout his presidency. 
Yet it is interesting to note that despite the tensions with Congress caused by Grant’s efforts 
to redefine the presidency in his republican vision, his successor, Rutherford B. Hayes, 
followed Grant’s example in selecting his cabinet appointments independently; however, he 
did consult with other Republicans.
3
 Hayes also did not exclude the leading lights of the party 
from his cabinet, but nor did he discuss patronage appointments with many of the party 
managers or his nominees.
4
 Hayes’ successor, James Garfield, did not have the privilege of 
independence, having won the nomination primarily through the determination of anti-Grant 
forces to deprive the former president of a third term.
5
 Tragically for Garfield, the perils of 
patronage would hit him with full force. His assassination by an office seeker resulted in a 
civil service reform measure – one very similar to Thomas A. Jenckes’ original proposal 
which Grant had backed in principle – passing Congress.
6
 Though Garfield was not in the 
privileged position of Grant – who with two unanimous nominations and nationwide 
popularity could act in a manner aloof from his party – his murder highlighted the 
treacherous situation presidents encountered when allocating patronage. Grant, it seems, had 
been politically astute in breaking with conventional wisdom on patronage appointments. 
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However, Grant’s refusal to follow the accepted practices of the presidential office has not 
generally been seen as the mark of a strong president. Often historians, and political 
scientists, have viewed Grant’s actions in office as the sign of an inexperienced and 
incompetent chief executive. Not only does this illustrate how the understanding of a 
presidency, when removed from its unique political culture, can become distorted but it also 
indicates the problems of comparing presidents in the quest of determining the value of an 
administration and in seeking out strong executives. Political scientists, in particular, have a 
tendency to expunge political culture from presidential studies. Though they appreciate the 
institutional changes of the office, they often do not appreciate the ideological context. 
Yet some aspects of republicanism can still be found within twentieth and twenty-first 
century American politics. The language of republicanism, especially professions of self-
sacrifice and antipartyism, still linger in attempts to portray presidential nominees as virtuous 
citizens. Perhaps the president who can claim the most similarity to Grant was Jimmy Carter, 
who has been read in an antebellum republican tradition.
7
 Some of the qualities which helped 
him win the presidency resonated with Grant’s appeal in 1868, such as his inexperience and 
‘his disdain’ for Washington’s party politics.
8
 Carter tried to present himself in an antiparty 
vein during the election and once elected continued this trend by appointing some nationally 
important figures to patronage positions over party politicians.
9
 However, Carter damaged his 
image as the ‘anti-politician’ when he broke a campaign pledge to not raise taxes; a situation 
not too dissimilar from the one which Grant faced, in 1874, when he was forced to decide 
whether to sign a bill into law which would break his financial promises to the nation. Unlike 
Carter, Grant considered such an action dishonourable and the bill detrimental to the 
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8
 Ibid., p. 75. 
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 Though, in appearance, Carter bore much resemblance to 
Grant’s presidency, where they differed was their commitment to the image of a republican 
president. Ultimately Grant, who sacrificed a third term to protect African-American civil 
rights, could claim more ably than Carter to have followed an antebellum republican 
tradition. 
But perhaps where republicanism has persisted most is in the exaggerated fears that emanated 
from the republican call to strenuously guard liberty, which have repeatedly risen in politics 
and influenced the trajectory of history. Most significantly, these worries have helped hinder 
progressive change within the country. In the twenty-first century suspicions of power and 
conspiracy theories have abounded throughout the presidency of Barack Obama. Many 
Americans have warned that Obama’s attempts to provide universal healthcare represented 
the inauguration of socialism in the U.S. which would undermine democratic rights.
11
 Some 
of his opponents, especially the right-wing Tea Party faction of the Republican Party, 
frequently make outrageous claims. In particular, they have accused Obama of being born 
outside of the country which would render him ineligible for the presidency.
12
 However, the 
allegation which resonates most with Grant’s presidency is the assertion that Obama’s 
policies represent an attempt to force a monarchy, or at least a third term, on the American 
electorate.
13
 Magazine articles entitled ‘Obama is Not a Monarch’ attest to the widespread 
existence of such claims and the Democrats’ perceived necessity to refute them.
14
 Saliently, 
suggestions that the election of Hilary Clinton – Obama’s former Secretary of State – to the 
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presidency in 2016 would merely constitute a third term for Obama highlights how the fears 
John Russell Young gave voice to in his Caesarism editorials in the New York Herald over 
the power former presidents can wield on future politics still resonates in American politics 
over 140 years later.
15
 While the rest of the world has admired the United States’ ability to 
bind a heterogeneous nation together, Americans seem obsessed with discovering attempts to 
render the country asunder. These examples suggest that elements of republicanism still 
reverberate throughout American politics. 
Many of the problems faced by Grant during his presidency still exist in various guises in 
American society today and prove powerful forces in restraining the president’s use of 
executive power. Suspicions of both federal and presidential power still hamper attempts to 
create an egalitarian society in the United States. Though little of the republican vision which 
guided Grant’s attempts to reinvent the executive office can be seen in the position today, the 
forces which negatively shaped the office and often defined his presidency are still present. 
Fears of tyranny, a lack of self-restraint, and the dangers of too much accumulated power in 
one man are all still features of American politics. In particular, their potency can most 
poignantly be found in the reluctance of many presidents to use the military to protect the 
gains of Reconstruction; it would be over 70 years before a president replicated Grant’s 
actions in support of African-American civil rights.
16
 The very ideology which encouraged 
Americans to rebel against British tyranny in the eighteenth century has, ironically, stymied 
efforts ever since to create an equal society in the United States. 
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